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If suicide be supposed a crime, 'tis only cowardice can impel us to it. If it be no crime, 
both prudence and courage should engage us to rid ourselves at once of existence, 
when it becomes a burden. 'Tis the only way, that we can then be useful to society, by 
setting an example, which, if imitated, would preserve to everyone his chance for 
happiness in life, and would effectually free him from all danger of misery.  
  
~ David Hume (1757) 
 
 
 
Padre Francisco:    Freedom without a life is not freedom. 
  
Ramón Sampedro:     A life without freedom is not a life.    
 
~ The Sea Inside (2004) 
  
 
 
Mirri Maz Duur:   So, tell me again exactly what it was that you saved? 
 
Daenerys Targaryen:     Your life! 
 
Mirri Maz Duur:  Why don't you take a look at your Khal? Then you will 
see exactly what life is worth, when all the rest has 
gone.  
 
~ Game of Thrones, Season 1, Episode 10: Fire and Blood (2011)  
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ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis I explore the issue of voluntary assisted suicide in a South African 
constitutional context through the tri-coloured normative prism of autonomy, dignity 
and human well-being. I will focus on the way South Africa, as a secular society, ought 
to engage with this highly emotive issue in light of the socio-legal framework in which 
we are embedded and which framework carries with it profound normative 
implications.  
  
I divide the discussion into two broad sections. In the first section I articulate, from an 
ethical standpoint, what I take to be the strongest positive case for South African 
society to permit voluntary assisted suicide. I argue that by permitting voluntary 
assisted suicide South African society would be giving proper expression to (i) 
individual autonomy (ii) human dignity, and (iii) human well-being. 
 
In articulating the positive case I also analyse the triumvirate concepts of individual 
autonomy, dignity and human well-being as well as their relationship to each other. I 
argue that individual autonomy is an essential component of a good human life, that is 
to say, a worthwhile life and that to speak of a dignified life is, in turn, to speak of the 
sort of life that is worthy of respect, reverence and honour. 
 
I then turn to an examination of two of the principal ethical arguments against the 
moral permissibility of voluntary assisted suicide in the literature, namely (i) the 
Sanctity of Life Argument, and (ii) the Social Harm Argument.  
  
iv 
I argue that neither argument is sufficiently persuasive to rebut the positive case in 
favour of voluntary assisted suicide. However, certain critical considerations are raised 
that do speak to the need for effective oversight and regulation of such a practice in 
South African society.  
 
Accordingly, I advance the view that, in light of the failure of these two principal 
arguments (and in the absence of any stronger arguments) voluntary assisted suicide 
ought to be permitted in South Africa subject to uniform, public and specifiable 
oversight criteria applicable to each individual who wishes to end his life with the 
assistance of another. 
 
In the second section, I describe the South African legal standpoint on voluntary 
assisted suicide in light of (i) the normative underpinnings of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (and in particular the Bill of Rights) and (ii) the present 
legal status of voluntary assisted suicide, taking into account both the common law and 
the South African Law Commission Report on Euthanasia and Artificial Preservation of 
Life, 1998.  
 
This analysis involves an examination of (i) the recent decision of Stransham-Ford v 
Minister of Justice and Correctional Services & Others1 handed down on 4 May 2015 in 
which the North Gauteng High Court granted, for the first time in South African legal 
history, an application allowing a terminally ill man the right to die and to be actively 
                                        
1 2015 (4) SA (GP) 50. 
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assisted to do so by a consenting physician; as well as (ii) the subsequent Supreme Court 
of Appeal decision in The Minister of Justice and Correctional Services & Others v Estate 
Late Stransham Ford2 that overturned the original decision. 
 
I argue that the best way to understand the socio-legal framework in which we find 
ourselves is as a social contract that ‘instantiates’ or ‘gives expression to’ a rights-based 
ethic, which in turn protects vital human interests. I argue further that this 
constitutional legal framework is capable of tracking and incorporating the positive 
ethical case for voluntary assisted suicide admirably.  
  
Finally, I posit that the quickest and most effective way to implement a permissive policy 
for voluntary assisted suicide is through the development of the common law. In the 
process, I tentatively suggest what appropriate safeguards and oversight of voluntary 
assisted suicide might look like, the practical implementation of which would allow 
South African society – specifically through the judicial branch of government - to more 
sagaciously and compassionately judge lives.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
2 2016 ZASCA 197 (6 December 2016). 
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1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS  
 
Elysian Fields: A Thanatological Taxonomy 
 
US    Unassisted Suicide 
AS    Assisted Suicide 
VAS    Voluntary Assisted Suicide 
DVAS    Direct Voluntary Assisted Suicide 
INVAS   Indirect Voluntary Assisted Suicide 
NPAS    Non-Physician Assisted Suicide 
PAS    Physician-Assisted Suicide 
NVAD    Non-Voluntary Assisted Death 
IVAD    Involuntary Assisted Death 
 
The Ethical Standpoint 
 
SLA    Sanctity of Life Argument 
SHA    Social Harm Argument 
NCT    Neutral Container Theory 
VCT    Valuable Container Theory 
DIC    Doctrine of Informed Consent
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2. INTRODUCTION 
 
Human beings find themselves in a strange predicament. We are each catapulted into 
existence3 seemingly out of nothing only to learn, all too quickly, that we are on a 
conveyor belt leading ineluctably toward an abyss that awaits insidiously ahead of us. 
Nabokov, viewed this predicament sub specie aeternitatis4 when he wrote ‘our existence 
is but a brief crack of light between two eternities of darkness’ (1966 [2000], p.5). And 
so, temporally sandwiched between the immense void behind us and the yawning abyss 
in front of us, we discover ourselves passengers on a rock hurtling around a gargantuan 
ball of fire as a result of gravity and angular momentum. It is on this cosmic carousel 
that human beings make, experience and discover their lives.5  
 
Good philosophy begins with good questions and so it is only natural, faced with such 
a preposterous predicament, that questions about how we ought to live begin to surface. 
Questions about how we ought to live inevitably lead to other questions about life’s 
antithesis. What is death? Should we fear it? Can there be good ways to die? Is it always 
a bad thing for us to die when we do? Such questions, once posed, seem only to beget 
further questions like an interrogative hydra.  
 
                                        
3 Heidegger described this as the state of the human individual ‘being thrown into the world’ (Dahlstrom, 
2013, p.212). 
4 From the perspective of the eternal. 
5 I am reminded of the wonderfully poignant words of Geertz that ‘man is an animal suspended in webs 
of significance he himself has spun’ (1973, p.5). 
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After all, what do we value in human life? Is it simple existence or is it something more? 
If we conclude that we value ‘something more’ how precisely should we characterize 
that ‘something more’? Why are we so concerned when people take their own lives or 
express desires for others to assist them to take their own lives? Ought we, as a society, 
to permit human beings to take their own lives and for others to assist them to do so? 
How ought we to judge, in moral terms, both those who desire the plunge into the abyss 
as well as those who throw them in on request? Ronald Dworkin, in considering these 
sorts of moral questions, writes: 
 
We cannot think intelligently about the legal and political issues – about who should 
make what choices, what constitutions should permit, and what nations and states 
should do – unless we have a better shared understanding, not necessarily about the 
meaning of death but at least about what kind of question we are asking. How should 
we think about when and how to die? (1994, p.182) 
 
In this thesis I explore some of these challenging questions, particularly as they relate 
to those of us living in a fledgling constitutional democracy grappling with the emotive 
issue of voluntary assisted suicide.  
 
3. MAJOR PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
 
However, it is first necessary to adumbrate four philosophical positions I shall assume. 
While not being the focus of this thesis, these assumptions are necessary to articulate 
explicitly at the outset insofar as they both inform, ground and contextualise my 
approach to the aforegoing questions. It is important for readers to understand the 
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worldview that I endorse and which colours my approach to philosophical questions in 
general and ethical questions specifically.  
 
The first is a broad metaphysical position about reality taken as a whole (Metaphysical 
Naturalism). The second is a broad position about the appropriate approach and 
attitude to ethics (Humanism). The third is a broad politico-legal position 
(Secularism). The fourth is a narrower metaphysical position specifically related to the 
concept of free will (Compatibilism).6 
 
3.1. METAPHYSICAL NATURALISM7 
 
The broad metaphysical position8 I shall adopt for the purpose of this thesis is 
principally an ontological stance.9 I shall take it, without further argument, that the 
universe and its contents are entirely natural and are (to a greater or lesser degree) 
accurately described by the natural sciences10 which have as their epistemological11 
foundations (i) a posteriori12 empirical and sceptical methodologies augmented by (ii) a 
priori13 mathematical and logical schema. 
                                        
6 A full articulation and defence of these philosophical positions is far beyond the scope of this thesis and 
will not be attempted here. 
7 Metaphysical Naturalism is the belief that only the natural world exists. A proponent of such a view 
denies the existence of the supernatural as a separate ontological category. It follows that Metaphysical 
Naturalism is a monistic ontology that entails the rejection of the type ‘supernatural’ and, accordingly, all 
tokens of the supernatural. Metaphysical Naturalism, therefore, logically entails Atheism. Atheism, 
however, does not logically entail Metaphysical Naturalism. 
8 Metaphysics is the philosophical study of the nature of existence. 
9 Ontology is the philosophical study of what exists. 
10 This is a Scientific Realist view, which entails the belief that the methodologies of science provide the 
most accurate description of the world.  
11 Epistemology is the philosophical study of knowledge. 
12 Knowledge gained by means of sensory experience. 
13 Knowledge gained by means of reason, logic and deduction. 
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Richard Carrier gives a crisp sketch of Metaphysical Naturalism as well as the 
principal ground for accepting it as the most probable ontological position: 
 
Thus, all metaphysical naturalists believe is that if anything exists in our universe, it 
is a part of nature, and has a natural cause or origin, and there is no need of any other 
explanation. This belief is not asserted or assumed as a first principle, but is arrived at 
from careful and open-minded investigation of all evidence and reason. . . As we see 
it, the progress of science and other critical methods has consistently found natural 
causes and origins for everything we have been able to investigate thoroughly – for so 
long, so widely, on so many subjects, both disparate and related. Indeed it has never 
once failed in this regard whenever a problem or question could be properly 
investigated. So it is a thoroughly reasonable inference that this shall continue 
unabated. We have every reason to believe that the results of future investigations will 
most probably be the same for every subject once we have access to sufficient evidence 
to decide the matter. (2005, pp. 67-68) 
 
This thesis, thus, will not address the influence of God14 or the supernatural on the realm 
of ethics nor will it involve examining any of the aforegoing questions through a 
supernaturalist lens. Therefore, I explore them and the moral permissibility of voluntary 
assisted suicide in South African society, on the basis that Metaphysical Naturalism is 
true. It follows that I shall take it that Theism15 is false and Atheism16 is true.  Such a 
metaphysical position also rules out the possibility of an ‘after-life’ as conceived by most 
religious traditions as well as the possibility of a human being surviving the destruction 
                                        
14 The classic theistic conception of God is that of a transcendent omnibenevolent, omnipotent, 
omniscient and omnipresent non-physical personal agent who created the universe, including human 
beings, and with whom human beings can have a personal relationship. God is, in short, classically 
conceived of as a transcendent personal metaphysical, axiological and soteriological ultimate. 
(Schellenberg, 2015) 
15 Theism is the belief that God exists. 
16 Atheism is the belief that God does not exist. 
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of her physical body17 at least without radical, massive and prodigious technological 
advances.18  
 
Accordingly, for the Metaphysical Naturalist, given the current state of technological 
progress, destruction of the physical body truly marks the end of personal existence. It 
may already be persuasively argued that in light of the finality such a philosophical 
position promises, the ethical questions which I intend to explore about voluntary 
assisted suicide acquire an immediacy, urgency and import that they may otherwise 
have lacked.   
 
3.2. HUMANISM19 
 
The broad ethical position I shall adopt fits comfortably and naturally (no pun intended) 
with my endorsement of Metaphysical Naturalism. For the purpose of this thesis I shall 
adopt Humanism as the appropriate attitude to ethics. To adopt a Humanist approach 
to ethics is not yet to align oneself with any particular normative ethical20 or meta-
ethical21 theory. There are as many different Humanist ethical theories as there are 
                                        
17 In particular, the destruction of the central nervous system (or a significant subset of the central nervous 
system) and the attendant patterns of neurological activity that ‘instantiate’ and/or ‘give expression to’ 
and/or ‘ground’ consciousness and personhood in human beings. The precise characterisation of the 
metaphysical relationship between ‘mind’ and ‘body’ forms the subject matter of philosophy of mind and 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
18 The possibility of such technological advances as well as the ethical questions that arise in relation 
thereto form the subject matter of Transhumanist thought and philosophy. 
19 Humanism is the belief that ethics and ethical discourse ought to be grounded in reason and our most 
generous, sympathetic and compassionate understanding of the human condition, divorced from 
supernatural explanations and considerations.  
20 Normative ethics is the philosophical study of right action and encompasses three broad approaches to 
ethics, namely (i) Deontology (ii) Consequentialism and (iii) Virtue Ethics.   
21 Meta-ethics is primarily the philosophical study of (i) the meaning of moral propositions and claims 
(moral semantics) (ii) the nature, justification and truth of moral propositions and claims (moral 
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individual philosophers to articulate them. Some are Consequentialists22, others are 
Deontologists23 and some are espousers of Virtue Ethics.24  
 
Common, however, to all Humanistic approaches to ethics, is the idea that an enquiry 
into ethical matters is a distinctly human concern to be rationally discussed, debated 
and developed without reference or recourse to the supernatural in general, or to any 
gods and goddesses in particular. 
 
A.C. Grayling characterises these central features of Humanism in most eloquent 
fashion: 
 
Humanism is above all about living thoughtfully and intelligently, about rising to the 
demand to be informed, alert and responsive, about being able to make a sound case 
for a choice of values and goals, and about integrity in living according to the former 
and determination in seeking to achieve the latter. . . As the foregoing shows, in the 
sense now given to the word, ‘humanism’ is a general label for ethical views about the 
nature of the good and well-lived life. It concerns the fundamental question – a 
                                        
ontology) and (iii) the methodologies and possibilities of acquiring moral knowledge (moral 
epistemology). (Darwall,2003)  
22 Consequentialism is the ethical view that holds that an action, rule or policy is morally permissible if 
and only if it brings about the best intrinsically good consequences compared to the alternatives available. 
In other words, the moral permissibility of an action (rightness) is defined in terms of the consequences 
it brings about (goodness). What constitute intrinsically good consequences will in turn depend on the 
particular axiological theory adopted. Consequentialism thus depends on an axiological theory to provide 
it with content and there will be as many types of Consequentialism as there are theories of ‘the good’. 
(Darwall, 2003) 
23 Deontology is a family of ethical views that hold that the moral permissibility of an action, rule or policy 
is not exhausted by intrinsically good consequences. In other words, that the moral permissibility of an 
action depends on intrinsically normative factors other than good consequences. For example, whether 
the action, rule or policy (i) disrespects a person or can be nomologically universalized (Kantian 
Deontology) or (ii) violates a person’s rights (Rights-based Deontology) or (iii) is agreed to by members 
of a moral community under certain specified conditions (Social Contract Theory). Deontological ethical 
theories can, therefore, be regarded broadly as Non-Consequentialist theories where the rightness of an 
action is defined independently of an action’s consequences. (Darwall, 2003; Davis, 1993) 
24 Virtue Ethics is the ethical view that holds that an action, rule or policy is morally permissible if and 
only if it would be performed or endorsed by a person of virtuous character. Virtue Ethicists are, therefore, 
principally concerned with exploring the nature of virtue (arête), the praxis of virtue (phronesis) and the 
cultivation of a flourishing life (eudaimonia). (Darwall, 2003; Pence, 1993)  
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question that everyone has to consider – of what matters in life, and its answer is 
premised on the view that ethics must be based on our most generous and 
sympathetic understanding of human nature and the human condition. Humanism is 
the concern to draw the best from, and make the best of, human life in the span of a 
human lifetime, in the real world, and in sensible accord with the facts of humanity as 
these are shaped and constrained by the world. This entails that humanism rejects 
religious claims about the source of morality and value . . . The key point about 
humanism is that it is an attitude to ethics based on observation and the responsible 
use of reason, both together informing our conversation about human realities, 
seeking the best and most constructive way of living in accordance with them. (2013, 
pp. 139-141) 
 
Humanism, viewed in this way, therefore, provides an expansive and creative 
intellectual space within which to explore the questions relating to voluntary assisted 
suicide, with one eye firmly on the terrestrial realities that face human beings in all 
their complexity, vulnerability and fallibility, and the other on the normative ideals 
that are deserving of rational endorsement in the face of those same challenging 
realities.25 It is also important to note that a Humanistic attitude to ethics could even, 
in principle, be adopted without contradiction by a Theist provided she was not also 
committed to a meta-ethical view that located the ultimate source, justification or 
grounds of morality in God’s commands26 or her character.27 
 
 
 
 
                                        
25 Fromm spoke of a humanistic approach to ethics in the following terms: ‘[h]umanistic ethics, for which 
"good" is synonymous with good for man and "bad" with bad for man, proposes that in order to know 
what is good for man we have to know his nature. Humanistic ethics is the applied science of the "art of 
living" based upon the theoretical “science of man.” ’ (1947 [2003], p.12) 
26 Divine Command Theory. 
27 Divine Aretaic Theory. 
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3.3. SECULARISM28 
 
The broad politico-legal position I shall adopt for the purpose of this thesis is 
Secularism. Such an attitude acknowledges that peoples, societies and cultures have 
numerous religious, theological and supernaturalist commitments but that such 
commitments have to be handled in pluralistic societies (such as South Africa) where, 
at the very least, epistemological uncertainty as to the veracity of competing religious 
claims, would make it unwise to have any one religious tradition underwrite the 
politico-legal system applicable to all the citizens of a country.  
 
It is more practical and prudent to keep politico-legal and religious institutions 
separate and have the politics, policies and laws of a country founded on reasons that 
all citizens (or at the very least, the majority of citizens) could reasonably endorse and 
which are not narrowly tethered to any controversial religious text, code or practice.  
 
Grayling characterises the Secularist position as follows: 
 
A secular dispensation is one in which matters of government, public policy and 
administration, and publicly funded provision of services, are kept distinct from 
religious organizations or movements and their particular wishes for the form that 
society should take and how it should be run. . . Secular does not imply ‘anti-religious’, 
it implies ‘non-religious’. So there have been and are many religious people who are 
also secularists, because they take the view that religion and government should be 
kept apart. . . Secularism should be distinguished from both atheism and humanism. 
There is of course a natural connection between the three positions, but any one of 
them can be held without the other two. . . In the natural way of things, the word 
                                        
28 Secularism is the belief that the politico-legal institutions and religious institutions of a society ought 
to be kept separate. 
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‘secular’ has come to acquire additional connotations and extensions of meaning. So 
for a main example, a secular outlook is one that bases itself on reason and evidence, 
at the same time opposing acceptance of views on the basis of faith, tradition, 
authority or superstition. (2010, pp. 472-473) 
 
Accordingly, in light of such a characterisation, I intend to examine the questions that 
sit at the core of this thesis without appealing to the religio-normative principles of any 
particular faith, dogma, authority or tradition. Furthermore, I shall assume without 
further argument that religious and politico-legal institutions and structures are best 
kept separate and that it is unwise to contaminate the latter with the former or attempt 
to forge robust connections from the one to the other.  
 
While this would follow in any event from my endorsement of Metaphysical 
Naturalism, it is worthwhile emphasising the reason for this approach again insofar as 
some readers may not embrace Metaphysical Naturalism (and its philosophical 
implications). However, they may nevertheless believe that Secularism, in the context 
of a pluralistic South Africa, at the very least, (i) represents a sound practical approach 
to structuring society where there are competing (and contentious) religious 
institutions, practices and moral codes, (ii) acts as an efficacious prophylactic against 
overtly theocratic and/or theonomous ideologies and (iii) requires that laws, policies 
and conduct be guided by reasons that could be endorsed by anyone regardless of their 
idiosyncratic theological commitments.  
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3.4. COMPATIBALISM29 
 
The spectre of Hard Determinism30 looms threateningly over all of ethics31 and for 
this reason it is necessary at the outset to adopt a philosophical position for the 
purposes of this thesis which affirms the ability to make meaningful moral judgments 
about the actions of personal agents and their moral praiseworthiness or 
blameworthiness but, at the same time, does not wallow in the obscure and panicky 
metaphysics of Libertarianism.32 (Strawson, 1962) 
 
Accordingly, insofar as questions about autonomy, choice and human dignity sit at the 
heart of this thesis, I intend to adopt a Compatibilist position to free will. Carrier gives 
a straightforward articulation of the Compatibilist view as follows: 
 
Even if my choices are entirely determined in advance, I still make decisions, and my 
decisions are still caused by who I am and what I know – my thoughts and desires and 
personality – just as they must be if I am to be “free” in any sense that matters. And 
because I am still their cause, I can still be praised or blamed for them . . . free will is 
doing what you want – nothing more, nothing less. And being responsible is being the 
                                        
29 Compatibilism – sometimes called Soft Determinism - is the view that asserts the existence of free will 
is not logically incompatible with causal and/or nomological determinism. (See Iredale, 2011; Mackie, 
1977) 
30 Hard Determinism is the incompatibilist view that asserts (i) the existence of free will is incompatible 
with causal and/or nomological determinism and (ii) causal and/or nomological determinism is true. The 
implication of such a view is that free will does not exist. (See Iredale, 2011; Mackie, 1977) 
31 The existential fear for many philosophers is that if Hard Determinism is true then it appears to entail 
that agents are not ultimately responsible for their actions and, accordingly, ascribing moral praise or 
blame to their conduct is unjustified. In short, moral responsibility appears to evaporate if Hard 
Determinism is true. (See Iredale, 2011; Mackie, 1977) 
32 Libertarianism is the incompatibilist view that asserts (i) the existence of free will is incompatible with 
causal and/or nomological determinism and (ii) causal and/or nomological determinism is false. The 
implication of such a view is that free will does exist. (See Iredale, 2011; Mackie, 1977) Libertarian free will 
rests on two propositions that are thought to be intuitively plausible, namely (i) agents are the ultimate 
conscious authors of their thoughts and actions (fons et origo) and (ii) agents could really have acted 
other than they did in a given situation (principle of alternative possibilities) (Harris, 2012) 
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cause – nothing more, nothing less . . . This conception of free will is commonplace in 
law, and clearly assumes that free will means getting what you want, such that you 
lose your free will only when you are tricked or forced to do something you didn’t 
really want – in other words, only when there is a substitution of someone else’s will 
for yours, or constraints that prevent you from doing what you will to do. This notion 
of free will is not eliminated by determinism. (2005, p.109) 
 
On such a view a person is free just in case her actions are performed in accordance 
with her will, desires, beliefs and reasons. Conversely, a person is ‘unfree’ precisely to 
the extent that her actions are not performed in accordance with her will, or her will is 
prevented from being actualised by other worldly constraints. Ultimate causal 
responsibility for an agent’s will, desires, beliefs and reasons for action is not required 
for the agent to be described as ‘free’ on the Compatibilist view. Accordingly, for the 
purpose of this thesis I align myself with Arthur Schopenhauer’s view regarding free 
will that a person can do what he wants, but he cannot want what he wants. (1839 
[2005]) 
 
4. ELYSIAN FIELDS: A THANATOLOGICAL TAXONOMY33 
 
Having now explicitly stated the four major philosophical positions that underlie my 
general approach to the questions that sit at the heart of this thesis, it is now time to 
articulate and disambiguate the key concept that is the subject matter of our enquiry- 
suicide.  
 
                                        
33 See Appendix I. In Greek mythology the Elysian Fields were the final resting place of the souls of the 
heroic, righteous and the virtuous. 
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There are intentional and unintentional ways to kill oneself. Suicide is the intentional 
act of killing oneself.34 Suicide is, of conceptual necessity, an act which has as its object, 
aim, purpose or goal, the termination of one’s own life. Therefore, a person commits 
suicide if and only if the person (i) intends to die by performing a given act35 and (ii) 
the person’s intention is then satisfied by performing that act (Hill, 2011; McMahan, 
2002).  
 
It is, therefore, a contradiction to say of a person that he committed suicide 
‘unintentionally’. To unintentionally kill oneself is to be the victim of either (i) an 
accident or (ii) one’s own recklessness, negligence or stupidity. In such a case the terms 
‘accidental death’36 or ‘negligent death’37 would then seem to be appropriate. 
 
Suicide can be performed with or without the assistance of another individual. In the 
former case there is only one individual involved who is both the subject and object of 
the act. This can then be classified as Unassisted Suicide (US) and is the conception 
of suicide that is most immediately familiar.38 However, the moment that a further 
person is involved in deliberately assisting or aiding an individual to end her life, in 
                                        
34 There are of course (i) a variety of ways for an individual to commit suicide (causal routes) and (ii) a 
variety of motivations for an individual to commit suicide (psychological reasons). 
35 The action can be either a commission (doing) or an omission (allowing). Much ink (perhaps too much) 
has been spilled arguing over whether there is an important and intrinsic moral distinction between 
‘killing’ and ‘letting die’. (e.g. Foot, 1984, Glover, 1977; Kagan, 1998; Quinn, 1989; Thomson, 1976) I do not 
intend to add to that debate and for the purpose of this thesis I shall take it that there is, in the final 
assessment, no significant moral difference between these two types of actions. (See Grayling, 2005; 
Rachels, 1975; Singer, 2011; Sumner, 2011) 
36 E.g. The individual who engages in a potential lethal activity but who, despite taking reasonable 
precautions, nevertheless kills himself while engaging in that activity. 
37 E.g. The individual who engages in a potentially lethal activity but does so without taking precautions 
or who acts recklessly thereby killing himself as a consequence. 
38 E.g. The individual who deliberately shoots himself in the head with his own gun, swallows a lethal 
overdose of prescription painkillers, suffocates himself in his car with carbon monoxide, jumps off a 
skyscraper, hangs himself, performs seppuku, starves himself to death etc. 
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whatever manner39, we are then dealing with an instance of Assisted Suicide (AS). 
When the individual who wishes to commit suicide (i) is capable of requesting the 
assistance of another and (ii) has, in fact, requested the assistance of another person we 
are then dealing with a case of Voluntary Assisted Suicide (VAS). An individual may 
desire (or be motivated) to engage in VAS precisely because the individual is (i) 
unwilling to engage in US40 or (ii) he is incapable of engaging in US.41   
 
The person who may ultimately provide the assistance or aid in cases of VAS could be 
(i) a friend, family member or other person with a sufficiently close connection42 to the 
life of the requester, or (ii) a physician. In the former case we would have an instance 
of Non-Physician Assisted Suicide (NPAS). In the latter case we would have an 
instance of Physician Assisted Suicide (PAS). 
 
Within the category of VAS the aid and assistance provided (either in the form of PAS 
or NPAS) could take one of two further forms, namely (i) direct assistance or (ii) 
indirect assistance.  In the former case, we are dealing with instances whereby the 
person providing assistance to the individual himself administers the medicinal means 
or agents43 to the individual which have the effect of hastening the death of the 
individual or who takes some other positive step that hastens the death of the 
                                        
39 Either through a commission or an omission. 
40 Such unwillingness could be due to, inter alia, fear of (i) botching the suicide altogether and being left 
alive but in an even worse predicament, or (ii) the successful suicide being marred by undue pain, 
violence, degradation, loneliness or humiliation. 
41 The incapacity could be due to a physical, psychological or emotional impediment. 
42 It is an open question as to what the limits of a ‘sufficiently close connection’ are. 
43 The medicinal ‘means or agents’ administered are most often (but by no means limited to) lethal doses 
of barbiturates, opioids or other pharmacological concoctions such as potassium chloride. 
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individual.44 Such a case could be termed an instance of Direct Voluntary Assisted 
Suicide (DVAS).  In the latter case, we are dealing with instances whereby the person 
providing assistance to the individual delivers the medicinal means or agents to the 
individual who then, in turn, self-administers those medicinal means or agents to 
hasten his own death. Such a case could be termed an instance of Indirect Voluntary 
Assisted Suicide (INVAS). 
 
When an individual has not requested the assistance of another person to die because 
either (i) she is presently incapable of making such a request45 (although she may have 
once had the capability) or (ii) has not yet developed the capability to make such a 
request46 we are dealing with instances of Non-Voluntary Assisted Death (NVAD).  
 
In such cases we are dealing with situations in which a life and death decision must be 
made by a surrogate for and on behalf of an individual who is presently incapable of 
requesting assistance to die. Such cases should not be classified as ‘suicide’ proper, 
precisely because the incapacitated individual presently lacks the ability required to 
form the intention to terminate his life. After all, the ability to presently request 
another to assist oneself to die presupposes the capacity to presently form the intention 
to terminate one’s life in the first place.  
 
                                        
44 E.g. turning off life-sustaining machinery like a ventilator. 
45 E.g. an individual who is in a so-called ‘permanent vegetative state’, an irreversible coma, or who is in 
the advanced stages of dementia. 
46 E.g. infants and some minors who are too young to conceptualise at all and thereby express anything 
remotely like a request to die. 
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It is also important to mention a final category that encompasses situations when a 
person (i) is capable of requesting assistance to die but (ii) has either not requested 
assistance to die or has specifically requested not to die i.e. does not wish her life to 
end. When a person is killed in such circumstances, presumably because it is thought 
to be for his own good, the term that might be used is Involuntary Assisted Death 
(IVAD). However, in my view, this term (or any like it) should be eschewed and such 
cases, insofar as they ever occur, should be called what they really are – murder.  
 
At this stage many readers may wonder where the term ‘Euthanasia’ fits into this 
analysis. The term ‘Euthanasia’ has meant (and continues to mean) a variety of 
different things to different people. We can distinguish between broad and narrow uses 
of the word. When used in the broadest sense it is a word that denotes ‘a good dying’ 
(Grayling, 2013, p.217), ‘a gentle and easy death’ (Singer, 2011, p.157) or ‘the action of 
inducing a quiet and easy death’ (Foot, 1977, p.1). However, the term has also been used 
in a number of narrower senses to refer to specific ways that an individual might die.  
 
For example, some thinkers have reserved the term solely for instances of PAS where 
the physician’s motive for assistance is specifically to alleviate the pain and suffering of 
another person (e.g. Sumner, 2011). For others it is a term used to refer to any decision 
that is made to end the life of an individual sooner than it could have otherwise ended 
(e.g. J. Harris, 1985). Yet for others still, it is a term reserved solely for instances of 
DVAS (e.g. Glover, 1977). Given the multitude of different ways that the term has been 
used in the literature, I shall, for the purpose of this thesis, use the term ‘Euthanasia’ 
simply as a word that covers all types of VAS and cases of NVAD.  
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However, while questions around NVAD are ethically complex and important in their 
own right, this thesis will focus exclusively on (i) the moral permissibility of VAS (either 
in the form of DVAS or INVAS), (ii) the supplementary question as to whether the 
assistance and aid provided (once found to be morally permissible) should emanate 
from either a physician or a non-physician (either PAS or NPAS) and (iii) what 
appropriate safeguards and regulatory criteria there should be in respect of such a 
practice.   
 
5. ISSUE OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIETAL IMPORTANCE 
 
The importance of addressing the question of the moral permissibility of VAS in a 
contemporary South African context cannot be overstated. The question of VAS 
necessarily arouses deep human emotion and sentiment. It is an issue that is capable 
of galvanizing societies, philosophers and politicians because it is an issue that exposes 
our deepest axiological convictions and commitments as moral agents.  
 
Robert Young frames the history of the debate about VAS (what he refers to as 
voluntary euthanasia) as follows:-  
 
Debate about the morality and legality of voluntary euthanasia has been, for the most 
part, a phenomenon of the second half of the twentieth century and the beginning of 
the twenty first century. Certainly, the ancient Greeks and Romans did not believe 
that life needed to be preserved at any cost and were, in consequence, tolerant of 
suicide in cases when no relief could be offered to the dying or, in the case of the Stoics 
and Epicureans, when a person no longer cared for his life. In the sixteenth century, 
Thomas More, in describing a utopian community, envisaged such a community as 
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one that would facilitate the death of those whose lives had become burdensome as a 
result of ‘torturing and lingering pain’. But it has only been in the last hundred years 
that there have been concerted efforts to make legal provision for voluntary 
euthanasia. (2016, p.2) 
 
The need for sound analytic thinking on this topic is, therefore, indispensable especially 
considering that suicide (and by implication VAS) often carries with it enormous social 
opprobrium, stigma and normative condemnation. No country in Africa has any direct 
legal framework in place addressing VAS. South Africa is the first country on the 
continent that is in the process of actively reassessing the morality and legality of VAS.47  
 
The need to provide moral and legal clarity to this issue is especially important in a 
contemporary South African context in light of the following:- 
 
(i) There is a complete lack of any extant statutory legislative structure or framework 
dealing with and/or addressing the question of VAS despite the 
recommendations made in the South African Law Commission proposal on 
Euthanasia and Artificial Preservation of Life prepared, November 1998; 
 
(ii) On 4 May 2015, in the North Gauteng High Court48, judgment in the case of 
Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services & Others49 was 
                                        
47 There are a number of jurisdictions beyond Africa that, in one way or the other, legally regulate VAS 
(either DVAS or INVAS), namely, Albania, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Japan and the American States of Oregon, Vermont, Washington, California, New Mexico and Montana. 
Since I am focussed on the question of the moral permissibility of VAS in a South African context it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to engage in a comparative analysis of the ways these jurisdictions have 
dealt with the issue. They are mentioned only for the sake of completeness. 
48 The High Courts of South Africa are established in terms of s 166 read with 169 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
49 2015 (4) SA 50 (GP). 
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handed down in which, for the first time in South African history, an application 
was granted allowing a terminally ill man the right to die and to be directly 
assisted to do so by a consenting physician. 
 
(iii) The State, as well as the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA)50 
opposed the application which opposition, inter alia, involved raising the (i) 
Sanctity of Life Argument, and (ii) Social Harm Argument. 
 
(iv) The matter was taken on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal51 where a 
number of other interested parties joined the appeal as amicus curiae.52  
 
(v) The Supreme Court of Appeal, on 6 December 2016, in the decision of The 
Minister of Justice and Correctional Services & Others v Estate Late Stransham 
Ford53 upheld the appeal and overturned the decision of the court a quo albeit 
without fully addressing the merits of the ethical arguments involved. 
 
                                        
50 The HPCSA is a statutory body set up in terms of the Health Professions Act 56 of 1974 which is designed 
to guide and regulate the health professions in South Africa in aspects pertaining to registration, 
education, training, professional conduct and ethical behaviour, ensuring continuing professional 
development, and fostering compliance with healthcare standards. All individuals who practise any of 
the health care professions incorporated in the scope of the HPCSA are obliged to register with the 
HPCSA. 
51 The Supreme Court of Appeal is established in terms of s 166 read with s 168 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996. It is the highest court of appeal on non-constitutional issues in the 
Republic. 
52 Friend of the court.  
53 2016 ZASCA 197 (6 December 2016). 
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(vi) The common law54 of South Africa as it currently stands, criminalises VAS either 
in the form of DVAS or INVAS and whether or not it is an instance of PAS or 
NPAS. In short, DVAS is considered murder and INVAS can, in appropriate 
circumstances, be considered murder. 
 
Having now set out my major background philosophical assumptions, disambiguated 
the key concept related to our inquiry and set out the pressing contemporary social 
importance of analysing the issue of VAS in a South African context, it is now time to 
turn our attention to the articulation and defense of what I consider to be the principal 
ethical argument in favour of VAS.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
54 South African common law consists of legal precedent embodied, articulated and developed in 
judgments of the Courts handed down over periods of time, and which has its historical roots primarily 
in Roman-Dutch jurisprudence.  
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PART A: THE ETHICAL STANDPOINT 
 
In this section I intend to set out and analyse the key concepts that constitute and 
contribute to the positive case for the moral permissibility of VAS. In so doing it will 
be necessary to explore a number of related philosophical issues. 
 
First, it will be necessary to articulate and distinguish between different categories of 
‘value’ as well as two differing accounts about the ‘value of human life’ which have a 
profound influence on beliefs about the moral permissibility of VAS. Second, it will be 
critical to articulate a plausible account of what death is, as well as a plausible account 
of what makes people consider death to be bad (and thus something to be avoided). 
We will then be in a position to discuss and explore the inter-related concepts of 
human well-being, individual autonomy and human dignity which are the core 
components of the positive case for VAS. 
 
Having articulated and explained the positive case for VAS, I shall then turn to discuss 
the two principal arguments against VAS, namely, the (i) Sanctity of Life Argument 
and the (ii) Social Harm Argument. In so doing, I intend to argue that neither 
argument undermines the positive case for the moral permissibility of VAS. They do, 
however, raise legitimate ethical concerns regarding effective oversight and regulation 
of such a practice. 
 
 
  
21 
A1. THE VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE 
 
A substantial part of the social anxiety over VAS is that we all have an intuitive feeling 
that human life is valuable. This intuitive feeling appears to be practically universal and 
all contemporary societies and cultures have come to believe (albeit for different 
reasons) that there is something precious about being a human being and that killing 
a human being (at least an innocent one) is morally impermissible. US and thus, a 
fortiori VAS, is considered by many people to be a direct antagonistic act that strikes 
at a fundamental normative intuition and is, thus, anathema to the very fabric of 
morality. This sort of conviction was forcefully expressed by Ludwig Wittgenstein 
when he wrote: 
 
If suicide is allowed then everything is allowed. If anything is not allowed then suicide 
is not allowed. This throws a light on the nature of ethics, for suicide is, so to speak, 
the elementary sin. And when one investigates it, it is like investigating mercury 
vapour in order to comprehend the nature of vapours. Or is even suicide in itself 
neither good nor evil? (Notebooks, 10.1.17, p.91) 
 
 
Furthermore, and as a result of the very strong intuitive feeling that human life has this 
special sort of value, we naturally tend to think that death is always an evil and 
something to be avoided. However, it is not a straightforward task to unpack what 
exactly it is about human life that makes it worthy of moral concern nor is it simple to 
explain why death is bad. It is reasonable to suppose, however, that the badness of 
death will be closely bound up with whatever is thought to make human life 
particularly valuable. In order to answer these questions it is, therefore, important to 
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first engage in analysis of the different categories of value and how human life might 
possibly fit into such categories. 
 
A1.1. TYPES OF VALUE: INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC 
 
There are two broad and overarching categories of value that are often appealed to 
within axiological theory55 and which have important implications not only for the 
debate about VAS but many other philosophical issues in general. These are the 
categories of intrinsic value56 and extrinsic value.57 Within the category of extrinsic 
value there is often a further distinction drawn between the following sub-categories 
of value, namely, (i) instrumental value (ii) contributive value and (iii) inherent 
value. (Taylor, 1972) 
 
A thing58 can be said to be intrinsically valuable insofar as its value is not dependent 
on anything else.59 In other words, to say that a thing has intrinsic value is to say it is 
valuable in-and-of itself, as an end-in-itself, it has terminal value or its value is not 
axiologically dependent on anything else.60 A thing instantiating intrinsic value could, 
                                        
55 Axiology is the philosophical study of value and its categories. 
56 Intrinsic value is also referred to as non-derivative value. 
57 Extrinsic value is also referred to as non-intrinsic or derivative value. 
58 I am using the word ‘thing’ in a broad sense to refer to any spatio-temporal object, event or experience 
that could potentially be an item of axiological enquiry or assessment.  
59 Pleasure is often thought to be one example of something that is intrinsically valuable. 
60 It is a debateable question within axiology whether there are many things that have intrinsic value 
(Axiological Pluralism) or whether there is only one thing with intrinsic value (Axiological Monism). 
It is a further debateable question as to whether value can exist independently of the existence of conscious 
beings who desire (Axiological Objectivism) or whether the existence of value is dependent on the 
existence of beings who desire (Axiological Subjectivism). Another way of putting this perplexing 
problem is to ask the question ‘are things valuable because they are desired, or are things desired because 
they are valuable?’ (See Brandt, 1959) 
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therefore, be judged as a summum bonum.61 As Dworkin explains ‘[s]omething is 
intrinsically valuable . . . if its value is independent [emphasis added] of what people 
happen to enjoy or want or need or what is good for them’ (1994, p.71) 
 
Intrinsically valuable things confer value onto other things, specifically things that fall 
within the category of extrinsic value. Intrinsically valuable things have the property of 
being ‘value-conferring’. Things of intrinsic value can, therefore, be said to have 
axiological primacy and act as the axiological foundations for all other things which are 
axiologically secondary.  
 
Accordingly, all things that are judged to be extrinsically valuable are things whose 
value is derivative. In short, what this means is that all forms of extrinsic value 
(instrumental62, contributive63, and inherent64) are ultimately axiologically 
grounded in, or tethered to, things of intrinsic value.  
 
It is important to emphasise that any given thing need not be limited to one category 
of value and it is entirely possible for a thing to be both intrinsically valuable and 
                                        
61 Highest or ultimate good. 
62 A thing can be said to have instrumental value  insofar as it promotes, causes or somehow brings about 
another thing which itself has some type of value. The value of this further thing can in turn be intrinsic 
or extrinsic (e.g. money that allows one to purchase a sports car from which, in turn, pleasure is derived). 
63 A thing can be said to have contributive value insofar as it promotes and/or maintains the value of the 
larger system of which it is a part, where the larger system can be extended in space (e.g. a brick that 
forms part of a bridge extending over a chasm) or in time (e.g. a series of novels written as sequels over a 
number of years). This sort of value is grounded in the mereological relation of parts to wholes. 
64 A thing can be said to have inherent value insofar as the thing is capable of producing, causing or 
facilitating in the mind of an entity encountering it some qualitative experience that is judged by that 
entity as having intrinsic value (e.g. a painting that produces an aesthetic sensation in a person which is 
judged by the person to be pleasurable, or a book that provides the person who reads it with new 
knowledge, or even a sunset that produces in a person with an experience of awe). 
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extrinsically valuable.65 Insofar as a thing is valuable, it is the appropriate object of 
praise, acquisition and positive moral assessment. Valuable things are, accordingly, 
desirable and are worth having, pursuing and maintaining. Finally, it is to be 
mentioned that the opposite of something that is valuable would be something that is 
disvaluable.66 Insofar as a thing is truly disvaluable, it is the appropriate object of scorn, 
avoidance and negative moral assessment.67 Disvaluable things are, accordingly, 
undesirable and not worth having, pursuing or maintaining.68  
 
In light of these axiological distinctions, the crucial question becomes: what sort of 
value could human life be thought to possess? Is the value of human life intrinsic or 
extrinsic? There are two distinct theories that can be developed to answer this question 
- neutral container theory (NCT) or valuable container theory (VCT). While it will 
later prove necessary in our discussion to decide between the two theories, at this stage 
let us simply articulate them. 
 
A1.2. NEUTRAL CONTAINER THEORY 
 
If one wishes to adopt the view that human life is extrinsically valuable then one is of 
necessity committed to the idea that human life derives its value from other things that 
must themselves be intrinsically valuable. A human life could, therefore, be 
                                        
65 Knowledge, for example, could be both intrinsically valuable and instrumentally valuable. 
66 One could, accordingly, have intrinsically disvaluable things or extrinsically disvaluable things. 
67 Pain is often thought to be an example of something that is intrinsically disvaluable and thus an evil.  
68 I am assuming here (i) an Axiological Objectivist and (ii) Axiological Pluralist stance to value and 
will do so for the remainder of this thesis. I, therefore, eschew Axiological Subjectivism and Axiological 
Monism. 
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instrumentally valuable precisely to the extent that it allows for the possibility of the 
existence of other things of intrinsic value.  
 
This conception of human life sees it as a neutral container, valuable only insofar 
(and precisely to the extent) that its contents have intrinsic value.69 Shelly Kagan 
explains this sort of theory as follows: 
 
How good it is to be alive is a matter of adding up all of what we can call the contents 
of life. . . That’s what’s relevant in determining the value of your life: what’s happening 
within your life. Being alive per se has no value. Rather, life itself is only a container 
which we fill with various goods or bads. And deciding how valuable it is, how good it 
is for me to be alive, is a matter of adding up the value of the contents. The container 
itself is indeed a mere container; it has no value in and of itself. (2012, p.258) 
 
Accordingly, we can say that if there are either (i) no such intrinsically valuable things 
in existence at all70 or (ii) a given human life does not, in fact, contain, express or 
instantiate intrinsically valuable things, then that particular human life will lack value. 
It is important to note that nothing about NCT in itself yet tells us what the intrinsically 
valuable and disvaluable things are. 
 
 
                                        
69 A useful analogy to consider might be a bank account. A bank account is valuable if and only if it 
contains money in it. The existence of the bank account itself is completely neutral. A bank account per 
se is not intrinsically valuable. The bank account is thus only instrumentally valuable if there is a positive 
balance. On the other hand, an overdrawn bank account, as anyone with a substantial overdraft will tell 
you, is positively disvaluable. 
70 The view that there is nothing of intrinsic value is called Axiological Nihilism. If such a view were 
true then this would entail that no human life could ever be valuable. I shall, for the purpose of this thesis, 
proceed under the assumption that this view is a highly implausible (if not completely false) axiological 
view.  
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A1.2. VALUABLE CONTAINER THEORY 
 
If, however, one wishes to adopt the view that human life is intrinsically valuable then 
one is of necessity contending that human life has terminal value and is valuable in-
and-of itself. Accordingly, its value is not dependent on anything else of intrinsic value 
and is worth having (is desirable) for its own sake.  This conception of human life sees 
it as a valuable container. Kagan, once again, usefully summarizes what this sort of 
theory entails: 
 
But there are those who think that in addition to thinking about the value of the 
contents of life, we also have to remember that life itself is worth having. There’s a 
benefit in being alive above and beyond the question of what’s going on within my life. 
These people claim that the mere fact that I am indeed alive gives my life some 
additional value. These are valuable container theories. (2012, p.259) 
 
 
It is important to note that, unlike NCT which does not, on its own, articulate what the 
intrinsic goods and evils are, VCT does, from the outset, incorporate a substantive 
account of value when it says that there is at least one thing that is intrinsically valuable 
– human life itself. As Peter Suber points out ‘[t]o say that life has sanctity (or is sacred) 
is normally to say that life per se has sanctity. For the assertion is meant to be 
distinguished from the view that the value of a life may depend on its quality, 
condition, or circumstance.’ (1996, p.2) 
 
Peter Singer similarly explains ‘[w]e may take the doctrine of the sanctity of human life 
as simply a way of saying that human life has some very special sort of value, a value 
quite distinct from the value of the lives of other living things.’ (2011, p.72) Another way 
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of articulating this core point is to say that human life itself, regardless of its contents 
(indeed in spite of its contents), is inviolable or sacred.71   
 
A1.4. WHAT IS DEATH? 
 
The concept of death should first be distinguished from the concept of dying. Dying 
is a causal process that happens to all of us while we are still alive and which is, barring 
a few exceptions72, subjectively and qualitatively experienced. Death, on the other 
hand, is the negation of life and all experience.73 Wittgenstein noted ‘[d]eath is not an 
event in life: we do not live to experience death.’ (1922 [2001], 6.4311, p.87). Grayling, in 
a similar vein, points out ‘[d]ying is an act of living . . . We do not experience death, 
which is not an activity but a state – a state of nonexistence indistinguishable from 
being born. But we very much experience dying . . .’ (2001, p.2).  
 
This is easy enough to understand and appreciate. However, when we then turn our 
attention from the concept of dying to the concept of death itself, we see that 
attempting to define what death is and when it occurs, is itself no easy task. There are 
at least two major conceptions that seek to provide an answer to the question about 
what death could be and, importantly, when it occurs – the biological account and 
the personal account. (J. Harris, 1985; Sumner, 2011)  
                                        
71 The word ‘sacred’ will obviously have religious, transcendent or theistic connotations for many readers 
but it need not. It is perfectly reasonable to suppose that the idea of sacredness can be explored in 
naturalistic and secular terms shorn of any superstitious shroud. (See Dworkin, 1994) 
72 When a person dies suddenly in her sleep for example. 
73 I am reminded of what Isaac Asimov once said about the process of dying ‘Life is pleasant. Death is 
peaceful. It’s the transition that’s troublesome.’ 
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The biological account focusses on the idea that death is intimately related to the 
breakdown of the holistic functionality of living organisms.74 Organisms are dead when 
their component parts irreversibly cease to function in an integrated, systemic and co-
ordinated way. The emphasis of the biological conception, when applied to organic 
organisms like human beings, is on the cessation of the complex and inter-related 
processes and functions we cannot help but associate with life. Such function include, 
for example, respiratory processes, metabolic processes, circulatory processes as well 
as other endogenous autopoeitic processes such as cellular mitosis and meiosis. On 
such a conception, a human being is dead just in case her heart isn’t pumping, her cells 
have stopped dividing, she has stopped breathing, she has started to decompose etc. 
 
The personal account, in contrast, focusses on the idea that human beings are not 
simply biological organisms of just any sort. Rather it acknowledges that we are highly 
complex biological organisms that (i) have an inner psychological, rational and 
conscious dimension to their existence75 and (ii) experience themselves as such. Carl 
Sagan believed that ‘what distinguishes our species is thought’ (1980 [1990]). Bertrand 
Russell too, believed that ‘thought is great and swift and free, the light of the world, 
and the chief glory of man’ (1916 [2009], p.389).  Both appear to have been greatly 
                                        
74 The organism could, in principle, be organic or synthetic. 
75 This is the so called ‘qualitative and intentional dimension’ of personal existence and is captured by the 
felt visceral sense that ‘there is something that there is like to be’ the sort of entity that I am, from the 
‘inside’ as it were (Nagel, 1974). Of course, a Metaphysical Naturalist would argue that this internal 
qualitative dimension (i) is ultimately reducible to the complex material substrate that constitutes a 
human being, particularly, the central nervous system (Central State Materialism), or (ii) is ultimately 
reducible to a complex set of functions and/or causal capacities realized by the central nervous system 
(Functionalism), or (iii) is emergent and metaphysically supervenient on the central nervous system 
(Non-Reductive Materialism). 
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influenced by John Locke who gave, what is perhaps the best articulation of the nature 
of personhood: 
 
We must consider what person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent 
being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself, the same thinking thing, 
in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is 
inseparable from thinking and seems essential to it; it being impossible for anyone to 
perceive without perceiving that he does perceive. (1689 [1976], p.162) 
 
 
Locke’s account of personhood incorporates self-consciousness76 as a sub-category of 
consciousness together with the attendant ability to conceive of being an entity that 
exists diachronically. John Harris elaborates slightly further on Locke’s conception of a 
person when he writes ‘a person will be any being capable of valuing its own existence.’ 
(1985, p.18). Nothing appears objectionable to such an addition, provided of course, it 
is remembered that the capacity to value one’s own existence logically piggybacks on 
the other capacities articulated by Locke. The capacities articulated by Locke seem to 
be more fundamental than the so called ‘valuing capacity’, insofar as they serve as 
necessary preconditions for the ability to engage in the cognitive act of valuing 
anything at all.77  
 
From the aforegoing, we can now say that on the personal account, a human being dies 
when he irreversibly ceases78 to have the inner psychological, rational and conscious 
                                        
76 By ‘self-consciousness’ I mean nothing more extravagant than the capacity of an entity to treat its 
subjectivity as an object of enquiry. 
77 Kagan refers to this complex set of capabilities as ‘person functions’ or ‘p-functions’ for short (2012, pp. 
19-20). 
78 The proviso of ‘irreversibility’ appears necessary insofar as we do not want to say someone has died 
simply because they are temporarily unconscious, for example, when in a deep, dreamless sleep. 
Determining in any given case whether ‘irreversibility’ obtains is an epistemological and empirical issue. 
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capacities of the sort articulated by Locke and which are the necessary preconditions 
for valuing anything at all, including his own existence. In short, when he irreversibly 
ceases to be a person.79  
 
Normally, biological death and personal death are synchronically associated. But they 
need not be. We can easily imagine a situation where the two ‘come apart’. For 
example, the individual in the so called ‘persistent vegetative state’ who is still 
breathing, her blood is circulating, her heart is beating and her cells are still undergoing 
mitosis and meiosis but, though all these outward indicia of life exist, she has lost the 
capacity to have any felt psychological, rational or self-conscious experiences and thus 
lacks the capacity to value her own life. In short, there is no ‘point-of-view’ associated 
with this individual or anything ‘that it is like’ to be this individual. In a case like this, 
we could reasonably say that such an individual has died in the personal sense but is 
still alive in the biological sense.  
 
However, as interesting as the biological account of death is, and as important as it 
may be to determine in certain circumstances when a human being has died in the 
biological sense, it would appear that the sort of death we ought to be morally 
concerned with is the personal account – the irreversible cessation of being a person. 
After all, it is to persons that we think moral concern is principally owed.80 Once this 
                                        
79 Personhood is plausibly a broader category than ‘human being’. Human beings might be persons but it 
does not necessarily follow that all persons are human beings. Personhood, as philosophers are apt to 
remind us, could be ‘multiply realizable’ and instantiated across a vast panoply of possible platforms 
including synthetic (and not just organic) platforms. 
80 I use the word ‘principally’ because moral concern is also owed to entities that are not persons but are 
nevertheless sufficiently complex such that they can experience pain and suffering. For example, at least 
some types of animals will be able to experience pain and suffering. As Bentham persuasively argued when 
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sort of death occurs ‘the being has ceased to be a person and then, even if their body is 
still technically alive, it has lost its moral significance and can either be killed or 
allowed to die or preserved as we choose.’ (J. Harris, 1985, p.242) As Kagan succinctly 
puts it regarding the two competing accounts of death and when it occurs: ‘[i]n terms 
of getting what matters, the important question is not whether I am alive or not, but 
whether or not I am a person.’ (2012, p.178).  If this is right - and it certainly appears to 
be - the next question crucially becomes: what is bad and, thus undesirable, about 
irreversibly ceasing to be a person? 
 
A1.5. THE BADNESS OF DEATH81 
 
Even armed with a rather plausible account of what death is and when it occurs - the 
personal account - there is still a conundrum that has troubled many a philosopher 
who has contemplated it. The conundrum is this: if death is correctly conceived of as 
the irreversible cessation of personhood then when a person dies he is not around to 
experience his death as something bad - death being the complete annihilation of 
personhood as well as any attendant experiences.82 On the other hand, when one is a 
person one is not dead. In what way, then, can death itself be bad?  
 
                                        
talking about moral obligations to such beings ‘[t]he question is not, Can they reason, nor Can they talk? 
But, Can they suffer.’ (1789 [1823], chap XVII, sec.1, footnote, p.144)  
81 We are here concerned with the badness of death for the person who dies. Of course it goes without 
saying that the death of an individual can be bad for other people left alive insofar as they may suffer 
emotional and psychological pain at the loss. ‘We experience dying for ourselves; but we experience death 
only in losing others, and the experience is one of grief and loss.’ (Grayling, 2013, p. 224) 
82 Death unmoors persons from the quay of existence and experience.  
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Epicurus, adopting this line of reasoning, denied that death could ever be bad for 
anyone: 
 
So death, the most terrifying of ills, is nothing to us, since so long as we exist, death is 
not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist. It does not then concern 
either the living or the dead, since for the former it is not, and the latter are no more. 
(1940, p.31) 
 
Lucretius too, following Epicurus’ lead, concurred: 
 
 
Death therefore to us is nothing, concerns us not a jot . . . For he whom evil is to befall, 
must in his own person exist at the very time it comes, if the misery and suffering are 
haply to have any place at all; but since death precludes this, and forbids him to be, 
upon whom the ills can be brought, you may be sure that we have nothing to fear after 
death, and that he who exists not, cannot become miserable. (1940, p.131) 
 
For many people, this answer seems to come a little too quickly and appears slighlty 
glib.83 I share their intuition. However, articulating the reason why Epicurus’ and 
Lucretius’ answer does not seem completely satisfactory is slightly more difficult. What 
they both seem to be correctly gesturing toward is the idea that because there is 
‘nothing that it is like’ to be dead then death itself is not a sort of experience that can 
be intrinsically bad. After all, the experience of dying may be bad, insofar as it may be 
painful, but the state of being dead is no sort of experience at all – it is equivalent to 
non-existence (Grayling, 2013).84 While this is an undoubtedly correct and critical fact 
                                        
83 If Epicurus and Lucretius were entirely correct in their assessment that death is not bad then it would 
seem to lend support to the view that there is nothing bad in bringing about, hastening or facilitating 
someone’s death ever (especially if this was achieved painlessly). We should find such a view implausible 
insofar as we believe murder to be morally impermissible.  
84 The point is often convincingly made that death bears an uncanny resemblance to the period of time 
before birth. This resemblance is emphasized by Lucretius when he writes ‘[l]ook back at the eternity that 
passed before we were born, and mark how utterly it counts to us as nothing. This is a mirror that nature 
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about the metaphysical nature of death, many will still have a powerful residual 
intuition that death is bad, albeit that it is not experienced as such by the person who 
dies.  
 
To my mind, the account which appears to most plausibly articulate the central bad 
making feature of death and which best cashes out our residual intuition, is what is 
known as the deprivation account.85 On this account, death is bad insofar as it 
deprives a person of intrinsically valuable goods and/or of the possibility of attaining 
further intrinsically valuable goods in future (Kagan, 2012; Nagel, 1979; Sumner, 2011).86 
This appears to be what Epicurus and Lucretius are failing to consider in advancing 
their rather sanguine attitudes about death.87  When we combine the deprivation 
account with our two competing theories of the value of life we achieve some 
interesting results.  
 
Those who adhere to VCT will believe that, insofar as human life is itself intrinsically 
valuable, death always deprives one of something of intrinsic value – one’s life. Thus 
for proponents of VCT death will always be bad and undesirable. Such a theory will 
also explain rather straightforwardly why killing a person (including oneself) is 
considered morally impermissible – it always destroys something sacred or inviolable.  
                                        
holds up to us, in which we may see the time that shall be after we are dead.’ (1951, p.125) This is not to 
completely exclude the possibility of an asymmetry to existence that could entail that the anticipated 
oblivion ahead is worse than the forgotten oblivion behind.   
85 This is not to say that the deprivation account does not face philosophical quandaries of its own. (See 
McMahan, 1988) However, I shall not attempt to resolve such quandaries here. 
86 The deprivation account finds humorous expression in the epitaph that W.C. Fields apparently wanted 
on his tombstone – ‘Here lies W.C. Fields. I would rather be living in Philadelphia’.  
87 There may be other additional supplementary features that make death bad for the person who dies, 
for example, its inevitability, its unpredictability, its variability and/or its ubiquity. (Kagan, 2012) 
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However, proponents of NCT will believe that death is bad only in circumstances when 
human life on the whole contains, and can reasonably be expected to contain in the 
future88, a set of intrinsic goods. Grayling articulates the contingent badness of death 
on this sort of view: 
 
Because on a naturalistic view, being dead is identical to being unborn, nothing about 
death in itself makes it good or evil. It is what it takes away from us that makes it one 
or the other. If it takes away suffering, it is good; when it takes away hopes, 
possibilities, relationships with those beloved, it is bad. (2013, p.226) 
 
 
If a human life lacks intrinsic goods or contains sufficient intrinsic evils then death will 
be a boon. Accordingly, for proponents of the NCT, death will only sometimes be bad. 
The adoption of such a view thus also entails that the killing of a person (whether it is 
oneself or another) may sometimes be morally permissible.  
 
A2. HUMAN WELL-BEING 
 
Armed with (i) a statement of the two principal theories of the value of human life (VCT 
and NCT) and (ii) a plausible conception of what death is and when it occurs (personal 
account), as well as (iii) a plausible account of the badness of death (deprivation 
account), we can now turn to consider the next important building block in the positive 
case for VAS, namely, human well-being. 
                                        
88 There is, of course, never any guarantee that the future will contain, on average, more intrinsic goods 
than evils. Human beings, by virtue of being embedded in a four-dimensional space-time manifold, are 
temporally myopic and epistemically hamstrung in this regard. All we can do is judge, as best we can on 
the information presently available, whether the future will most probably contain more intrinsic goods 
than evils or vice versa.    
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First, it is important as a matter of terminology to state that I shall take the term ‘well-
being’, when used in connection with human life, to refer to ‘a flourishing life’ or a 
‘worthwhile life’.89 Thus, to say that a particular human life is characterised by (or 
instantiates) ‘well-being’ is simply to state that one is in the presence of a life that is 
flourishing or a life that is worth living.  
 
In speaking of such a life one would be committed to believing, at the very least, the 
following definite things about it: (i) it is a good life to lead (ii) it is a life that is the 
appropriate object of admiration, and (iii) it is a life worthy of pursuit and 
maintenance. Such a life would express or instantiate what the Ancient Greeks called 
eudaimonia viz. the state of having an objectively desirable life.90 When one thinks 
about the concept of ‘well-being’ in such terms it is indeed difficult not to think that it 
is the beating heart of value and the life-blood of ethics.  
 
Second, it is important going forward to keep in mind a crucial distinction between (i) 
what a given human life must contain if it is to be a worthwhile life, and (ii) whether 
one is capable of learning, discovering or judging a given human life to be worthwhile 
or not. The former is an ontological issue, the latter an epistemological one. The two 
should not be conflated.  
 
Finally, it is important to note that for a proponent of VCT, human life will always be 
good to lead, will always be the appropriate object of admiration and always be worthy 
                                        
89 I use the terms ‘well-being’, ‘flourishing’ and ‘worthwhile’ interchangeably throughout.  
90 The term ‘eudaimonia’ has a variety of meanings in English including ‘flourishing’, ‘happiness’ or ‘well-
being’. For a fuller analysis of the term (See Hursthouse & Glen, 2016). 
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of pursuit and maintenance. After all, according to VCT, human life itself is sacred. 
This will not necessarily be the case for the proponent of NCT. For the proponent of 
NCT human life will only be good to lead, be admirable and be worthy of pursuing and 
maintaining if it contains, on the whole, more intrinsic goods than evils. This presents 
a further challenge for any proponent of NCT insofar as it would appear necessary to 
provide a positive account of the content of a worthwhile human life – what exactly are 
these intrinsic goods that conduce to the eudaimon life? 
 
A2.1. WHAT IS IT FOR A LIFE TO GO WELL? 
 
It is customary to distinguish between at least three broad accounts of well-being that 
can be put forward at this point, namely, (i) hedonistic accounts91 (ii) desire-
satisfaction accounts92 and (iii) objective list accounts93 (Crisp, 2006, 2013).  
 
Hedonistic accounts, in essence, equate the worthwhile life with a pleasurable life. 
Such accounts are, however, highly implausible for two principal reasons: First, they are 
unduly axiologically restrictive since, intuitively, there appear to be a plurality of things 
that are intrinsically valuable over and above the experience of pleasure (e.g. knowledge, 
friendship, love, truth, beauty etc.). Second, we do not just want to seem to have 
pleasurable experiences, we also want them to be actually connected to reality in 
                                        
91 Hedonism is the belief that the experience of pleasure is the only thing of intrinsic value. 
92 There are various desire-satisfaction accounts but what they all share in common is the belief that 
having one’s desires actually satisfied is what is of intrinsic value. 
93 Such accounts share the common belief that certain things are valuable regardless of whether they are 
desired by any particular person. 
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veridical ways.94 Subjective experiences of pleasure may be necessary for a worthwhile 
life but they do not appear to be sufficient for one. 
 
The most plausible version of the various desire-satisfaction accounts, in essence, 
equates the worthwhile life with the satisfaction of the most fundamental desires a 
person would have if they were fully informed and cognisant of all their options. 
However, even this most plausible version is vulnerable to a powerful counter-example. 
One need only imagine the person who is fully informed of all the possible things she 
could desire and have satisfied but who, nevertheless, (i) develops the deep and 
fundamental desire to watch paint dry and (ii) proceeds to satisfy that desire every day 
of her life to the exclusion of anything else. For many, including myself, it seems highly 
implausible to say that she is living a worthwhile life.  
 
Finally, objective list accounts, in essence, equate the worthwhile life with an 
objective set of goods.95 Such theories are ones that: 
 
[H]old that being well off is a matter of having certain goods in one’s life, goods that 
are simply worth having, objectively speaking. Similarly there may be certain objective 
bads or evils, the having of which simply leaves one worse off. Possession of the 
relevant goods and the absence of the relevant evils is what constitutes well-being. 
And the goods and evils themselves have intrinsic value or disvalue independently of 
our desires (actual or ideal); indeed, they have the particular value they have 
regardless of whether anyone is in a position to realize this. (Kagan, 1998). 
 
                                        
94 Nozick’s thought experiment – ‘the experience machine’ - is an example of an intuition pump that 
presses this point powerfully (1974, p.43). 
95 It is important to point out that both (i) the experience of pleasure and (ii) the actual satisfaction of 
desires are likely to appear on any objective list account worth the name.  
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In light of the persuasive criticisms that have been levelled at both hedonistic accounts 
and desire-satisfaction accounts, taken together with my endorsement of Axiological 
Objectivism and Axiological Pluralism96, it should come as no surprise that I also 
believe that a pluralistic objective list account is the most plausible account of well-
being.97 This is not, however, to say that such a view is free of any and all difficulty.  
 
Possibly the most serious criticism is that it is thought by many to be an absurd notion, 
and perhaps even elitist, to ever hope to enumerate a comprehensive and exhaustive list 
of intrinsic goods that make life worth living i.e. a numerus clausus of well-being.  The 
concern appears, in part, to be that in articulating such a list one is being unjustifiably 
prescriptive and unduly procrustean.98  
 
Jonathan Glover, appears to be articulating something like this when he writes: 
  
Any list of the ingredients of a worth-while life would obviously be disputable. . . I 
shall not try to say what sorts of things do make life worth living (Temporary loss of a 
sense of the absurd led me to try to do so. But apart from the disputability of any such 
list, I found that the ideal life suggested always sounded ridiculous) . . . If life is worth 
preserving . . . because it is necessary for something else, then, that ‘something else’ is 
the heart of this particular objection to killing. It is what is meant by “a life worth 
living” or a “worth-while life”. (1977, pp.51-52) 
 
J. Harris, too, recognises the difficulty of enumerating such a list, stating: 
                                        
96 See footnote 68. 
97 The adoption of such an account entails that a person can really be wrong in her assessment about 
whether a life is worth living, even if it is an assessment of her own life. 
98 I must confess that, to my ear, this is a strange sort of criticism to level at any theory of value that is 
supposed to underwrite our ethical concerns. After all, is not the entire point to articulate a reasoned and 
true account of value which has prescriptive consequences for human conduct? 
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Here, our question is so profound as to be almost absurd. Like the question of the 
meaning of life, that of the value of life, when put in such broad terms, seems 
unanswerable. Not because there is no answer, but rather because there are so many 
answers. There are likely to be, and perhaps are, as many accounts of what makes life 
valuable as there are valuable lives. Even if we felt confident that we could give a very 
general account of what makes human life valuable for human beings, perhaps by 
singling out the most important or most frequently occurring features from the lists 
of what they value of a large cross-section of people, we would have no reason to 
suppose that we had arrived at a satisfactory account. (1985, p.16) 
 
It is this difficulty that leads J. Harris to eschew the notion of providing a detailed list 
of the content of a worthwhile life and instead to focus on the fact that persons can 
(and do) value their lives for a variety of reasons. For J. Harris, it is not necessary to 
exhaustively enumerate what those reasons are in order to say that a human life is 
worth living. In order to recognise we are in the presence of a worthwhile life it is only 
necessary that we know (i) those reasons - whatever they may be – exist, and (ii) are, in 
fact, valued by the person whose life it is. After all, according to him: 
 
Our interest is in knowing [emphasis added] which other beings have valuable lives, 
and there may be good reasons for being much surer of this than of the value of any 
of the features that are supposed to make life valuable?. . . What matters is not the 
content of each account but rather that the individual in question has the capacity to 
give an account. (1985, p.16). 
 
Although there is much to be said for this epistemological shift in emphasis, it does 
seem to me that the pessimism about articulating ontologically what ‘goes into’ making 
a worthwhile life is perhaps a little quick. After all it could be argued that we can go at 
least some way to enumerating the content of a worthwhile life even while (i) 
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acknowledging that it is not a presently exhaustive list, and that (ii) the content of the 
list could expand in future as we learn more about what it is to be a person. 
 
Sam Harris adopts this more optimistic attitude: 
 
Defining goodness in this way [equivalent to well-being] does not resolve all questions 
of value; it merely directs our attention to what values actually are – the set of 
attitudes, choices, and behaviours that potentially affect our well-being, as well as that 
of other conscious minds. While this leaves the question of what constitutes well-
being genuinely open, there is every reason to think that this question has a finite 
[emphasis added] range of answers. Given that change in the well-being of conscious 
creatures is bound to be a product of natural laws, we must expect that this space of 
possibilities – the moral landscape – will increasingly be illuminated by science. (2010, 
pp.12-13) 
 
It could thus persuasively be argued that, in light of the sort of entities we already know 
human beings to be, it is not too soon to say authoritatively and robustly that a human 
life which contains, for example, pleasure, knowledge, truth, beauty, love, friendship 
and actual achievement is really more worthwhile than a life that lacked such things 
(or which was filled with their antithesis). If making such a pronouncement is 
considered ‘elitist’ or ‘unduly prescriptive’ then the title should be worn with pride, 
especially insofar as such a pronouncement would be a product of the continuous 
collation of self-knowledge distilled by human beings over the course of millennia. 
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A2.2. WELL-BEING AS AN ELASTIC CONCEPT 
 
What I suggest then is that the most plausible notion of human well-being is going to 
be pluralistic and elastic: the list of intrinsic goods will at least, in principle, be capable 
of being extended as more is learned about human beings and the complex world we 
inhabit. However, there will also be some definite things we can already, with 
confidence, put on such a list. In short, we can already articulate some of the desiderata 
of the eudaimon life.  
 
It may be useful, at this juncture, to also mention and distinguish between what 
Dworkin calls experiential interests and critical interests. (1994, p.201) 
Experiential interests are things people engage in doing because they are enjoyable 
to them when they are engaged with them.  One person finds reading philosophy 
enjoyable, another person finds ornithology fascinating, while yet another finds solving 
differential equations positively exhilarating. No one person is wrong, or making a 
genuine mistake, in pursuing one interest or the other. They simply have different 
tastes or personal preferences when it comes, for example, to the cultivation of 
enjoyment. Critical interests, however, are interests that are genuinely better to have 
and to satisfy. In other words, a person can be genuinely mistaken and worse off 
precisely to the extent that he does not recognise these critical interests or attempt to 
satisfy them. Such interests are not simply matters of taste or personal preference. In 
short, either to not have such interests at all, or to fail to satisfy such interests in life, 
would make a life legitimately worse off. For example, it would be a mistake (and a 
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tragedy) for a person to either eschew love, friendship or knowledge entirely or to fail 
in the attempt to have such things instantiated or expressed in his life. 
 
This distinction between experiential interests and critical interests seems, to my 
mind, to track the distinction between things that are extrinsically valuable and things 
that are intrinsically valuable. Experiential interests could be thought of as the 
plethora of possible activities one might undertake that result in the experience of 
some intrinsic good like pleasure or knowledge, for example.  Critical interests, on 
the other hand, could be conceived of as that set of intrinsic goods themselves. 
 
Now, of course, the content of any objective list will not reflect particular or 
idiosyncratic tastes or preferences like ‘wind-surfing’, ‘eating waffles’, ‘listening to 
Beethoven’s ninth symphony’, ‘studying chemistry’ or ‘making coffee for one’s spouse’. 
That truly would be absurd insofar as it would fallaciously identify the particular 
means, modes and methods of producing, experiencing and discovering intrinsic goods 
(experiential interests) with the intrinsic goods themselves (critical interests).  
 
Instead, the content of the list will be the ultimate, fundamental and terminal features 
of our experiences, activities and behaviours that are intrinsically, as opposed to 
extrinsically, valuable. I have already alluded to some of the things that will (hopefully) 
strike the reflective reader as reasonable contenders for the title of ‘intrinsically 
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valuable’ viz. pleasure, knowledge, truth, beauty, love, friendship, and real 
accomplishment.99 
 
Grayling offers a compelling portrait of ‘the worthwhile life’ which reflects and records 
a number of the intrinsic goods already mentioned: 
 
So – bearing in mind that by ‘good lives’ we mean lives worth living, fruitful or 
flourishing lives, lives that have a positive impact on others – we might try to identify 
a number of characteristics that such lives are likely to display. One is that good lives 
seem meaningful or purposeful to the people living them. Another is that they are 
lives lived in relationships, having at their core real intimacy – love or friendship – 
with one or more others. A third is that they are lives of activity – of doing, making or 
learning. A fourth is that they are consistently marked by honesty and authenticity. A 
fifth is that they manifest autonomy, that is, the acceptance for the choices that shape 
the course of life. A sixth is that the felt quality of the life from an aesthetic point of 
view is positive; that is, the experience of living it feels rich or satisfying to the person 
living it. The seventh and last is integrity, in the sense of the integration of all the 
others into a whole which constitutes the individual’s chosen project for the good. 
(2013, pp.161-162) 
 
What is important, for the purposes of our discussion, and especially from the point of 
view of the proponent of NCT, is that in Grayling’s portrait there is one thing 
mentioned which appears to have the right sort of axiological ‘aseity’ that demands 
inclusion in any list of intrinsic goods that would make human life worthwhile, but 
which until now has not been mentioned – individual autonomy.  
 
                                        
99 It is important here to mention that such things are also incrementally valuable. That is to say, ceteris 
paribus, it is better (i) to have more of each of these things (quantitative dimension) and (ii) to have richer, 
deeper and more profound instances of these things (qualitative dimension). It is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to determine whether quantity trumps quality (or vice versa) within a given sort of intrinsic good 
or across (or between) intrinsic goods.  
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A3. INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 
 
The philosophical literature is replete with attempts to articulate the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of an ‘autonomous action’. As an exercise in metaphysics this is a 
perfectly noble and important project. However, for the purposes of our discussion the 
labyrinthine twists and turns of such an endeavour would force us to wander too far 
afield and would be worthy of a thesis all its own.  
 
Kagan, while acknowledging the difficulty in defining ‘autonomy’, thankfully offers a 
useful starting point: 
 
Now the basic notion of autonomy is a complex and controversial one, but one basic 
idea seems to be something like this. To have autonomy is to have the various aspects 
of one’s life under one’s control. Typically, if I have autonomy over some aspect of my 
life (whether my career, my hair color, or how I spend this Thursday afternoon), then 
I can deliberate concerning how I want that aspect of my life to go, choose among 
various alternatives open to me, and act so as to make my life the way I want it to be 
in that regard. (1998, p.111) 
 
It is the twin notions of control and choice that appear to constitute the beating heart 
of autonomy. In this vein, J. Harris writes ‘[a]utonomy is strictly speaking “self-
government”, and people are said to be autonomous to the extent to which they are 
able to control their own lives, and to some extent their destiny, by the exercise of their 
own faculties.’ (1985, p.195) Singer follows a similar formulation stating ‘“[a]utonomy” 
here refers to the capacity to choose and to act on one’s own decisions. Rational and 
self-aware beings presumably have this capacity, whereas beings who cannot consider 
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the alternatives open to them are not capable of choosing in the required sense and, 
hence, cannot be autonomous.’ (2011, p.84) Dworkin speaks of autonomy as ‘the right 
to make important decisions about defining their own lives for themselves’ (1994, 
p.222) while Joseph Raz states that autonomy ‘is essentially about the freedom of 
persons to choose their own lives.’ (1985, p.370) Finally, L.W. Sumner’s understanding 
is that ‘exercising autonomy/self-determination is a matter of managing one’s own life 
in accordance with one’s own values and priorities.’ (2013, p.33)   
 
Taking my cue from such thinkers, I would begin simply by gesturing toward some 
general features of ‘autonomy’ which, at the very least, should not strike the reflective 
reader as highly implausible.100 In this regard I think it useful to paint a portrait of two 
types of possible existences and compare them – we will call the one an autonomous 
existence and the other a heteronomous existence.  
 
An autonomous existence is one characterised by self-determination. This means 
thoughtful control, not simply over the formulation of one’s goals and plans but also 
over the most appropriate means to achieve one’s goals and plans and their actual 
execution.  Importantly, it involves the ability to use reason and discernment to assess 
and pass judgment on the world (including oneself). It involves being open, receptive 
and amenable to reasons for acting one way rather than another. It further involves a 
sensitivity to new information, evidence, debate and deliberative reflection as well as a 
                                        
100 The word ‘autonomy’ literally means ‘one who gives oneself one’s own law’. 
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capacity for self-reflexivity and introspective consideration101 when formulating goals 
and plans and devising the means to achieve them.  
 
From this general picture we can reason that a heteronomous existence is the 
antithesis of an autonomous one. It is an existence characterised by a lack of self-
governance and self-determination. It is an existence where control over one’s goals, 
plans, actions and behaviour is ‘outsourced to’ and ‘dictated by’ the beliefs, values and 
judgments of others as well as the vagaries of circumstance. It is an existence where 
the assessment and judgment of the world, including one’s own life, is left completely 
to others and where one’s own views are forcibly uprooted, supplanted and replaced. 
It is an existence where decisions for action are divorced from reasons for acting one 
way rather than another and where one’s decisions are simply and solely at the whim 
of the next temperamental emotion, feeling or desire that comes careening into 
consciousness. 
 
A3.1. AUTONOMY AS A DESIDERATUM OF WELL-BEING 
 
This distinction between an autonomous existence and a heteronomous existence 
is important because, in contemplating their differences, we begin to shed light on 
what it is about individual autonomy that makes it so valuable and why throughout 
human history people have fought, bled and even died to achieve it. 
                                        
101 I am here reminded of Socrates’ view that ‘the unexamined life is not worth living’ (Apology, 38a5-6). 
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Individual autonomy is clearly extrinsically valuable in the sense that it is both 
instrumentally valuable and contributively valuable.102 Individual autonomy is 
instrumentally valuable insofar as it allows persons to obtain, experience and 
discover other intrinsic goods. A person can choose to go to an art exhibition, or read 
a book on philosophy and thereby derive pleasure and knowledge from these activities 
respectively. Furthermore, a person can choose who they spend time with, who they 
marry and what profession they wish to engage in and thereby discover friendship, love 
and meaningful achievement. John Stuart Mill seemed to be gesturing toward the 
instrumental value of individual autonomy when he wrote: 
 
He who lets the world or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no 
need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan 
for himself, employs all his faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and 
judgment to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide, 
and when he has decided, firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision. 
And these qualities he requires and exercises exactly in proportion as the part of his 
conduct which he determines according to his own judgment and feelings is a large 
one. It is possible that he might be guided in some good path, and kept out of harm’s 
way, without any of these things. But what will be his comparative worth as a human 
being? It really is of importance, not only what men do, but also what manner of men 
that are that do it. Among the works of man which human life is rightly employed in 
perfecting and beautifying, the first in importance is man himself. (1859 [2001], p.55) 
 
 
For Mill it would appear that autonomy forces a person to utilize his cognitive 
capacities in his interactions with the world and is valuable precisely insofar as it allows 
                                        
102 Individual autonomy can, of course, in certain instances also be instrumentally and contributively 
disvaluable insofar as autonomous action can bring about or contribute to other things of intrinsic 
disvalue, for example, pain or ignorance.  
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a person to, inter alia, perfect himself – presumably by utilising that set of complex 
cognitive faculties to obtain other intrinsic goods that make his life worth living.  
 
Individual autonomy is also contributively valuable insofar as it is an integral part of 
the construction of short, medium and long term goals that give life its holistic 
structure, tone and tenor - a kind of narrative integrity. Roger Scruton explains the 
narrative- like appreciation we have for human life as follows: ‘[w]e do not understand 
human life simply as the process whereby a human being endures from birth to death. 
We understand it as a continuous and developing drama, with a meaning that resides 
in the whole, and which is not reducible to the felt significance of its parts.’ (2012, p.424) 
Carl Wellman picks up on this narrative motif when he writes ‘one’s life is a biography 
experienced as a drama with a beginning, a middle and an end such that the intrinsic 
value of each part is determined much more by one’s awareness of its significance for 
the whole than by its felt pleasantness or painfulness.’ (2003, p.24) 
 
This ‘narrative’ or ‘literary’ conception of life is crucial to bear in mind especially when 
it comes to an assessment of how a person’s life might possibly end. This is because 
‘[w]e worry about the effect of [a] life’s last stage on the character of [a] life as a whole, 
as we might worry about the effect of a play’s last scene or a poem’s last stanza on the 
entire creative work.’ (Dworkin, 1994, p.199) Expanding on this idea, Dworkin writes 
further: 
 
[T]he value of autonomy. . . derives from the capacity it protects: the capacity to 
express one’s character – values, commitments, convictions and critical as well as 
experiential interest – in the life one leads. . . It allows each of us to be responsible for 
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shaping our lives according to our own coherent or incoherent – but in any case, 
distinctive – personality. . . Autonomy encourages and protects people’s general 
capacity to lead their lives out of a distinctive sense of their own character, a sense of 
what is important to and for them. (1994, p.224)   
 
Individual autonomy would thus appear to be a crucial part in the construction of the 
continuing and developing dramatic whole that is a human life and which plays a vital 
role in how a person might leave the proscenium of existence when the curtain finally 
falls. Does one leave the stage with one’s integrity intact? Is the exit graceful or 
grotesque? Is it triumphant or tragic?  How a person exits the play may also determine 
whether there is a standing ovation or whether there is nothing but sorrowful silence 
and the slow shuffling of shoes as the spectators slink off.103  
 
However, in addition to this extrinsic sort of value, it could also be argued that 
individual autonomy is itself an intrinsic good – that is to say, desirable as an end-in-
itself. In order to see how this might be so, let us imagine two possible worlds. Let us 
call the first possible world W and the other W*. In both W and W* there is a person – 
Adam - who is living a certain sort of life. In both W and W* the intrinsic goods that 
are contained in each Adam’s life are identical. Each Adam has the same satisfying job, 
the same pleasurable experiences, the same quantum and quality of knowledge and the 
same fulfilling friendships and experiences of love. W and W* are thus identical in every 
respect except one. 
 
                                        
103 It is also worth mentioning that the inability to determine the timing and manner of one’s death could 
itself be a profound source of psychological and emotional anguish for a person. 
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Unbeknownst to the Adam living in W*, all his ‘choices’ (what job he engages in, what 
sort of people he becomes friends with, what he has learned and from where, who falls 
in love with and marries etc.) are always made on his behalf by a panel of experts known 
as the ‘Worthwhile Life Collective’ who transmit their committee decisions about 
Adam’s life, via a complex and clandestine technological process, directly and 
seamlessly into his central nervous system. Adam then proceeds to act on the basis of 
these committee decisions as if they were his own. This has all been quite wonderful 
for Adam of course because his life has turned out to contain a cornucopia of intrinsic 
goods. After all, the ‘Worthwhile Life Collective’ always has Adam’s best interests at 
heart!104 
 
The question arises though: does the Adam living in W* have the same sort of life as 
his duplicate living in W? Which Adam is living a better (more worthwhile) life? Which 
life is more desirable? Which Adam would you rather be? The intuition of many, 
including myself, will be that the Adam living in W* is not at all living a better life than 
his duplicate living in W. In fact, there is a very strong sense that he is living a life that 
is decidedly worse.  
  
But what is it that cashes out this powerful intuition? I would suggest it is precisely the 
fact that the Adam living in W* is not living his own life. Instead, he is living the life 
dictated, mapped out and planned by others viz. the Collective. His existence is 
thoroughly heteronomous. One might reasonably expect that, were the Adam living 
                                        
104 I have adapted this idea from similar ones explored both in the film ‘The Adjustment Bureau’ directed 
by George Nolfi (2011) and ‘The Truman Show’ directed by Peter Weir (1998). 
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in W* to discover the Collective’s surreptitious scheme, he would (i) feel justifiably 
indignant toward the Collective, and (ii) understandably dismayed at the state of his 
own life even though, under the Collective’s ‘omniscient’ and ‘omnibenevolent’ 
guidance, it contains a panoply of other intrinsic goods.  
 
Of this exceptionally high premium placed on individual autonomy, Glover writes: 
 
There are many aspects of life where a person may be delighted to hand over decisions 
to someone else more likely to bring about the best results. . . But there are many other 
decisions which people would be reluctant to delegate even if there were the same 
prospect of greater long-term satisfaction . . . Even in small things people can mind 
more about expressing themselves than about the standard of the result. And, in the 
main decisions of life, this is even more so. Suppose people’s marriage partners and 
jobs were chosen by experts, and studies showed a far higher level of satisfaction 
among those whose marriages and jobs were chosen than among people who made 
their own arrangements. Even so, many of us would prefer not to delegate such 
important decisions, for if we did so we would lose the sense of living our own lives, 
and we prefer to forgo a great deal of happiness, or risk a fair amount of disaster, to 
losing control of our lives in this way. (1977, p.81) 
 
J. Harris, in a similar vein, articulates the value placed on individual autonomy in the 
following terms: 
 
Autonomy has a very special and very central role in the value of life. People have been 
and continue to be prepared to sacrifice their lives in order to win for themselves or 
others autonomy over relatively minor sorts of decisions. Many things that we would 
find delightful if we had chosen them for ourselves lose all charm when they are seen 
to have been chosen for us or imposed on us by others. A life that seems thoroughly 
rich and worthwhile may be so only because we choose freely to live it. If we are 
condemned to live it, it may be worthless to us. And if life is far from rich and 
worthwhile, how much more terrible to be condemned to live it against our will. (1985, 
p.80). 
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What I believe the ‘Adam – Collective’ thought experiment highlights is that it is not 
sufficient for a life to contain a list of intrinsic goods like pleasure, knowledge, 
friendship etc. in order to be considered worthwhile. It is highly important that those 
intrinsic goods are themselves felt to be the product of autonomous actions taken by 
the person whose life it is.  In short, it is itself intrinsically valuable that our pleasures, 
loves, friendships, knowledge and accomplishments be chosen.105 This intrinsic value 
extends to the attendant epistemic ability associated with individual autonomy, 
namely, the ability to assess and judge the other intrinsic goods contained in one’s life, 
to weigh them against each other and to adjudicate between them as part of one’s 
decision making process. 
 
Accordingly, autonomy is, itself, something that makes life worthwhile. This 
conclusion can also help explain why, for the proponent of NCT, killing someone 
whose life contains a dearth of intrinsic goods and an overabundance of intrinsic evils 
might nevertheless remain morally impermissible – to do so deprives a person of a 
distinct intrinsically valuable thing viz. the ability to exercise control over her own life 
and how she might wish to die.106 
 
Glover expresses this very point when he writes: 
 
                                        
105 This is not, of course, to discount the possibility of some intrinsic goods arising in a human life by 
chance. 
106 We can think, for example, of the poor wretch living in the most extreme and brutal squalor, who 
experiences pain and suffering daily without any hope of respite, who lives a solitary life cut off and 
divorced from friends, family or close interpersonal relationships and whose hopes for real achievement 
and knowledge in life are thoroughly non-existent but who, nevertheless, desires to persist in the business 
of living. Of such a person Singer writes ‘the fact that [such a] person wishes to go on living is good 
evidence that her life is worth living. What better evidence could there be?’ (2011,p.177) 
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The main argument for the direct wrongness of killing . . . is that it is wrong to shorten 
a worth-while life. This argument has seemed incomplete, as suggested by 
considerations of the question of killing someone against his wishes where his life can 
be [accurately] predicted to be one where he would be better off dead. . . I believe that 
the incompleteness of the argument against killing stems from its disregard of a 
person’s autonomy in taking decisions about his own life and death. . . This is a reason 
for holding that, if someone, wants to go on living, it may still be directly wrong to kill 
him even where there are good grounds for thinking his life is not worth living. (1977, 
p.74) 
 
A worthwhile life can then be said to be, at least in part, a life that is one’s own. And 
when a person’s life is her own this entails that she is epistemically entitled to assess, 
weigh and adjudicate on its contents as she sees fit and to act on that considered 
assessment accordingly.107 It is this intrinsically valuable dimension of self-dominion 
which seems to underwrite and inform Mill’s famous proclamation that ‘[o]ver himself, 
over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.’ (1859 [2001], p.13) as well as 
Schopenhauer’s similar assertion that ‘there is nothing in the world to which every man 
has a more unassailable title than to his own life and person.’ (1851 [2015], p.493) 
 
A3.2. SOME WAYS TO LACK AUTONOMY 
 
Having mentioned why it could be thought that autonomy is so valuable, it may be 
useful at this juncture, if only because it will become important for aspects of our 
conversation later, to mention briefly some of the specific ways that a person might be 
thought to lack autonomy. We can begin by distinguishing between two broad 
                                        
107 This does not mean that her judgment regarding the contents of her own life is infallible or irrebuttable; 
nor does it mean that other people cannot themselves judge the contents of her life and perhaps, in 
principle, do so more accurately. As Scruton points out ‘[a] life is an object of judgment, like a work of 
art; and judgment means viewing it from outside, as the life of another.’ (2012, p.425).  
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categories of what could be called ‘defeaters’ to autonomy – external defeaters and 
internal defeaters. 
 
External defeaters are aberrant features of the world that emanate from outside a 
person and which are thought to undermine his ability to engage in self-government. 
Such defeaters could be either personal108 or impersonal.109 For the purposes of our 
discussion, personal defeaters are the most important and include instances where 
(i) one person explicitly substitutes his decisions for another person’s decisions110 
(explicit compulsion), or (ii) one person implicitly substitutes his decisions for 
another person’s decisions111 (implicit compulsion).  
 
Internal defeaters relate to aberrant features that emanate from within a person 
himself, specifically, aberrant cognitive and emotional processes that are reasonably 
thought to undermine his ability to self-govern.  J. Harris sketches four sub-categories 
that could fall under this broad categorisation, namely, (i) defects in the person’s 
control over her desires and/or actions112 (defects of control), (ii) defects in the 
person’s reasoning process itself113 (defects of reasoning), (iii) defects in the 
information available to the person upon which her choices are made114 (defects of 
                                        
108 Defeaters traceable to the conduct of other persons. 
109 Defeaters traceable to features of the world other than the conduct of other persons. 
110 E.g. where one person physically forces another person to conclude a contract that the latter does not 
wish to conclude. 
111 E.g. where a person is coerced, deceived or manipulated over a period of time to abandon his own 
decisions in favour of another’s i.e. there is a ‘surreptitious and insidious supplanting’ of the will.     
112 E.g. where a person’s desires, choices and actions are vitiated by (i) mental illness, (ii) intoxication, 
and/or (iii) unwanted addiction. 
113 E.g. where a person’s desires, choices and actions are vitiated by faulty cognitive procedures, like (i) 
fallacious deductive or inductive reasoning and inference, and/or (ii) cognitive bias. 
114 E.g. where a person’s desires, choices and actions are vitiated by (i) insufficient or incomplete relevant 
information and/or (ii) false information. 
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information) and (iv) defects in the stability of the person’s desires115 (defects of 
stability). (1985, pp.196-199) 
 
From these observations we are then in a position to say that a person will be 
maximally autonomous, in any given situation, when he is free from both external 
and internal defeaters. For every defeater present a person will be less and less 
autonomous. A person will be minimally autonomous, in any given situation, when 
he is beset by the greatest number of external and internal defeaters. A person could 
also, in principle, be beset by some defeaters but not others and thus find himself 
anywhere on the spectrum from minimal autonomy to maximal autonomy. The 
crucial point for the purposes of this discussion is that when any person makes any 
decision of great importance it is critical that it be made in a state of maximal 
autonomy or, at the very least, in as close a state to maximal autonomy as the 
circumstances possibly allow.116   
 
A3.3. INFORMED CONSENT 
 
It is the great importance that autonomy has in our lives that explains why we are 
especially sensitive to any attempts by others to encroach on or dictate how our lives 
                                        
115 E.g. where a person’s desires, choices and actions are vitiated by temperamental, volatile or capricious 
swings in mood. 
116 This seems to track our intuition that the more important a given decision is, the more important that 
it be made in a state approximating maximal autonomy. Accordingly, for decisions of relatively minor 
importance, while it may be desirable that they be made in a state of maximal autonomy, it may not be 
vital. 
  
56 
should go and why we consider it a significant harm when such encroachment occurs.117 
This sensitivity is apparent in many social contexts where people interact with each 
other but it is perhaps particularly heightened in medical contexts where we explicitly 
demand that medical treatment of persons only be performed on the basis of what is 
called the doctrine of informed consent (DIC) (J. Harris, 1985; Sumner, 2011). 
 
The DIC forms a fundamental feature of medical practice precisely because we 
recognise that anyone who administers a medical treatment to (or performs a medical 
procedure on) another person encroaches substantially on their bodily and mental 
integrity and thus encroaches on a domain that is intimately connected to a person’s 
existence and their well-being.  
 
Accordingly, we demand that such encroachments are justified only when they are 
made pursuant to, and as a result of, a person’s own decision that they should occur - 
that is to say, as a result of their own autonomous choice.118 It is for this same reason 
that the DIC also operates to allow a person to refuse medical treatment outright or to 
suspend medical treatment once it has already begun.  In short, adherence to the DIC 
is the principal method by which the intrinsic and extrinsic value of autonomy is 
protected and respected in medical contexts. 
 
                                        
117 The greater the encroachment, especially in respect of major life decisions, the greater the harm 
suffered by the person. 
118 The DIC finds application in many other social contexts outside the field of medicine. For example, in 
a boxing match each fighter consents – that is to say, exercises an autonomous choice – to enter the ring 
and risk physical injury for the purpose of winning the bout. 
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Sumner outlines the four essential components of the DIC as follows: (i) assent119 (ii) 
capacity120 (iii) voluntariness121, and (iv) disclosure.122 (2011, pp.28-30) In outlining 
these components Sumner is articulating the necessary and sufficient factors that must 
be met before a decision to undergo or suspend a proposed medical treatment or 
procedure is autonomous. It should be obvious that conditions (ii) – (iv) seek to negate 
the external and internal defeaters already mentioned and thereby ensure that the 
person is in a maximally autonomous state, while condition (i) is simply the obvious 
requirement that some clear and unambiguous signal be given by the person that he 
has made the decision.  
 
The idea is that once these four conditions are collectively satisfied then it can be said 
that the person is making a truly autonomous decision to undergo (or suspend) a 
medical treatment or procedure and the administration (or termination) thereof will 
then, accordingly, be morally justified. Conversely, if such conditions are not met then 
if the proposed treatment or procedure occurs (or is not terminated) it will be morally 
unjustified insofar as it will amount to an unwarranted and disrespectful encroachment 
on the person’s bodily and mental integrity and thus their autonomy.  
 
The DIC is, thus, absolutely critical when we contemplate any person who is desirous 
of engaging in VAS insofar as it will provide for us the necessary and sufficient 
conditions that must be satisfied if a person can be said autonomously to request 
                                        
119 The person must by some method express or signal a choice to undergo a particular medical treatment, 
at a particular time and administered or performed by a particular person or persons. 
120 The person must be free of (i) defects of control (ii) defects of reasoning and (iii) defects of stability. 
121 The person must be free of explicit and implicit compulsion. 
122 The person must be free of defects in information. 
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euthanasia. Determining (or judging) whether such conditions obtain for a given 
person in any particular circumstance will be a separate epistemological and empirical 
issue.  
 
A.4. HUMAN DIGINITY 
 
We have now examined the concepts of human well-being, individual autonomy, 
their intimate relationship with each other as well as having outlined what constitutes 
an autonomous action in a medical context (DIC). We have also considered some of 
the possible defeaters to autonomous action (internal and external defeaters). It is 
now time to look at the final building block of the positive case for the moral 
permissibility of VAS – human dignity.123 
 
At the outset it is important to emphasize that the concept of human dignity is 
intimately connected to the twin notions of value and respect.124 However, it is to be 
noted that in light of the Axiological Objectivism that I endorse, we are not here 
concerned with any given person’s subjective feeling that they are respectable or 
worthy. A person can feel (or believe) that she warrants respect in a given situation 
without actually being deserving of it.125 Conversely a person can feel (or believe) that 
they are not respectable when in actual fact they are.126 Nor are we concerned with 
                                        
123 Or more correctly, the dignity of human persons.  
124 The word ‘dignity’ comes from the Latin dignitas meaning ‘worthiness’. 
125 E.g. The immoral, callous and cruel king, who rightly deserves contempt, but who feels that, because 
of his political status and power, he is deserving of respect from his subjects. 
126 E.g. The magnanimous and compassionate pauper – who rightly deserves to be honoured – but who 
feels, because of his lowly economic status, he is not deserving of respect from others. 
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what has been termed ‘appraisal respect’, that is to say, respect that a person may have 
earned for displaying various kinds of excellences or achievements. (Darwall, 1977) 
Furthermore, we are not concerned with any parochial cultural or historical conception 
of what is considered respectable within a given society at any particular time in human 
history.127  
 
A.4.1. TWO CONCEPTIONS OF A DIGNIFIED HUMAN LIFE 
 
Instead our concern is with a concept of dignity which is far more fundamental than 
personal feeling, appraisal or culture. Our focus is on an idea that has been mentioned 
a number of times already and that is the idea that human beings are valuable and thus 
deserving of respect qua human being. The status that matters in our discussion is, 
accordingly, not cultural, ethnic, political, religious or economic, nor is it even a 
person’s estimation of their own status.128 Instead the status that matters for our 
purposes is that of ‘human being’ – what has been termed ‘recognition respect’. 
(Darwall, 1977) 
 
This conception of respect captures the idea that human beings, regardless of any 
accident of birth or station in life, have a special status which demands a certain type 
of ethical consideration. That special status is, accordingly, thought to place moral 
constraints (or limits) on how a human being is to be treated by others (and even 
himself). Human dignity, so construed, thus entails the comporting and constraint of 
                                        
127 E.g. The Victorian conception of what it is to be a ‘dignified and respectable gentleman’. 
128 The estimation of one’s worth in one’s own eyes. 
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conduct out of deference to ‘humanness’ i.e. it determines an appropriateness or 
fittingness between any proposed conduct and the object of humanity. Based on our 
original distinction between VCT and NCT we can then advance two different accounts 
of human dignity. 
 
For the proponent of VCT the dignity of human beings goes hand-in-glove with the 
intrinsic and terminal value of human life itself. Human life is thought to be 
intrinsically valuable and thus it will always be the appropriate object of respect. To 
destroy a human life is, therefore, to unjustifiably violate or undermine human dignity 
– it is to disrespect something that is always meant to be the appropriate object of 
honour and reverence.  
 
Dworkin, writing of the dignity of human life, links the concept explicitly to intrinsic 
value:  
 
A person’s right to be treated with dignity, I now suggest, is the right that others 
acknowledge his genuine critical interests: that they acknowledge that he is the kind 
of creature, and has the moral standing, such that it is intrinsically, objectively 
important how his life goes. Dignity is the central aspect of value we have been 
examining . . . the intrinsic importance of human life. (1994, p.236) 
 
Dworkin has clearly been influenced by the views of Kant, who provided one of the 
most important and influential secular articulations of human dignity. Gentzler 
describes Kant’s view of human dignity as follows: 
 
According to him [Kant], dignity (Wűrde) is absolute and unconditional intrinsic 
value. Objects with dignity are not merely instrumental means to the satisfaction of 
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various people’s ends but rather, in Kant’s famous phrase, they are “ends-in-
themselves” . . . As such they are to be valued and treated with the utmost respect. . . 
According to Kant, all human beings have dignity in virtue of their humanity, that is, 
their capacity for autonomous action. (2003, p.462) 
 
Sandel writes of the Kantian notion of respect as ‘a duty we owe to persons as rational 
beings, as bearers of humanity. It has nothing to do with who in particular the person 
may be. . . Kantian respect is respect for humanity as such, for a rational capacity that 
resides, undifferentiated, in all of us.’ (2010, p.123) This utmost respect due to human 
beings is, in Kant’s own words ‘infinitely above all price, with which it cannot be 
brought into comparison or competition at all without, as it were, violating its 
holiness.’ (1785 [1996], 4:435) Gunderson points out that Kant’s position in this regard 
‘is best interpreted as meaning that dignity is incommensurable with other values and 
not to be measured against or traded for other values. Dignity is not to be dealt with in 
terms of a cost-benefit analysis.’ (2004, p.279) Accordingly, human dignity, on this 
view, is both independent of (and incommensurable with) the contents of life and thus 
enjoys a sort of normative primacy.  
 
However, for the proponent of NCT, human life per se does not ipso facto generate 
dignity and thus does not automatically demand respect or reverence from anyone. 
Instead it will be the content of a human life that will determine whether any given life 
is ‘dignified’, ‘worthy of respect’ or ‘worthy of honour’. This view entails that there is a 
logical possibility for some human beings to live truly undignified lives. That is to say, 
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human lives that are not worthy of respect or honour and which are, for that reason, 
to be judged with disdain, shame or pity.129  
 
‘Dignity’ then, for the proponent of NCT, is neither a self-standing intrinsic good nor 
is it part and parcel of human life per se but rather it is a feature of a particular sort of 
human life.130 In particular, the epithet ‘undignified’ will be appropriate for a human 
life whenever there is a surplus of intrinsic evils in that life i.e. when the life is not 
worth living. On this sort of view ‘dignity’ can be said to track131 the ‘worthwhileness’ 
or ‘flourishing’ of human life. Accordingly, it is a contradiction on such a view to say of 
a particular person that (i) they have a life that is not worth living, but (ii) it is 
nevertheless a life that is worthy of respect, admiration, honour or reverence i.e. a 
dignified life. The dignified nature of a human life, on this view, is conditional on the 
contents of life and is normatively secondary. 
 
 
 
                                        
129 If you doubt this, consider the following sorts of lives: (i) a life suffused with severe pain, anguish and 
suffering which overshadows and swallows up all present intrinsic goods as well as the possibility of 
obtaining intrinsic goods in future; (ii) a life where one’s autonomy is so diminished that one can barely 
conceptualise and/or appreciate and/or attempt to obtain other intrinsic goods; (iii) a life so isolated and 
divorced from any sort of love, friendship, knowledge, connection or real accomplishment that it is 
empty, hollow and meaningless; (iv) a life that is characterised by elements of (i), (ii) and (iii). S. Harris 
paints a particularly nightmarish (but all too plausible) portrait of a life that qualifies for (iv). (2010, p.15) 
130 My position is similar, but by no means identical, to Aristotle’s conception of a life with dignity as being 
a life of activities that develop or exercise the human virtues. (See Gentzler, 2003)  
131 However, I should not be interpreted here as meaning that there are degrees of dignity. By ‘tracking’ I 
mean that the dignified nature of a life can be lost and gained when the worthwhileness of a life is lost or 
gained. However, if there are two lives that are both worthwhile they will both be just as dignified even if 
one of the lives contains qualitatively better and quantitatively more intrinsic goods (all things 
considered) than the other. 
  
63 
A4.2. AUTONOMY AND HUMAN DIGNITY 
 
For the proponent of VCT the link between autonomy and dignity is intimate and 
straightforward. A human being will only cease to have dignity when he ceases to be a 
human being. If Kant’s view of human dignity is adopted, this will occur only when a 
human being ceases to be autonomous. To cease to have the capacity for autonomous 
action, for Kant, is to cease to be a human being and to essentially become ‘a thing’ or 
‘an object’. 
 
For the proponent of NCT the relationship between autonomy, dignity and respect is 
slightly more complicated. Should a human life no longer be worth living it would be 
appropriate to say that such a life is ‘undignified’ and is no longer worthy of respect or 
admiration. This would be to correctly characterize the life viewed in toto. However, 
as already indicated, this would not be to say that for that reason alone the autonomy 
of the person whose life it is, is to be disrespected or disregarded. A life may not be 
worth living (or undignified) viewed in toto but the autonomy that a person has is still 
an intrinsic (and extrinsic) good, worthy of concern and respect.  
 
In short, the proponent of NCT could consistently assert the following three things 
about a human life: (i) that a given human life is not worth living judged in toto 
(unworthiness of life) (ii) such a human life is thus an undignified life which is 
unworthy of honour, respect or reverence (indignity of life), however, (iii) the 
autonomy of the person whose life it is ought to be respected precisely because of its 
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own intrinsic value as well as the possibility of its extrinsic value (instrumental and 
contributive) for the future life of the person (respect for autonomy). 
 
In this regard, the proponent of NCT can be ad idem with the proponent of VCT who 
adopts Kant’s notion of human dignity that autonomy is a thing to be respected and 
revered. However, what will separate the two is the latter’s assertion that autonomy is 
both (i) constitutive of what it is to be a human being, and (ii) is incommensurable 
with any other intrinsic goods. This is what I shall term the constitutive thesis and 
the incommensurability thesis respectively.  
 
A.5. THE POSITIVE CASE FOR VOLUNTARY ASSISTED SUICIDE 
 
We are now finally in a position to draw the threads of our previous discussion together 
and articulate the case for VAS, weaving together not just our discussion of death, its 
badness and the value of life but also the three interrelated concepts of human well-
being, individual autonomy and human dignity.  
 
In this section I intend to set out what, in my view, is the strongest positive case in 
favour of permitting VAS. However, it is to be emphasised it is only a prima facie case. 
What I mean by this is that I have adopted the philosophical burden of proof of putting 
forward prima facie reasons for why VAS should be permitted in South African society. 
I thus accept that I bear the so called ‘risk of non-persuasion’. Having set out such a 
case, the positive argument needs to be tested against the strongest arguments 
  
65 
advanced by opponents of VAS to see whether it is sustainable. This will be the focus 
of the following section where the two strongest arguments against the permissibility 
of VAS - the Sanctity of Life Argument (SLA) and the Social Harm Argument (SHA) 
- will be articulated, critiqued and found wanting. 
  
The positive case for the moral permissibility of VAS has two parts. The first part is 
based firmly on the view that NCT is the correct axiological account of the value of life, 
and addresses when VAS is permissible in respect of individual persons. The second 
part addresses why a social policy of prohibition of VAS is unjust and ought to be 
replaced by a permissive policy that incorporates regulation. The two parts can be set 
out in standard form as follows: 
 
PART I – INDIVIDUAL LIVES 
 
1. The value of a person’s life is instrumental and dependent on the intrinsic value of 
its contents. (NCT) 
2. A worthwhile life (a flourishing life or a life characterised by well-being) is one that 
(i) contains a net surplus of intrinsic goods, and/or (ii) will probably contain a net 
surplus of intrinsic goods in the future. (eudaimon/dignified life) 
3. A life that is not worth living is a life that (i) contains a net surplus of intrinsic evils 
and/ or (ii) will probably contain a net surplus of intrinsic evils in the future. (non-
eudaimon/undignified life) 
4. Death is the irreversible cessation of being a person. (personal account) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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5. Therefore, (a) death is bad if it deprives a person either of (i) a life that has a net 
surplus of intrinsic goods and/or (ii) of acquiring a probable net surplus of intrinsic 
goods in the future, and (b) death is good if it deprives a person either of (i) a life 
that has a net surplus of intrinsic evils and/or (ii) of acquiring a probable net surplus 
of intrinsic evils in the future. (deprivation account) (from 1 - 4) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
6. If the death of a person would be good then it is permissible for that person to 
exercise her autonomy to end her life. (intrinsic and extrinsic value of 
autonomy) 
7. If it is permissible for a person to exercise her autonomy to end her life then it is 
permissible for that person (i) to request another’s assistance to help her do so, and 
(ii) to be so assisted. (DIC) 
8. Sometimes the death of a person would be good. 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
9. Therefore, it is sometimes permissible for a person to exercise her autonomy to end 
her life. (from 6 and 8) 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
10. Therefore, it is sometimes permissible for (i) a person to request another’s 
assistance to end her life and (ii) to be so assisted. (from 7 and 9) 
 
PART II – SOCIAL POLICY 
 
11. A policy of prohibition in a society is, by definition, a policy that absolutely 
prohibits a certain practice (i.e. the practice is always impermissible). 
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12. VAS is sometimes permissible (from 10). 
13. There is presently a policy of prohibition of VAS in South Africa. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
14. Therefore, it is the case that VAS (which is sometimes permissible) is always 
prohibited in South Africa. (from 12 and 13) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
15. If a policy of prohibition always prohibits that which is sometimes morally 
permissible then such policy is unjust and ought to be reformed in favour of a policy 
of permissibility incorporating regulation. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
16. Therefore, the policy of prohibition of VAS in South Africa is unjust and ought to 
be reformed in favour of a policy of permissibility and regulation. (from 14 and 15). 
 
The first thing to notice about both Part I and Part II is their formal structure. Both 
parts are deductively valid. That is to say, if the premises are true then the conclusions 
follow as a matter of deductive inference. The key question then is whether the 
premises are true, or at the very least, whether they are more probably true than false. 
In short, in order to defeat the positive case, the soundness of Part I and/or Part II 
must be undermined. However, before addressing the main arguments against the 
crucial premises (that will be the focus of the next two sections) it will be useful to 
explicate the structure of the two parts, the role some of the important premises play 
and what is actually entailed by each part of the argument. 
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A.5.1. EXPLAINING PART I 
 
The first thing to notice is that Part I does not have a conclusion that permits VAS in 
any and all cases. The conclusion of Part I is very clear that VAS is only sometimes 
permissible. This means that it is possible for some instances of VAS to be 
impermissible i.e. morally wrong. A question immediately arises: assuming the 
soundness of Part I, under what circumstances would VAS be impermissible in the 
case of an individual person?  
 
To answer that question we must examine and explain premise (6) a little more closely. 
This premise makes the goodness of death the sole determining feature as to whether 
a person is entitled to utilise their autonomy to end their life i.e. commit US or engage 
in VAS. The implication of premise (6) is that it is impermissible for a person to exercise 
their autonomy to end their own life if their life is worthwhile i.e. if death would be 
bad. However, it could be argued that this places autonomy (itself an intrinsic good 
deserving of respect) in direct conflict with the other intrinsic goods that make life 
worthwhile and which are also worthy of respect. If this is the case, how can this 
conflict be resolved?  
 
To think about how we might do this, let us first think about two possible attitudes or 
views one could have toward the conflict. First, one could say that autonomy always 
trumps the existence of the other intrinsic goods in a person’s life. Let us call this the 
autonomy always view. To adopt the autonomy always view would be to say that 
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no matter how wonderful the content of a person’s life they are always entitled to end 
their lives when they so choose. This entails that it would be permissible for a person 
who was, in fact, living a eudaimon life to end it simply if he chose to do so. On this 
view, the autonomy of a person is always respected even if it is not (objectively 
considered) in his own good. In short, such a view entitles a person to always act 
against his own good (even tragically so) in the case of his decision to die, despite being 
the bearer of a eudaimon life. A person’s life is, on this view, analogous to ‘property 
held absolutely’ (Chetwynd, 2004, pp.177-179) and, provided there is no substantial 
harm to other persons, he can absolutely do with it as he wishes (including destroy 
it).132  
 
Second, one could say that the other intrinsic goods contained in a life always trump 
and constrain the autonomy of a person. Let us call this the goods always view. To 
adopt the goods always view would be to say that if a person is (objectively 
considered) living a eudaimon life he cannot ever exercise his autonomy to end his life. 
To adopt such a view would entail that a person living a eudaimon life is condemned to 
live it. The autonomy of a person on this view is respected only to the extent that he 
chooses to continue living and contribute (in whatever way he pleases) to his life but 
it is disregarded insofar as he wishes to end his eudaimon existence. 
 
                                        
132 Chetwynd uses the analogy of a home “[i]f I want to let my house fall down around me, and don’t think 
the effort of saving is worth making, that decision is mine alone, providing of course it does not injure 
anyone else as it falls down!” (2004, p.178) This is in stark contrast to Kant’s view. Sandel writes ‘Kant 
insists that we do not own ourselves. The moral requirement that we treat persons as ends rather than as 
mere means limits the way we may treat our bodies and ourselves. “Man cannot dispose over himself 
because he is not a thing; he is not his own property.” (2010, p.13o). 
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These two views – the autonomy always view and the goods always view – represent 
two extremes. The autonomy always view entails respecting the choices of a person 
who wishes to destroy his own eudaimon life – the thing that would, by its very nature, 
be most deserving of moral consideration and protection. The goods always view 
entails that we always disrespect a person’s autonomy when, although living a 
eudaimon life, he wishes to make one of the most important and intimate decisions a 
person can make, namely when and how he is to die.  This appears to be itself a serious 
harm to the person. After all, as Wellman points out ‘to disrespect the rational agency 
of another by interfering with her action is to reduce her control over her life and 
thereby threaten what matters most to the value of her life.’ (2003, p.27) 
 
Neither view appears particularly attractive or persuasive. Is there a solution to this 
apparently aporetic predicament? Or is it simply a matter of arbitrary personal 
preference which view to adopt? I wish to suggest a third view, which hopefully 
represents a reasonable middle path, and which acknowledges the powerful points 
made by its more extreme siblings. We could call this view the rebuttable autonomy 
view.  
 
This view starts first by acknowledging that it is not permissible (and thus undesirable) 
for people to end their lives if they are, in fact, lives worth living. The reason being that 
eudaimon lives are, by definition, precisely the sorts of lives that are worth having, 
maintaining, respecting and protecting from destruction. It acknowledges that it 
would be wrong for a person to end a eudaimon life even if it is his own.  
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However, this view also acknowledges that the person whose life it is, will often be the 
one best situated to judge whether he is living a eudaimon life or not. The reason for 
this is because he will be the one most intimately and viscerally acquainted with the 
contents of his life. He will have lived his life from ‘the inside’133 and will in most cases 
have a privileged acquaintance with its present features and future prospects. Of 
necessity, anyone else judging it from the outside – like Scruton imagines134 - will be 
judging it in a somewhat impersonal and indirect way. Accordingly, a person’s 
judgment – being a crucial aspect of his autonomy – about the worthwhileness (or lack 
thereof) of his life ought to be respected unless his judgment is ‘overruled’ by even 
more cogent, persuasive and prodigious evidence to the contrary.  
 
This means that there ought to be a presumption in favour of the person’s own 
epistemic assessment of the contents of his life and his autonomous choices in respect 
thereof, including a decision to engage in VAS. This presumption is, however, 
rebuttable. This is because it is also to be recognised that while people are usually 
competent judges of the contents of their lives, occasionally they can be genuinely 
mistaken in their own assessment.135 Human beings are not infallible even in respect of 
their own lives. And death, after all, is ferociously final.136 It is, in my view, only by 
                                        
133 From ‘the marrow to the meat’ as it were. 
134 See footnote 107. 
135 We can think here, for example, of the young man who has just experienced his first romantic 
heartbreak and is in the midst of emotional suffering sufficient for him to wish his life was over. However, 
he still has many rewarding friendships and relationships, has the capacity to engage in a worthwhile and 
meaningful profession, he knows he can yet experience pleasure and realises that he still has the capacity 
to love and cultivate further knowledge. While he might judge his life to no longer be worth living, it is 
reasonable to suppose that he is making a tragic mistake and that there is sufficient cogent countervailing 
evidence to indicate that he is still living, and will probably live in future, a eudaimon life. 
136 Tyrion Lannister – a character in the HBO television series ‘Game of Thrones’ – perspicaciously reminds 
us ‘death is so final, whereas life is full of possibilities.’ (season 1, episode 2: The Kingsroad, 2011) 
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carefully and slowly walking this middle path that we can best ensure that (i) those 
human lives that are worthwhile continue to flourish, while simultaneously (ii) 
respecting the autonomy of those who judge their lives to no longer be worth living.137  
 
Premise (6) is important for a further reason. Nothing about Part I places any 
additional restrictions on who is entitled to request VAS. It is sometimes thought, for 
example, that VAS should be permitted but restricted to the terminally ill (Gunderson 
& Mayo, 2000) or perhaps only to those suffering from severe physical pain. If Part I 
and, in particular, premise (6) is sound then there is no justifiable moral reason for 
limiting the scope of permissibility to the terminally ill or those in severe physical pain. 
In fact to do so, would be to act quite arbitrarily and would do justice to neither (i) the 
rich, multifaceted and elastic concept of a life worth living nor (ii) the intrinsic value 
of autonomy. If premise (6) is accepted then any person who is not living a worthwhile 
life will be entitled to exercise their autonomy to engage in VAS. It is perhaps useful at 
this juncture to recall, with some compassion and empathy, that there could be any 
number of human lives that may reasonably be thought not to be worthwhile.138  A life 
touched by terminal illness or severe physical pain may be just one such life.  
 
Next, some readers may also be concerned about premise (7). Does it follow that 
because a person is entitled to end their own life they are then entitled to request 
another to assist them to do so and then to be so assisted? As Sumner reminds us 
                                        
137 However, in those rare cases where a person’s own epistemic assessment about the worthwhileness of 
his life and the contradictory evidence pull in equal but opposite directions, the epistemic assessment of 
the person (and thus his autonomy) ought to triumph. 
138 See footnote 129.  
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‘[w]hile suicide remains within personal boundaries . . . assistance crosses those 
boundaries: it is an action not by a person on herself but by one person upon another.’ 
(2013, p.85) It is indeed a conceptual possibility that although it is permissible for some 
person to perform an action it would be impermissible for another person to assist 
them to perform it.139 However, that being said, given the very nature of VAS which is 
characterised by an autonomous request (consent) for another to assist in the ending 
of a life ‘[t]he real ethical burden of justifying assistance with suicide seems to be 
discharged by justifying suicide itself.’ (Sumner, 2011, p.85) Similarly, Glover writes ‘[i]f 
it is right to stand aside and let someone kill himself, it is hard to see why it is wrong 
to provide necessary assistance.’ (1977, p.184) 
 
It must also be emphasised that the conclusion reached in Part I contains no 
proscription on the mode or method of assistance that can be provided to the person 
requesting VAS. This means that if Part I is sound then VAS both in the form of DVAS 
and INVAS is permissible.140 The conclusion of Part I also places no restraints on who 
is permitted to provide assistance. The conclusion of Part I thus entails the 
permissibility of both PAS and NPAS.  
 
We might think, however, that there is at least one persuasive practical and 
professional reason for preferring PAS over NPAS (at the very least, when PAS is 
possible and available). Physicians are specially trained in the field of medicine and 
                                        
139 The converse does not appear to hold though. If it is impermissible for a person to perform some action 
then it is impermissible to assist that person in performing that action. (McMahan, 2002) 
140 Furthermore, it would not matter whether the assistance provided took the form of a commission or 
omission. As I have already indicated, I consider there to be no intrinsic moral difference between the 
two types of conduct. See footnote 35.  
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thus are experts in the provision of medical treatments including the procedures that 
would be sufficient to end the life of a person requesting VAS quickly and painlessly, 
whereas, friends or family members often lack the medical expertise needed and may 
do more harm than good in providing the specialised assistance that is required.  
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that what has been argued for is the permissibility of 
VAS. There has been no suggestion that it is ever obligatory for a person to assist 
someone who requests VAS. In fact, there are very good reasons for supposing that it 
should not be obligatory. To obligate a physician (or a non-physician) to render 
assistance to any person who requested VAS would itself undermine the autonomy and 
well-being of the physician (or non-physician) and constitute a serious harm. No one 
should be compelled to euthanize another person. The efficaciousness of requests for 
VAS in individual cases will thus depend on a person obtaining the services of a 
physician (or non-physician) who has himself autonomously agreed to render 
assistance. In this way the autonomy and well-being of persons who decline to assist 
can be respected and they need not be concerned by the threat of compulsion.141 
 
However, some readers may wonder, with understandable concern, what is to happen 
to the person who desires VAS but who can find no willing physician to assist them. In 
such a case the person should then be entitled to obtain the assistance of a non-
physician, such as a close friend or family member. However, what of the person who 
                                        
141 This is especially important because a person may experience substantial emotional and psychological 
distress and even severe trauma should they be compelled to render such assistance. Such harm could 
arise for a variety of reasons, for instance, they might have strong religious or theological objections or 
they might simply recoil at the prospect of having a morbid and melancholic chapter forcefully written 
into their own book of life by another person.   
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can find neither a physician nor a non-physician who is willing to assist? Is such a 
person to be left without any recourse? Will they be condemned to languish in an 
undignified existence? I believe that the answer might very well be that they are.142 
However, I also believe that any concerns about such unlikely cases amounts to a 
premature cry over un-spilt milk. After all, the capacity for human pity is both 
ubiquitous and potent and the probability of a person being unable to obtain assistance 
from anyone is, in my view, remarkably slim.  
 
A.5.2. EXPLAINING PART II 
 
Part II is simpler than Part I. The crucial premise is premise (15) which asserts one 
simple point, namely, that the absolute prohibition of a practice is unjust143 if there are 
instances of the practice that would sometimes be permissible. This is simply to state 
that absolute prohibitions are sometimes unjustly over-proscriptive. Figuratively 
speaking, they are policies that catch fish in the trawling net that ought properly not 
to be caught. This is one very strong reason for seeking to change a given policy of 
prohibition. It is important to emphasise, however, that the pendulum swing from 
absolute prohibition is not one to absolute permissibility.  
 
The constraints on when VAS is permissible arises from premise (6) of Part I subject 
to the rebuttable autonomy view. Part I thus provides a very good reason for 
                                        
142 In such a tragic case a person must either (i) somehow attempt to engage in US or (ii) resign herself to 
the reality that nothing can be done unless and until another person is willing to assist her. 
143 I use the term ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ as the socio-legal and political level analogues of ‘morally permissible’ 
and ‘morally impermissible’ at the individual level. 
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supposing that while absolute prohibition is unjust, complete permissibility would also 
be unjust. Part II argues that the best route is one that permits and regulates the 
practice of VAS and thereby ensures that only those fish that ought to be caught in the 
net are, in fact, so caught. It is to be noted finally that nothing about the conclusion of 
Part II indicates how the practice of VAS should be regulated or what method of 
regulation would be best. The precise contours of such regulation is an important 
question and one to which we will return in the second section. For now, let us turn to 
the two main arguments that stand ready to do battle with Part I and Part II of the 
case just presented. 
 
A.6. THE MAIN ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE POSITIVE CASE 
 
Hume wrote that ‘if suicide be criminal, it must be a transgression of our duty, either 
to God, to our neighbour or ourselves.’ (1757 [2014], p.3).144 Of course any concerns 
about moral duties to God have been rendered moot as a consequence of one of the 
major philosophical assumptions with which we began, namely, Metaphysical 
Naturalism.145 This leaves us with two remaining viable justifications for moral 
impermissibility viz. violations of a moral duty to our neighbours and/or ourselves. 
 
                                        
144 By ‘criminal’ Hume means, in this context, morally impermissible. 
145 Of course, both Metaphysical Naturalism and/or Atheism could be false. It is interesting, however, to 
point out, that at a purely descriptive level, the overwhelming majority of contemporary analytic 
philosophers seem to believe that Atheism is true (72.8%). More philosophers also believe Metaphysical 
Naturalism is true (49.8%) than those who embrace a non-naturalistic view (25.9%). The remainder 
appeared to endorse some ‘other’ metaphysical view (24.3%) (Borget & Chalmers, 2013).    
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There are two major arguments that seek to meet Hume’s challenge, namely the 
Sanctity of Life Argument (SLA) and the Social Harm Argument (SHA). Each 
argument addresses a different aspect. The SLA addresses most directly the 
impermissibility of VAS as a violation of a duty to ourselves. The SLA is a thoroughly 
deontological argument. By this I mean that the moral permissibility or 
impermissibility of VAS is not going to depend solely on good or bad consequences.146  
 
On the other hand, the SHA acknowledges that even if VAS does not violate a duty to 
oneself (and that there can be some cases where VAS is permissible for individuals) 
there would nevertheless be a cascade of social harms which would ensue if a 
permissive VAS policy was adopted over a policy of prohibition. The SHA thus has a 
consequentialist heart beating in its chest.147 The idea is that a policy of complete 
prohibition conduces to better consequences for our neighbours in society than the 
adoption of any other policy. We can see then that the SLA is going to take issue with 
Part I of the positive case while the SHA is going to take up the sword against Part II 
of the positive case. 
 
However, before turning to these principal arguments, a preliminary criticism of the 
positive case and its reliance on the concept of autonomy deserves mention. It is 
sometimes argued as follows: 
 
[P]roponents of assisted suicide face a dilemma in appealing to autonomy, whether of 
a descriptive or ascriptive stripe. Descriptive autonomy, devoid of normativity, defies 
                                        
146 See footnote 23. 
147 See footnote 22. 
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restrictions because society thwarts the autonomy of an individual when it denies his 
“authentic” or “self-creative” choice to die, or any other choice. Ascriptive autonomy 
retains normativity, but only by capitulating its moral neutrality and violating the 
autonomy of adherents of conflicting moral theories. Certainly society must limit the 
harm that autonomous acts could yield, but any limitation implicates a view of the 
good and undermines opponents’ autonomy. Thus autonomy-based arguments for 
assisted suicide are self-refuting in two regards: first, acts of assisted suicide 
committed in the name of autonomy annihilate the very basis of individual autonomy; 
second, arguments grounded on autonomy ultimately depend on a view of the good 
that, if socially prescribed, would subvert individual’s autonomy to attain alternative 
views of the good. (Safranek, 1998, p.35) 
 
This critique is unpersuasive for three reasons. First, it should be obvious to the 
observant reader that the positive case does not rely on a descriptive view of 
autonomy, that is to say a morally neutral account of autonomy, but rather an 
ascriptive view of autonomy. On such a view autonomy is itself considered an intrinsic 
good that is constitutive of human well-being.  
 
Second, insofar as the positive case does appeal to an ascriptive view of autonomy it 
does, of necessity, endorse a specific conception of the good viz. a specific conception 
of human well-being (Axiological Pluralism and Axiological Objectivism). This is 
readily and easily granted. However, since the positive case does not entail that any 
third person is obligated to accede to a given person’s request for VAS, we need not be 
concerned that the autonomy of third persons with alternative conceptions of the good 
will be violated, or otherwise forced to bend to a foreign conception of the good. In 
short, their autonomy, well-being and personal conception of the good would remain 
intact.  
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Third, the positive case does not entail compelling a person to engage in VAS even if 
there is good reason to believe that their life is not worth living. Thus there can be no 
question of violating individual autonomy by forcing persons to engage in VAS out of 
deference to a particular theory of the good. However, it is true that if the person is 
clearly living a eudaimon life then the positive case would not permit him to exercise 
his autonomy to engage in VAS. This would indeed be a restraint on his autonomy out 
of deference to a particular conception of the good. However, if that conception of the 
human good is correct then this is not a serious challenge to the positive case but rather 
the normative consequence of a true account of the human good with prescriptive 
consequences for human conduct.  It is also worth remembering that this potentially 
paternalistic consequence would be tempered by the application of the rebuttable 
autonomy view. That is to say, the presumption in favour of a person’s own immediate 
and intimate epistemic assessment of the worthwhileness of his life, which could be 
rebutted only by reference to clear, cogent and compelling evidence to the contrary. 
 
Finally, this leaves the charge that VAS annihilates the very basis for autonomy. The 
idea seems to be that the positive case is somehow illogical insofar as one is justifying 
the use of autonomy to engage in an act that undermines future autonomy. However, 
this criticism ignores the fact that, according to the positive case, autonomy is simply 
one intrinsic good among a plurality of intrinsic goods. According to the positive case, 
autonomy is not to be preserved at the expense of all the other intrinsic goods.148 If a 
                                        
148 It should be emphasized that we recognise this in many other areas of our lives. We often limit, 
constrain or trade-off our autonomy (to various degrees) for the sake of other intrinsic goods. For 
example, we make promises to friends that constrain our future autonomy out of deference to the 
friendship. We undermine present autonomy for the sake of learning activities that give us knowledge. 
Out of deference to certain pleasurable experiences we are willing to forego autonomous action. We are 
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person is truly not living a worthwhile life (viewed in toto), then he is by definition 
better off dead even if his life nevertheless contains the intrinsically valuable element 
of autonomy. In such circumstances, utilising one’s autonomy to terminate a non-
worthwhile life is not a contradictory or illogical thing to do at all, even though it 
involves the annihilation of the possibility for autonomous action in the future. With 
this preliminary challenge out of the way, we can now turn to an examination of the 
SLA. 
 
A6.1. THE SANCTITY OF LIFE ARGUMENT 
 
The SLA attacks two fundamental premises of the positive case. First, that the NCT is 
the correct account of the value of a human life - premise (1). Second, that death can 
ever be a good thing for a person - premise (8). On the contrary it asserts that VCT is 
the correct axiological theory to account for the value of human life and that in virtue 
of this axiological theory death is always bad for a person.  
 
We can put the SLA into standard form as follows:- 
 
1. Human life per se is intrinsically valuable. (VCT) (Sacred or inviolable) 
2. It is impermissible to destroy (or disrespect) something of intrinsic value. 
3. US and thus, a fortiori, VAS constitutes the destruction of human life. 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
                                        
also, in many cases, willing to forego autonomy (in various degrees) to avoid intrinsic evils like mental 
and physical suffering.  
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4. Therefore, US and thus, a fortiori, VAS always constitutes the destruction of 
something of intrinsic value. (from 1-3) 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
5. Therefore, US and thus, a fortiori, VAS is always impermissible. (from 2 and 4) 
 
Formally the SLA is deductively valid and thus if the premises are true the main 
conclusion will follow straightforwardly. Premise (1) is simply the assertion of the truth 
of VCT. Premise (2) reflects the idea that has been central throughout our discussion, 
namely, that things of intrinsic value are the very sorts of things that are the 
appropriate objects of moral concern and ought not to be destroyed, disrespected or 
undermined. Premise (3) is a straightforward articulation of what is entailed by US and 
VAS. When premise (2) is combined with the sub-conclusion in premise (4) what is 
entailed is an absolute and unconditional conclusion. Such a conclusion, if true, means 
that not only is Part I unsound but we would then also have good reason to reject Part 
II. After all, if a certain practice is always impermissible in individual cases then we will 
have at least one strong reason to implement a prohibitionist policy across society.  
 
However, what reasons do we have to be convinced of the truth of premise (1) of the 
SLA? If the SLA is to be at all persuasive it must defend this premise or fall to be 
rejected. I shall argue that this key premise cannot be adequately defended and thus 
the SLA is not a good argument. While reflecting on the persuasiveness of the SLA it 
might be useful for the contemplative reader to keep the following question firmly in 
mind: 
 
  
82 
Our ability to sustain vital signs virtually as long as we wish pointedly raises the 
question whether we value life for its electrical efflorescence or for qualities that might 
be enjoyed by the person whose life is in jeopardy. In fact it raises the question what 
the life is that we value. Is it biology or biography? (Suber, 1996, p.1) 
 
A6.1.1 ANALYSIS AND RESPONSES 
 
In truth, premise (1) has two philosophical siblings that make even bolder claims which 
are worth examining, if only for the sake of completeness and conceptual clarity. First, 
some might believe that it is not human life that is intrinsically valuable but rather that 
existence per se is intrinsically valuable (brute existence view). Second, some might 
believe that even if brute existence is not per se intrinsically valuable, biological 
existence certainly is (biological existence view). While the former view is even 
bolder than the latter, both views entail that human life would be intrinsically valuable. 
(Frankena, 1976) Unfortunately, it is precisely in virtue of their boldness that these 
views are highly implausible. 
 
Let us begin with the brute existence view. A proponent of this view might argue that 
it is simply better, all things considered, for things to exist rather than not exist. 
Existence, on this view, is always axiologically preferable (and thus desirable) to non-
existence. When things (regardless of what they are) have the property of existing then 
they are intrinsically valuable. If this view is correct then anything would be 
intrinsically valuable simply by virtue of its existing (including human beings).There 
are at least two problems with the brute existence view.  
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First, the view mistakenly seems to posit ‘existence’ as a separate distinct property that 
things can possess149 rather than viewing ‘existence’ as a descriptive term for a thing 
that has properties.150 Second, and perhaps more importantly, the question can always 
be asked: what reasons do we have to accept that brute existence is intrinsically 
valuable (and thus desirable) over non-existence?  
 
Admittedly, when asking this question it is difficult not to rely on certain intuitions. 
However, to test our intuitions I propose that we imagine a possible world that has 
certain things existing in it. Since the brute existence view asserts that mere existence 
is intrinsically valuable we must exclude any other potential intrinsically valuable thing 
from this possible world. One could, therefore, imagine a possible world filled to the 
brim with only inanimate matter, for example, rocks. Let us call this world WR. One 
could then ask is WR intrinsically valuable?  
 
The answer, to my mind, is clearly no. It seems to be patently obvious that WR is no 
better than no world at all. A world consisting only of rocks can, by definition, make 
no difference to anyone or anything else. It would be a completely inanimate and 
stagnant world lacking dynamism, change or growth. Such a possible world appears to 
be nothing more than the ultimate ontological recluse, a hermit world destined to 
affect nothing and no-one forever. In short, to say that there is a possible world that 
exists but it affects nothing and no-one seems to be on a functional par with the world’s 
                                        
149 As if additional information is added to the concept of a particular table, for example, by saying that 
the table is rectangular, brown, located in my living room, weighs twenty kilograms and it exists.  
150 The proponent of this view might then retort it is simply the having of properties that is intrinsically 
valuable. To exist is to have properties and having properties (whatever they may be) is intrinsically 
valuable. 
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non-existence. WR appears to be a possible world which, when contemplated in the 
actual world, justifiably prompts the thought ‘well if it did exist, it may as well not 
exist’. It is, therefore, extremely difficult, if not impossible, to see how the brute 
existence of rocks in WR could be intrinsically valuable.  
 
In the face of such implausibility, the biological existence view might be asserted 
instead. It may be conceded that while brute existence is not intrinsically valuable, 
biological existence fares better. After all, it may be argued, that biological existence is 
sufficiently different from inanimate existence to warrant being thought of as 
intrinsically valuable. It may be argued, for example, that contrary to inanimate matter 
biological life grows, is dynamic and changing. Biological life multiplies and 
perpetuates itself. In short, things that are biologically alive possess a host of properties 
which are lacking from inanimate matter (like rocks) and which make an axiological 
difference. Albert Schweitzer best articulated this sort of unconstrained view about the 
intrinsic value of all biological life when he wrote: 
 
A man is truly ethical only when he obeys the compulsion to help all life which he is 
able to assist, and shrinks from injuring anything that lives. . . Life as such is sacred to 
him. He tears no leaf from a tree, plucks no flower, and takes care to crush no insect. 
(1923 [2015], p.105) 
 
Once again we can return to our possible world thought experiment to test the 
inherent plausibility of such a view. This time instead of imagining WR let us imagine 
a possible world consisting solely of a single biological organism - a weed. Let us call 
this possible world WW. In WW the weed grows, it multiplies, it is dynamic and 
perpetuates itself. It will continue to grow forever and ever, all the while WW will 
  
85 
continuously expand to facilitate this weed-like behaviour. Is WW intrinsically 
valuable?  
 
I would again suggest a negative answer. The added properties of dynamism, growth, 
perpetuation and multiplication do not seem to be a sufficient justification for 
asserting the intrinsic value of the weed (and thus WW) at all. Certain questions 
naturally arise. Growth for whom? Multiplication to what end? Perpetuation for what 
purpose? Again we seem to be faced with a form of existence that is unable to affect 
anything or anyone ever. The weed’s biological self-perpetuation in WW seems 
gratuitous and absurd.  
 
What difference could it possibly make whether the weed lives or dies or whether it 
ever existed at all for that matter? If such a world spontaneously slipped out of 
existence would anything sacrosanct truly be lost? It may be argued that surely it 
matters to the weed that it grows, perpetuates itself and continues to exist. But herein 
lies the rub, since there is no ‘point of view’ associated with the weed. There is nothing 
that ‘it is like to be’ the weed and there are no phenomenal properties that can possibly 
be ascribed to the weed. Accordingly, I do not believe it is possible to defend the 
preferability and desirability of the existence of WW over no world at all. Each seem, on 
critical reflection, to be axiologically on par with each other - equally devoid of intrinsic 
worth.151  
                                        
151 It is important, at this juncture, to remember the crucial distinction between intrinsic value and 
extrinsic value, and particularly, inherent value.  I am not denying that such worlds (WR and WW) 
might instantiate some sort of inherent value. I am arguing that such worlds are not intrinsically 
valuable, that is to say, desirable in any way for their own sake. 
  
86 
Perhaps we are being unfair in advancing these two views. After all, it is not brute 
existence or biological existence of any sort that is intrinsically valuable but rather 
existence as a human being that counts (human existence view). This is what the 
proponent of the SLA is really asserting viz. the human organism qua biological entity 
is intrinsically valuable. Such a proponent is asserting that the human organism is a 
special sort of living biological machine that is sufficiently different from a rock or a 
weed to render it intrinsically valuable. On this view, the human body: 
 
[I]s the life of a person and has the dignity of a person. Every human being is equal 
precisely in having that human life which is also humanity and personhood, and thus 
that dignity and intrinsic value. Human bodily life is not mere habitation, platform or 
instrument for the human person or spirit. It is therefore not merely an instrumental 
good, but is an intrinsic and basic human good. (Finnis, 1995, pp.32-33).  
 
John Keown concurs, writing that human life has ‘an intrinsic dignity [that] grounds 
the principle that one must never intentionally kill an innocent human being’ (2002, 
p.40) and thus ‘human life is not only an instrumental good, a necessary precondition 
of thinking or doing, but a basic good, a fundamental basis of human flourishing.’ 
(2002, p.41). Finally, William Frankena writes: 
 
If we ask ourselves what makes acts of shortening or preventing human bodily life 
wrong, then one answer is to say that such acts are wrong just because they are acts 
of ending . . . a human bodily life. In this view (and only in this view), the sanctity of 
human life, absolute or presumptive, is a basic ethical principle, holding that we 
should respect human bodily life as such, because of what it is and not because of 
other facts about it. (1976, p.34) 
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The human existence view, therefore, asserts that the complex evolved biological 
form of a token human being is intrinsically valuable. Dworkin views the sanctity of 
human life on this view as arising, at least in part, from a kind of evolutionary 
investment in the complex and organic machinery that constitutes human biological 
existence (1994, p.84), the destruction of which would represent a ‘cosmic shame’ and 
be a tragic waste. (1994, p.75) However, this view has at least two immediate problems. 
First, it appears to be arbitrarily speciest. (Singer, 2011) Second, it appears to be 
susceptible to exactly the same sort of criticisms levelled against the previous two 
views. 
 
First, it is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to see how the mere fact that an entity 
has, over a lengthy period of time, evolved to be biologically human could, on its own, 
magically transduce the entity into something that is intrinsically valuable. Why is 
evolved human life special as opposed to evolved weed life? Or evolved virus life? Or 
evolved mushroom life? As Glover points out: 
 
It is worth mentioning that the objection to taking human life should not rest on what 
is sometimes called ‘speciesm’: human life being treated as having a special priority 
over animal life [or any form of life] simply because it is human. The analogy is with 
racism . . . according to which people of a certain race ought to be treated differently 
simply because of their membership of that race without any argument referring to 
special features of that race being given. This is objectionable partly because of its 
moral arbitrariness . . . an adequate justification must cite relevant differences 
between species. (1977, pp. 50-51) 
 
In the absence of at least one distinguishing property that makes a plausible and salient 
moral difference, the claim that evolved biological human life is intrinsically valuable 
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appears to amount to no more than the white supremacist’s claim that ‘white lives’ per 
se matter more than ‘non-white lives’ simply in virtue of their ‘whiteness’.  
 
Second, it can be argued that this view is susceptible to exactly the same sort of 
criticism levelled against both the brute existence and biological existence view. 
To see how this might be, let us imagine a possible world where the capability exists to 
grow entities that are biologically and genetically identical to human beings. Let us call 
this possible world WC.  These human clones have working respiratory systems, 
circulatory systems and they take in nourishment from the world in order to perpetuate 
their metabolic functions. They are, by all accounts, extraordinarily complex biological 
machines that breathe in oxygen and expel carbon-dioxide. However, the clones lack 
any ‘internal qualitative dimension’ to their existence. Although they are biologically 
and genetically identical to human beings, they lack the capacity for consciousness. In 
short, the clones are human but they are not persons. They are phenomenologically 
vacuous carbon-based organic platforms that simply happen to contain human genetic 
material. There are no experiences, dreams, relationships, hopes, desires or wants 
associated with the clones nor are they capable of exercising any rational cognitive 
capacities. 
 
Now imagine that WC is filled only with such clones suspended in special tanks that 
provide them with the nourishment necessary to allow them to persist in this purely 
biological sense.152 Could such a possible world truly be said to instantiate or express 
                                        
152 I adapted this thought experiment from two sources which, in their own way, examine the existence of 
conscious and non-conscious human clones. First, the film ‘The Island’ directed by Michael Bay (2005). 
Second, the interactive video game ‘Technobabylon’ published by Wadjet Eye Games (2015). 
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anything of terminal value? Could it seriously be contended that such a world 
represents any kind of existence that is desirable in itself? If we do think such a world 
to be intrinsically valuable are we not simply guilty of fetishizing the electrical 
efflorescence and ‘vital signs’ of human biological existence over its biography?153 
Would you consider an existence of this sort to exemplify a basic or fundamental 
human good?  
 
Glover writes ‘I have no way of refuting someone who holds that being alive, even 
though unconscious, is intrinsically valuable. But it is a view that will seem unattractive 
to those of us who, in our own case, see a life of permanent coma as in no way preferable 
to death.’ (1977, p.45). I could not agree more, and believe it can be said with reasonable 
certainty that no reader who seriously and honestly contemplates WC could desire to 
exist as one of its ‘hollow denizens’ or think that such a world instantiates anything 
remotely sacred, admirable or worthy of respect. Far from being sacrosanct as Finnis 
or Keown suggests, the relentless respiration of the clones seems chillingly repulsive. 
Accordingly, if the tanks sustaining the biological existence of the clones were all 
switched off and their biological functions ceased, I contend nothing bad would have 
occurred.  
 
If someone did think that such an occurrence would be morally tragic or repulsive then 
I would align myself with Suber in arguing such a person to be a victim of a moral 
shibboleth where ‘one is still associating vital signs per se with the kind of life that is 
                                        
153 One is here tempted to exclaim in disbelief together with Tennyson’s Ulysses ‘as tho’ to breathe were 
life!’ (1842 [2004], p.697). 
  
90 
worth living. The repulsion is difficult to shake off because our moral intuitions have 
been cultivated in circumstances in which biological life is a pretty good surrogate for 
life worth living. But repulsion is not an argument, only an artefact of our moral 
genealogy.’ (1996, p.25) 
 
At this point the proponent of the SLA could become indignant and accuse me of 
straw-manning her position. After all, what she is really asserting is that conscious 
human life - personhood - is intrinsically valuable. Let us call this the personal 
existence view.  This does seem like a more promising view to hold for two principal 
reasons. First, by adopting this view the charge of speciesm can plausibly be side-
stepped, insofar as consciousness does appear to be a salient moral property that 
distinguishes persons from most other biological organisms and all inanimate 
artefacts. After all, it was the personal account of death that carried with it a moral 
valence that the biological account of death lacked. Second, this shift to the assertion 
that personhood is something of intrinsic value is not as far-fetched (or intuitively 
implausible) as the other views mentioned above. Writing of consciousness and its 
intimate connection to value, S. Harris says: 
 
I think we can know, through reason alone, that consciousness is the only intelligible 
domain of value. What is the alternative? I invite you to try to think of a source of 
value that has absolutely nothing to do with the (actual or potential) experience of 
conscious beings. Take a moment to think about what this would entail: whatever this 
alternative is, it cannot affect the experience of any creature (in this life or any other). 
Put this thing in a box, and what you have in that box is – it would seem, by definition 
– the least interesting thing in the universe. (2010, p.32) 
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S. Harris does not, however, distinguish in this passage between the intrinsic and 
extrinsic value of consciousness and thus it is not clear whether he takes 
consciousness to instantiate one or the other? Or perhaps even both? The question 
now pressingly becomes: is personhood desirable as an end-in-itself or is it desirable 
simply as a means to other more substantive terminal ends?  
 
It is important here to emphasise that it will not be sufficient for a proponent of the 
personal existence view to argue that personhood is simply another intrinsically 
valuable thing that can take its place in the pantheon of intrinsically valuable things. 
Even if this were to be granted, it would entail that personhood (as just one intrinsic 
good) could nevertheless, in principle, be outweighed or overridden by a 
superabundance of other intrinsic evils or the dearth of other intrinsic goods contained 
within a person’s life. Death could, in the final analysis, still be good even if personhood 
were counted as something of intrinsic value on par with other intrinsic goods.  
 
To avoid this unpalatable conclusion, the proponent of the personal existence view 
must not only argue that (i) personhood is intrinsically valuable, but also that it is (ii) 
incommensurable with other intrinsically valuable and disvaluable things. It would be 
this feature of incommensurability that would ensure that, no matter what is going on 
‘within’ a person’s life, death could never be good for a person. Such a view, if sound, 
would then entail that all cases of US and VAS would be impermissible.  
 
A proponent who advances the personal existence view and who is desirous of 
articulating the strongest case for such a view might draw quite powerful support from 
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a particular notion of human worth that has already been mentioned, namely, the 
Kantian notion of the intrinsic worth of human persons. The personal existence 
view, which is exemplified in David Velleman’s writing, thus deserves further detailed 
consideration (1999).  
 
Velleman openly admits that what he is arguing for is a sanctity of human life position 
grounded in secularism:  ‘talk of someone’s value as a person sounds like religion rather 
than philosophy. Such talk is a secular version of religious talk about the sanctity of 
human life. . . What secular morality must regard as sacrosanct, I have suggested, is 
not the human organism but the person . . .’ (1999, pp.615-616).154 
 
In advancing his secular argument for premise (1) of the SLA, Velleman distinguishes 
between two sorts of value. He draws a distinction between what he calls interest-
relative value and interest-independent value. (1999, pp.610-611) Interest-relative 
value is the sort of value that one would normally associate with what can be good for 
or bad for a particular person. For example, pain and suffering are bad for the person 
whose life it is, whereas love, knowledge and pleasure are good for the person whose 
life it is. Viewed in this way, it is clear that for Velleman, interest-relative value is 
synonymous with a particular person’s good or well-being.  
 
                                        
154 Keown, too, acknowledges the potential for a theistic and secular grounding for human dignity with 
the former being articulated in theological terms (human beings created in the image of God) and the 
latter being articulated in the language of nature (human beings having the capacity for rationality). 
(2002, p.40) 
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On the other hand there is interest-independent value which Velleman describes in 
quite majestic and even transcendent terms as follows: 
 
A value of this kind, which a person has in himself but not for anyone, is the basis of 
Kantian moral theory. Kant’s term for this value is ‘dignity’, and he attributes dignity 
to all persons in virtue of their rational nature. What morality requires of us, according 
to Kant, is that we respect the dignity of persons. The dignity of a person is a value 
that differs in kind [emphasis added] from his interest. Unlike his interest, for example, 
his dignity is a value on which his opinion carries no more weight than anyone else’s. 
Because this value does not accrue to him, he is in no better position to judge it than 
others. Similarly, respect for a person’s autonomy does not require deference to him 
on questions of dignity, as it does on questions of his good. On the contrary, respect 
for a person’s autonomy is an appreciation of a value in him that amounts to dignity, 
in Kant’s sense of the term, precisely because it commands respect. . . He cannot claim, 
in other words that out of respect for his autonomy we should defer to his judgment 
that he possesses nothing worthy of our respect . . . challenging a person’s judgment 
about his good is objectionable because it undermines his role as the agent of his own 
affairs; but his value as a person is not just his affair. Although his good is a value that 
accrues to him alone . . . his value as a person inheres in him among other persons. 
It’s a value that he possesses by virtue of being one of us . . . The value of being a person 
is therefore something larger than any particular person who embodies it. (1999, 
pp.611-612) 
 
What, however, is it exactly that is supposed to make it be the case that persons matter 
in this fundamental way? For Velleman (as for Kant) it is because of their autonomous 
rational nature. Autonomy is not just another intrinsic good for Velleman, it is the 
intrinsic good. For Velleman, ‘autonomy’ is what is both constitutive of personhood 
and what ‘bequeaths’ unto persons incommensurable value. He thus explicitly 
advances and endorses the constitutive thesis and the incommensurability thesis 
mentioned earlier.  
 
  
94 
Velleman proceeds to argue that (i) we are only concerned with interest-relative 
value (value for persons) because we already believe that persons have a kind of 
interest-independent value (value in persons), (ii) interest-independent value 
thus cannot be weighed against interest-relative value, and accordingly (iii) if the 
former is ‘traded’ for the latter something morally impermissible has occurred insofar 
as personhood itself has been disrespected. He explains as follows: 
 
But the dignity of a person isn’t something that he can accept or decline, since it isn’t 
a value for him; it’s a value in him, which he can only violate or respect. Nor can it be 
weighed against what is good or bad for the person. As I have argued, value for a 
person stands to value in the person roughly as the value of means stands to that of 
end: in each case the former merits concern only on the basis of concern for the latter. 
And conditional values cannot be weighed against unconditional value on which they 
depend. The value of means to an end cannot be overshadowed by the value of the 
end, because it is already only a shadow of that value, in the sense of being dependant 
on it. Similarly, the value of what’s good for a person is only a shadow of the value 
inhering in the person, and cannot overshadow or be overshadowed by it. (1999, p.613) 
 
To put Velleman’s point another way, the well-being of persons matters if and only if 
persons matter in themselves. He articulates this forcefully by reflecting on his own 
value: 
 
But what would it matter how much I lost or gained if I myself would be no loss? My 
gains and losses would merit concern only on the basis of concern for me – which, 
being the basis of concern for them, could not be offset by that concern. Hence my 
gains or losses wouldn’t matter unless I had a value that could not be offset by theirs. 
(1999, p.614) 
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For Velleman, it is precisely because a person matters in himself qua person that his 
personhood cannot be weighed against whatever is constitutive of that person’s well-
being. In short, any concern for well-being, of necessity, commits us to a more 
fundamental and antecedent normative concern about the terminal value of persons. 
Accordingly, ‘we cannot avoid presupposing the existence of [interest-independent 
value] anyway, since it’s needed to account for the importance of interest-relative 
values. We cannot justify someone’s death on the grounds that it’s good for him, while 
also denying the existence of another value, embodied in him.’ (Velleman, 1999, 
p.615).155  
 
Unfortunately, Velleman’s argument is unsound for three principal reasons. First, it 
does not appear to be the case that autonomy is constitutive of personhood. On the 
contrary, autonomy is more plausibly thought of as an intrinsic good that can be 
possessed by persons. Second, it is not at all obvious that either US or VAS does, in 
fact, disrespect personhood. Such actions may very well honour personhood. Finally, 
Velleman’s argument gets our concern about the value of persons precisely backwards. 
I shall address each objection in turn. 
 
                                        
155 It is interesting to mention that Velleman does believe there is at least one circumstance when US (and 
thus VAS) might be permissible, namely, when it would constitute an ‘expression of respect for one’s 
person.’ For Velleman, this appears limited to cases where a person would be acting to prevent the future 
deterioration of his rational agency. (1999, pp.616-617) This ‘exception’ is not without its own problems. 
If it is true that rational agency is of intrinsic and incommensurable value, and if a person were only going 
to lose his rational agency in the future, then he would still be destroying something of intrinsic and 
incommensurable value that exists in the present i.e. at a time when he still embodies interest-
independent value. However, if a person were to wait until he lost his rational agency he would then 
no longer be in a position to autonomously engage in US or VAS. On Velleman’s view, an individual 
would thus find himself caught between the Scylla of autonomous impermissibility and the Charybdis of 
heteronomous permissibility.  
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First, it simply does not appear that autonomy is constitutive of personhood. After all, 
we had no problem imagining Adam in W* who, despite living a heteronomous 
existence, was still clearly a person. We had no reason to doubt that Adam was self-
aware, had an internal qualitative dimension to his existence, could conceive of himself 
as an entity that persists through time and was the sort of entity that could engage in 
the act of valuing things, including his own existence. We may very well have thought 
that he was an unfortunate person who was having his existence manipulated by the 
Worthwhile Life Collective, but it never crossed our minds that such manipulations 
entailed he was not a person at all. He was simply a person who just happened to lack 
an intrinsic good that his duplicate in W enjoyed viz. autonomy. Rather than being 
constitutive of personhood itself, autonomy simply seems to be way of talking about 
(i) how persons may or may not be able to act, and (ii) how it is desirable for persons 
to act. Velleman could always concede this point and abandon autonomy as the core 
of the constitutive thesis. In its place he could accept that consciousness (and not 
autonomy) is the feature that is both constitutive of persons and confers 
incommensurable value to them. In other words, Velleman’s argument could 
potentially be modified to refer only to consciousness.  
 
However, it is at this juncture that the second problem arises. It is not at all clear how 
exactly, given Velleman’s argument, US or VAS would disrespect consciousness? After 
all, it could be persuasively argued that it is precisely in exercising her critical and 
rational faculties regarding the timing and manner of death that a person expresses 
what is most noble and worthy of respect viz. the ability of a conscious entity to take 
hold of the reins of existence and direct it toward chosen ends. After all, do we not 
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think it noble when persons seize control from the vicissitudes of chance and rise above 
the vagaries of circumstance? Do we not think it honourable when conscious entities 
reflect on their position in the world and then direct their lives to better ends? If we 
think this noble and worthy of honour when contemplating a person’s conduct 
regarding her life why should we think any differently of a person’s conduct regarding 
her death? William McCord articulates this very point in a powerful and poignant 
passage: 
 
By affirming this uniquely human capacity to meditate and mold death, we enhance 
our threatened autonomy in the face of remorseless fate. To take the opposite path – 
as most people do in a mindless submission to the dictates of fate – betrays our highest 
quality: our capacity for freedom. A death with dignity is a final proof that we are not 
merely pawns to be swept from the board by an unknown hand. As a courageous 
assertion of independence and self-control, suicide can serve as an affirmation of our 
ultimate liberty, our last infusion of meaning into a formless reality. (1993, p.27) 
 
Finally, Velleman’s core point is that we only care about the well-being of persons 
because we first care about persons in themselves. Without this core point the entire 
edifice of his argument crumbles. However, this core point is simply untrue and rests 
on a confusion. We are not concerned about the well-being of persons because of our 
prior concern for persons in themselves. Rather we are concerned about persons 
because we are first concerned about the nature of well-being. (Sumner, 2011)  
 
It is because persons are the sort of entities whose existence can meaningfully go better 
or worse that we are concerned how things do, in fact, go for them. Our concern for 
persons is thus deeply dependant on our prior commitment to well-being and how its 
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absence or presence can shape the contours and content of a person’s existence. This 
fully explains why we are not concerned about how things might go for rocks, weeds 
or even ‘hollow clones’. They are not the sort of entities for which things can be better 
or worse in any meaningful sense. A person, on the other hand, is the sort of entity 
whose existence can certainly be better or worse.  
 
Contrary to Velleman, our commitment to the value of persons, therefore, depends 
thoroughly on our prior commitment to the concept of their well-being. Consciousness 
(or personhood) is thought valuable only to the extent that it provides the means by 
which to experience, discover and create other things of intrinsic value, things which 
give substantive content to the notion of an entity’s well-being. In short, any value we 
place on consciousness (and thus personhood) is conditional on other things of 
terminal value. Persons are worthy of moral concern because a conscious existence is 
the only sort of existence that can possibly be hellish or heavenly. When it is hellish we 
cease to think of consciousness as valuable at all. In fact, when consciousness bears 
witness to (or constructs) hell it becomes positively disvaluable.    
  
In conclusion, the brute existence view, the biological existence view and the 
human existence view are to be rejected for their patent implausibility. The personal 
existence view advanced by Velleman is far more plausible and his articulation of the 
view is perhaps the strongest secular version of the SLA.  
 
However, Velleman’s argument is unsound insofar as it: (i) depends on a false view of 
what constitutes a person, (ii) it is not obvious how either US or VAS disrespect 
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personhood. Such practices may, in many cases, be expressions of all that we consider 
noble and honourable about persons, that is to say, actions we think becoming of 
conscious entities, and (iii) the argument rests on the flawed notion that our concern 
for the well-being of persons is presupposed by a prior and incommensurable 
normative concern for persons in themselves. On the contrary, our moral concern for 
persons reflects an antecedent normative commitment to the concept of well-being of 
any entity for whom existence can be meaningfully better or worse. 
 
With the failure of the personal existence view it would appear that we are left 
without a good reason to accept premise (1) of the SLA. Therefore, Part I of the positive 
case stands and is perhaps even endowed with greater persuasive force after our tour 
of the implausibility of the SLA. However, as already indicated, the SLA is not the only 
argument that can be made against the positive case. Even if Part I of the positive case 
stands, a successful consequentialist argument could still be constructed against Part 
II. It is to an examination of this sort of argument to which we shall now turn.  
 
A6.2. THE SOCIAL HARM ARGUMENT 
 
The SHA is willing to admit the soundness of Part I of the positive case and allow for 
the possibility, that in certain individual cases, VAS is morally permissible. However, 
the SHA is concerned not just about any given individual but also for society at large. 
Specifically, the SHA is preoccupied with the slew of possible harms that could befall 
our neighbours in society if a policy of permissibility was implemented instead of a 
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policy of prohibition. These consequences are deemed so bad that they outweigh 
whatever good could possibly accrue from a policy of permissibility. The SHA is thus a 
direct antagonist to premise (15) of Part II of the positive case. 
 
However, it is important to mention at the outset that the SHA should not be conceived 
of as one single argument but rather as a constellation of arguments. It is, thus, more 
accurate to say that there are different versions of the SHA. Each version emphasises a 
different sort of bad consequence that is imagined would befall society if a 
prohibitionist policy were abandoned. Let us first articulate the five versions that are 
most often advanced and thought to provide persuasive reasons to reject the 
implementation of a permissive VAS policy. Thereafter, we shall analyse each version 
in turn and assess their respective plausibility. 
 
A6.2.1. THE FIVE PRINCIPAL VERSIONS 
 
First, there is the version that asserts that if a permissive VAS policy were adopted then 
society would find itself on a ‘slippery slope’ toward another expanded policy that 
would ultimately permit the morally abhorrent. This version of the argument is often 
buttressed by emotionally charged thoughts that a policy of permissibility would place 
society on a path to endorsing horrific Nazi-style ‘euthanasia’ programs, where persons 
deemed ‘undesirable’, ‘unfit’ or ‘defective’ by society are callously and cruelly culled. 
This is the slippery slope argument. Leo Alexander, writing shortly after World War 
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II, articulated this concern with explicit reference to the Nazi ‘euthanasia’ programs as 
follows: 
 
Whatever proportions [Nazi] crimes finally assumed, it became evident to all who 
investigated them that they had started from small beginnings. The beginnings at first 
were merely a subtle shift in emphasis in the basic attitude of the physicians. It started 
with an acceptance of the attitude, basic in the euthanasia movement, that there is such 
a thing as a life not worthy to be lived [emphasis added]. The attitude in its early stages 
concerned itself merely with the severely and chronically sick. Gradually the sphere of 
those to be included in the category was enlarged to encompass the socially 
unproductive, the ideologically unwanted, the racially unwanted and finally non-
Germans. But it is important to realize that the infinitely small wedged-in lever from 
which this entire trend of mind received its impetus was the attitude toward the 
nonrehabilitable sick. (1949, p.44) 
 
Second, there is a version which asserts that a permissive VAS policy would inevitably 
be violated, either mistakenly156 or intentionally, and that individuals, especially those 
who are extremely young, elderly, mentally impaired or socio-economically vulnerable, 
would be pressured or coerced into engaging in VAS.157 The idea is that a policy of 
permissibility would result in the deaths of individuals who ought not to be killed in 
terms of that policy. This cannot happen at all under a prohibitionist policy. This is the 
mistake and abuse argument.  
 
Yale Kamisar endorses both the mistake and abuse argument and slippery slope 
argument respectively: ‘I see the issue, then, as the need for voluntary euthanasia 
                                        
156 There are two general sorts of mistakes possible, namely, (i) mistakes relating to judging whether a 
person is acting autonomously in requesting VAS, and (ii) mistakes relating to judging whether an 
individual’s life is worth living. 
157 The concern is roughly that family members, physicians and third parties with nefarious intent might 
manipulate and put substantial pressure on such persons to end their lives prematurely. 
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versus (1) the incidence of mistake and abuse; and (2) the danger that legal machinery 
initially designed to kill those who are a nuisance to themselves may someday engulf 
those who are a nuisance to others.’ (1958, p.976)  
 
Third, there is the version that asserts that if a permissive VAS policy were adopted 
then people would cease to trust their physicians. Physicians need to be viewed as 
being professionally committed to human life at all costs. The physician-patient 
relationship is thought to be so fundamental that it should not be stress tested at all 
lest it buckle to the detriment of society. The prohibitionist policy preserves this trust.  
This is the corrosion of trust argument. Leon Kass has argued in this vein that ‘[t]he 
patient’s trust in the doctor’s wholehearted devotion to the patient’s best interests will 
be hard to sustain once doctors are licensed to kill.’ (1989, p.35) 
 
Fourth, there is the version which asserts that if a permissive VAS policy were adopted 
it would undermine a set of important physician specific duties not to take or harm 
human life, which duties are thought integral to the moral character of the medical 
profession and which, if eroded, would be harmful for society at large. The 
prohibitionist policy ensures that physician specific duties are not eroded. This is the 
special duties argument. (Baumrin, 1992; Kass, 1989; Pellegrino, 1992) 
 
Finally, there is the version that asserts that if a permissive VAS policy were adopted 
this would be corrosive of a vital societal respect for human life in general. The 
corrosion of this respect would in turn undermine other important social relationships 
to society’s detriment. A prohibitionist policy is the only policy that promotes a general 
  
103 
respect for all human life and ensures the structural integrity of our other important 
social relations. This is the corrosion of respect argument. Daniel Ncayiyana, writing 
somewhat apocalyptically of the potential corrosive effects of a permissive VAS policy 
in a South African cultural context, says:  
 
Euthanasia -  a recourse of last resort – can only really be justified in a country with 
the very best medical care for all, a well-organised and universally accessible palliative 
care and support system, stable and well-functioning (particularly judicial) 
institutions, and a strong culture of respect for human life [emphasis added]. In South 
Africa, with its ‘severe constraints on health care facilities and the totally inadequate 
allocation of resources for highly effective medical treatments’, there is a real risk of 
euthanasia becoming a substitute for proper care for the terminally ill and other 
patients in dire medical straits. Even more damning for South Africa is the pervasive 
lack of an ethos of respect for human life [emphasis added]. We are an extraordinarily 
violent society, with over 45 murders committed daily and interpersonal violence the 
second highest cause of death. Mob justice, police brutality and xenophobia abound. 
Needless deaths occur regularly in our hospitals through staff neglect and 
indifference. Health care providers think nothing of downing tools and walking off, 
abandoning critically ill patients, or of blocking ambulances with critical emergencies 
from entering health facilities during labour disputes. In the circumstances, 
euthanasia cannot be at the top of the wish-list of things that must be accomplished 
in order to improve the human condition of South Africans. (2012, p.334).158  
 
A6.2.2. ANALYSIS AND RESPONSES 
 
Let us begin with the slippery slope argument. The first and most obvious point to 
make is ‘that it is easier to assert the existence of a slippery slope than to prove that it 
exists’ (Benatar, 2011, p.206) and thus ‘we need to greet claims of its presence with a 
                                        
158 Foot voices a similar concern about how a permissive VAS policy might alter general societal 
expectations about life and death. (1977, pp.111-112) 
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great deal of caution.’ (Benatar, 2010, p.301) At the outset it does not seem possible to 
establish that the implementation of a permissive VAS policy would logically lead to 
any sort of expanded policy at all. In short, there is nothing about the implementation 
of a permissive VAS policy that necessarily entails that any other sort of expanded 
policy would ever arise, let alone be in the offing. Recognising this logical point, 
proponents of the argument usually advance a far more modest claim, namely, that a 
morally abhorrent expanded policy would be rendered more probable as a consequence 
of the implementation of a permissive VAS policy. This is the motivation (or so it is 
argued) for not taking a ‘first step’ onto the slippery slope, lest we slip and fall into a 
very dark and disturbing ditch. 
 
Sumner distinguishes between the two crucial components of this argument which 
must both be true if it is to have any persuasive force. The two components are the (i) 
empirical component, and the (ii) normative component. The empirical 
component asserts that if a policy of permissibility were implemented then it is 
probable that it will mutate into a new expanded policy. The normative component 
asserts that the new expanded policy would be ethically abhorrent. (2011, pp.175-176) 
Sumner goes on to note, however, that it is ‘difficult to find (or imagine) an [e]xpanded 
[p]olicy such that both claims are true.’ (2011, p.176) Given the thanatological taxonomy 
I have adumbrated, there are only two expanded policies that could be of potential 
concern to a proponent of this version of the argument: (i) a permissive IVAD policy 
or (ii) a permissive NVAD policy. I shall address each in turn. 
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It is easy enough to imagine (and be emotionally misled by) horrific expanded policies 
that might await society at the bottom of the slope. It is also trivially easy to concede 
that a permissive IVAD policy would be a morally noxious policy.159  However, it is far 
harder to articulate with any degree of certainty that a society will ever arrive at such 
a morally abhorrent policy. In fact I would suggest that we can state the following 
general principle: the more morally abhorrent the expanded policy is imagined to be 
at the bottom of the slope, the more we are entitled to be initially sceptical that society 
will ultimately arrive there. This initial scepticism can, of course, always be rebutted 
by cogent empirical evidence that there is an immediate or immanent toxic moral 
trajectory. However, herein lies the rub. There is simply no empirical data indicating 
that any society that presently has a permissive VAS policy has either (i) endorsed a 
permissive IVAD policy, or (ii) is presently on its way to doing so.  
 
In fact, it could be persuasively argued that if Part I of the positive case is sound then 
we have already done the philosophical work of articulating the fundamental ethical 
principles that (i) would render any permissive IVAD policy categorically beyond the 
pale, and (ii) if implemented and affirmed consistently, would render any societal 
movement toward adopting such a policy highly improbable. After all, the positive case 
is explicitly premised on a strong and fundamental commitment to human well-being, 
autonomy and dignity. Whereas, a permissive IVAD policy would, of necessity, involve 
completely rejecting those self-same normative principles. This would, to my mind, be 
tantamount to society rejecting ethics entirely. It is exceptionally unlikely that this 
                                        
159 I have already indicated that IVAD is simply murder under a sanitized moniker. 
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would happen. As J. Harris reminds us ‘slopes are only slippery if they catch us 
unawares and we have strayed on to them inadequately equipped. . . we do not outlaw 
effective contraception because we fear that to practise population control is to step 
on to a slope that leads inexorably to the extinction of the human race.’ (1985, p.127). 
We are not stepping on to the slope ethically unawares and can thus safely say that this 
possible expanded policy, while normatively noxious, is empirically improbable. The 
argument thus fails to satisfy both components. 
 
In this thesis I have not explored the moral principles that might govern cases of NVAD 
nor considered the probability that a permissive VAS policy would lead to a permissive 
NVAD policy. However, there is no reason to think that the ethical principles about 
how we ought to deal with cases of NVAD are either (i) incompatible with the 
principles undergirding the positive case for VAS, or (ii) would open the door to a 
permissive IVAD policy.  Furthermore, any permissive NVAD policy would have to be 
assessed on its own moral merits. Accordingly, even if we did accept that a permissive 
NVAD policy would be rendered more probable by the implementation of a permissive 
VAS policy, we would still be owed a valid and sound argument showing that NVAD is 
unambiguously morally impermissible. It is not obviously the case that NVAD is 
morally noxious.160 
 
                                        
160 It is perhaps even less obvious now especially when we consider the failure of the SLA. 
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It is worth emphasising that NVAD may turn out, in the final ethical analysis, to be 
completely defensible based on similar (if not identical) ethical principles that 
undergird the positive case for VAS. As David Benatar points out: 
 
To be sure, non-voluntary euthanasia raises issues that do not arise in the case of 
assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia. Whereas decisions about the quality of a 
competent person’s life can be left largely to that person, decisions about the quality 
of incompetent beings’ lives have to be taken by others. Making such decisions is 
clearly very difficult but there is no alternative. Never terminating the life of an 
incompetent being, no matter how poor its quality, is also a decision – a decision to 
allow suffering to continue. The appropriate response to a difficult decision is to make 
it as well as possible rather than to pretend that it need not be made. . . I have 
mentioned non-voluntary euthanasia only to note that many of us take it to be both 
[sic] a morally acceptable implication of the defence of voluntary euthanasia. (2010, 
p.304) 
 
Accordingly, this potential expanded policy, even if empirically probable, is not 
obviously morally noxious. In fact, it could plausibly be defended using similar ethical 
principles that undergird the positive case. Therefore, once again, the argument fails 
to satisfy both components.  
 
Let us now turn to the mistake and abuse argument. I am happy to concede at the 
outset that this argument is perhaps the strongest version of the SHA. Its strength is 
drawn from three important and related observations, namely, (i) human beings are 
imperfect and fallible (ii) the implementation of any socially permissive policy will 
reflect human imperfection and fallibility, and (iii) mistakes and abuse of a permissive 
social policy are inevitable. From these observations, it is then argued that a permissive 
VAS policy would be vitiated by mistakes and abuses that would be so ubiquitous that 
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it would constitute an overwhelming social harm. On this point Kamisar writes ‘the 
incidence of mistake [or abuse] of one kind or another is likely to be quite considerable. 
. . If this indeed be the case, unless the need for [euthanasia] is compelling enough to 
override it, I take it the risk of mistake [or abuse] is a conclusive reason against 
[euthanasia].’ (1958, p.976) 
 
While these are indeed valid observations that ought to be taken seriously by anyone 
considering the matter, I am by no means convinced that the argument is persuasive 
for three reasons. First, the mere fact that a permissive VAS policy might be fallible or 
open to abuse is not sufficient justification to prevent its adoption and implementation. 
Second, the potential risk of mistake and abuse inherent in permissive VAS policy must 
be balanced accurately against the definite harmful consequences visited on society by 
maintaining the prohibitionist status quo. Third, a permissive policy will probably 
prevent mistakes and abuses in respect of persons who might otherwise engage in VAS 
in the social and legal ‘shadows’. I shall address each of these points in turn. 
 
First, we already accept that societies often adopt and implement a panoply of 
permissive policies which are nevertheless fallible or susceptible to abuse and which 
cause some harm. The most familiar examples, are the permissive policies surrounding 
the distribution of prescription drugs or the licensing and driving of motor vehicles. 
(Benatar, 2010) However, we do not believe that the possibilities of such harm require 
the absolute prohibition of prescription drugs or the licensing and driving of motor 
vehicles. Instead, we acknowledge the probability of mistake and abuse inherent in the 
permissive policies, seek to identify the most likely ways in which mistake and abuse 
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could arise, and then work tirelessly to implement appropriate safeguards and 
regulatory controls that seek to limit instances of mistake and abuse. As Suber 
percipiently writes: 
 
‘It is part of the burden of clarity and courage imposed upon us by our cleverness that 
we must move beyond easily administered crudities to complicated positions that 
reflect the complexity of the world we have created for ourselves. It is part of that 
burden to institute the morally preferable theory and stay awake at night [emphasis 
added] to detect abuse. When we invented methods to extend vital signs beyond the 
extinction of personality, we lost the right to live by a simpler moral code.’ (1996, p.27). 
 
If we are willing to adopt such a reasonable approach toward other permissive social 
policies, many of which are no less concerned with the life and death of persons, then 
it behoves us to be consistent and adopt a similar approach when it comes to a 
permissive VAS policy. It is worth remembering that: 
 
If we prohibit physician assisted suicide and euthanasia entirely then we will force 
some patients to endure needless suffering. . . On the other hand, if we permit the 
practices with no safeguards then we will be exposing some patients to avoidable risks. 
. . There are costs to both permitting assisted death and limiting it. . . As we raise the 
bar of regulation we decrease the risk to third parties and increase it for patients; as 
we lower the bar the reverse will be true. The best regulatory regime is the one with the 
optimal balance of these costs [emphasis added]. No regime can eliminate all of them. 
(Sumner, 2011, p.187). 
 
As Benatar writes ‘the appropriate response is regulation, imperfect though it may be.’ 
(2011, p.206) J. Harris concurs, writing ‘[w]hile the fear that people might falsely or 
implausibly decide that others might be better off dead and act on that decision is a 
real one, and is one that clearly animates much of the opposition to euthanasia, it is 
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not an objection in principle but rather a demand for safeguards.’ (1985, p.65) What 
these optimal safeguards and regulatory controls should be, will be a topic addressed 
in the second section of this thesis.  
 
Second, it is often assumed by proponents of this argument that there is no harm 
caused to society by maintaining a prohibitionist policy. It is argued that the 
prohibitionist policy prevents anyone from being killed at all and thus it harms no one. 
However, this assumption is certainly false and arises from the failure to acknowledge 
that a prohibitionist policy results in definite harm to many persons in society. The 
harm consists both in condemning certain persons to live non-worthwhile lives when 
they would be better off dead and depriving them of the ability to exercise their 
autonomy in the face of that nightmarish prospect.  
 
As J. Harris writes ‘[t]here is no such thing as playing it safe. To make a choice is to 
entertain the possibility of making a wrong choice. But a wrong choice is no less likely 
when the decision is not to entertain the idea of euthanasia, but rather countenance 
the suffering of the individual who can only be released from suffering by death.’ (1985, 
p.82) Similarly, Singer acknowledges ‘[a]ll of this is not to deny that departing from the 
traditional sanctity of life ethic carries with it a small but nevertheless finite risk of 
unwanted consequences. Against this risk we must balance the tangible harm 
[emphasis added] to which the traditional ethic gives rise – harm to those whose misery 
is needlessly prolonged.’ (2011, p.189) In short, it must be accepted that the 
prohibitionist policy results in definite harm to persons and there is no reason to think 
that a permissive VAS policy, augmented by appropriate safeguards and regulatory 
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controls, would be any worse. In fact, there is good reason to think precisely the 
opposite. This is the thrust of my third point. 
 
Even in a society that endorses a prohibitionist policy, it must be acknowledged that 
there will inevitably be persons who engage in the practice of VAS surreptitiously. Such 
cases will often take place furtively in the ‘shadow’ of the law and beyond the 
censorious eye of the public. Physicians are bound to assist their terminally ill patients 
to die. Friends and family members will inevitably help those who suffer from chronic 
pain and suffering to shuffle off this mortal coil. To believe that such practices do not 
already happen is, to put it bluntly, exceptionally naïve.  
 
However, to acknowledge this fact is also to acknowledge that, inherent in such 
clandestine and opaque practices, there are absolutely no safeguards to prevent 
(and/or deter) mistake or abuse. This will be especially dangerous for those persons 
who are considered the most vulnerable members of society viz. the very young, 
elderly, disabled or socio-economically disadvantaged. As Benatar reminds us ‘[w]e 
know that there are instances of euthanasia even in jurisdictions where it is legally 
prohibited. Some of these instances are morally justified, but it is highly unlikely that 
all are. Yet when euthanasia is illegal the abuses may well be better hidden than when 
it was legal.’ (2010, p.305).  
 
It could thus be persuasively argued that it is far better for society to have a permissive 
VAS policy with appropriate safeguards and regulatory controls thereby conducing to 
a culture of transparency and accountability. Ironically, such a policy would ensure that 
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the probability of mistake and abuse, especially for those perceived to be the most 
vulnerable members of society, is minimized. There are perhaps a few things that are 
better left to proceed in clandestine and furtive obscurity; the deaths of fellow human 
beings is certainly not one of them.  
 
What of the corrosion of trust argument? How likely is it that the relationship 
between physicians and their patients will be undermined if the former were 
permitted, under certain prescribed circumstances, to assist the latter to die? Not only 
does it seem highly unlikely that members of the public would begin to think of 
physicians as ‘murderers in waiting’ but it is far more probable that the public, once a 
permissive VAS policy was explained and understood, would come to think of this 
expanded role as a welcome addition to the professional function of a physician.  
 
Not only would physicians be able to speak openly to their patients about their health 
and well-being but they would now also be able to talk honestly and candidly about all 
available treatment options, including the possibility of VAS in those cases that seem 
to warrant it, and for those persons who specifically enquired about it. If nothing else, 
I would imagine that this would engender trust between patients and physicians rather 
than erode it. After all, it is the hallmark of any trusting professional relationship that 
they are premised on honest and frank discussion of sensitive issues and the best ways 
to navigate them. The notion that hospital wings of physicians would be waiting with 
eager anticipation to coerce and kill off their patients instead of expending energy to 
treat them (Kass, 1985) is not just insulting to physicians but is the sort of 
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phantasmagorical fever dream that would require substantial evidence to vindicate. 
Fortunately for us, there is absolutely no evidence that this is the case. 
 
Perhaps the special duties argument will fare better? Have we not all heard of the 
Hippocratic Oath and the physician’s sworn duty to first do no harm to his patient? 
What would become of this role specific duty? Would not physicians become 
compromised and conflicted about their moral obligations and duties if a permissive 
VAS policy was implemented?  Would this not, in turn, lead to an erosion of the 
medical profession to the detriment of society? I do not think so for four principal 
reasons.  
 
First, if the positive case is sound then there is nothing morally wrong about a physician 
assisting a person to engage in VAS in certain circumstances. It simply does not entail 
the violation of any sort of general moral duty (Sumner, 2011).  Furthermore, it is by no 
means clear that the duty of care a physician has toward to his patient can be so neatly 
condensed and limited to the slogan ‘physicians should not kill their patients’. Why 
physicians should not do so will inevitably depend on the reasons we think it is bad to 
kill a person in general. As Wellman points out ‘I do not believe that one can define 
the role of the physician so simply. What physicians can and ought to do in any society 
is only partly defined [emphasis added] by the traditional purposes of the profession. 
Also one traditional duty of the physician has been to relieve the suffering of her patient 
even when to do so may threaten her life.’ (2003, p.30) 
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Second, if there are specific circumstances under which we think it may not be 
impermissible to kill a person, as the positive case suggests, then perhaps there needs 
to be a rethinking of the physician’s role in society and his professional duty of care 
toward his patients. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the following 
represents the true duty of care owed to patients: ‘a physician should never act so as to 
harm or undermine the well-being or autonomy of his patient.’ When we think of a 
physician’s duty in that expanded way, we can see that sometimes keeping a patient 
alive or refusing to assist him to die when he is no longer living a worthwhile life, (and 
in the face of his voluntary and informed request) would amount to harming his well-
being and his autonomy. Perhaps what should be concluded is that the traditional role 
specific duties that sit at the core of the medical profession need to be re-examined and 
expanded in light of the persuasiveness of the positive case.161 Perhaps it is the character 
of the medical profession that could do with some moral growth? 
 
Third, even if there were no expansion to the traditional role specific duties of 
physicians, there would be nothing about a permissive VAS policy that would compel 
any physician to assist an individual to engage in VAS. Thus, if a particular physician 
felt obliged to defer to a traditional role specific duty, like the Hippocratic Oath, then 
                                        
161 It is apposite to note that the HPCSA’s ethical guidelines already acknowledge that health care 
practitioners should (i) always regard the best interests or well-being of their patients as their primary 
professional duty (Booklet I, paragraph 5.1.1) and (ii) respect the dignity of their patients (Booklet I, 
paragraph 5.2.1). Furthermore, a health care practitioner is required at all times to act in the best interests 
of his or her patient (Booklet II, paragraph 27A(a)) and respect patient dignity (Booklet II, paragraph 27A 
(b)). Finally, in terms of the National Patient Rights Charter which has been adopted by the HPCSA, 
patients have the responsibility ‘to advise health care providers of his or her wishes with regard to his or 
her death.’ (Booklet III, paragraph 3.7). However, despite these ethical guidelines and commitments, the 
HPCSA states that it ‘finds active euthanasia, or the willful act by a health care professional to cause the 
death of a patient unacceptable, notwithstanding whether or not such an act is performed at the request 
of the patient or his or her closest relatives or of any other person.’ (Booklet XII, paragraph 1.3) This patent 
inconsistency should be done away with in light of the positive case. 
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he would be entitled to do so. This would simply be for him to say ‘I am not the 
physician you are looking for. I choose not to provide that sort of assistance.’ There is 
thus no necessary conflict between a permissive VAS policy on the one hand and a 
physician choosing to comport his medical practice to a traditional role specific duty 
on the other.  
 
Finally, we may also think that this argument could be substantially diffused through 
a practical intervention, namely, the creation and development of a specialized branch 
of medicine dedicated solely to providing the required assistance to persons wishing to 
engage in VAS. Writing of this sort of practical solution, Grayling suggests:  
 
A practical innovation might therefore be suggested: that there should be a medical 
sub-division of anaesthesiology which might be called ‘thanatology’ (to coin a word 
from Thanatos, death), and that these specialists should work within a framework of 
law under the supervision of hospital ethics committees, so that every thanatological 
treatment is approved in advance, monitored during administration and properly 
recorded afterwards. Since only thanatologists will be involved in helping those who 
have shown a stable and intelligent desire to be helped to die, all other medical 
practitioners will continue to work under the assumption that their sole concern is to 
save life, cure ills and palliate suffering. (2013, p.233).162  
 
Lastly, we come to the corrosion of respect argument. The core idea behind this 
argument is that a permissive policy ‘would change the social scene in a way that would 
be a spiritual disaster . . . for it envisions widespread side effects on the expectations, 
attitudes, motivations, and moral principles that enrich our interpersonal relationships 
                                        
162 To this I might add that the development of a specific set of HPCSA ethical guidelines applicable 
specifically to thanatologists would be entirely possible. 
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and sustain the social fabric of our society.’ (Wellman, 2003, pp.34-35) Although the 
use of the phrase ‘spiritual disaster’ has theological connotations it can be understood 
in secular terms to be more akin to a ‘disaster for the socio-cultural zeitgeist’.  
 
The central concern is that a permissive policy would (i) radically divert the socio-
cultural orientation away from one that respects human life to one that cheapens and 
denigrates it, and (ii) this would have further inimical implications about our treatment 
of each other. As already indicated by Ncayiyana, this could be disastrous in a country 
like South Africa where there is already a culture that purportedly does not place a high 
premium on human life (2012,p.334).  
 
As plausible as this argument initially appears, I do not believe that it survives closer 
scrutiny. First, it loses sight of the fact that the positive case is an argument that is 
premised on a reasoned articulation of what it is that makes human life valuable and 
worthy of respect in the first place. Any permissive VAS policy will thus be premised 
on, and built around, the ethical principles that undergird the positive case. The 
permissive policy would thus be reflective of a sharpened social sensibility about what 
is truly valuable and what we truly value about each other. It would also be a policy 
which, if properly articulated and implemented, would enhance our moral percipience, 
and expand our capacity for compassion. In short, the implementation of a permissive 
policy would invigorate the very elements that are necessary for, and conduce to, 
flourishing relationships with our neighbours in society.  
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Wellman has pointed out that when considering a permissive policy ‘[t]here is no 
reason that it should damage our expectation that we will be cared for when we become 
old or ill. Rather, it will reflect and reinforce a deeper and more compassionate 
understanding of proper medical care.’ (2003, p.35) Furthermore, such a policy ‘would 
not devalue the lives of the most vulnerable members of society; it would recognize 
that society ought to accept their own valuations of their lives and not impose external 
moralistic constraints upon how they are permitted to live and die’ (2003, p.35) In 
short, rather than constituting a socio-cultural ‘spiritual disaster’, a permissive policy 
would represent a socio-cultural ‘humanistic maturation.’  
 
Second, there are at least two problems implicit in Ncayiyana’s argument. First, there 
is an implicit assumption about what a permissive policy would have to look like if it 
were implemented. Second, there is an implicit commitment to the idea that a 
permissive policy is not a desideratum for South African society because there are other 
more pressing and immediate social challenges that need to be solved. I shall address 
each of these problems in turn. 
 
Ncayiyana appears to be operating with a caricature of a permissive policy in mind in 
terms of which physicians (and the medical profession in general) are given free rein 
to decide when and if a patient should be euthanized. There does not appear to be an 
appreciation that a permissive policy could look very different thereby nullifying many, 
if not all, of Ncayiyana’s concerns. For example, a permissive policy could be one that 
requires explicit engagement with the judicial branch of government at the sole and 
specific instance of the person desiring to engage in VAS, and limited to instances 
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where he has, in advance, secured the services of a consenting physician. This is, in 
fact, the sort of permissive VAS policy I have in mind. 
 
Furthermore, it simply does not follow that because South Africa is faced with other 
social problems like violent crime, police brutality, mob justice, xenophobia and 
healthcare neglect (all of which reflect horrific disrespect for human life by some 
persons), that we should not simultaneously address the needs of those persons that 
truly desire (and deserve) to escape the burden of living. In fact, by attending maturely 
and reflectively to the needs of such persons we would be fostering the exact sort of 
ethical milieu necessary to counter and combat other moral atrocities that plague 
South African society. We defeat such moral blights, in no small part, by implementing 
social policies that reflect the better angels of our nature.  
 
In conclusion, it is my view that none of the five versions of the SHA argument are 
sufficiently persuasive to rebut Part II of the positive case.  No doubt there may be 
other versions of the argument I have not articulated or examined. However, the five 
versions that I have examined are the most common, prototypical and ubiquitous 
consequentialist arguments raised by prohibitionist proponents set against a 
permissive VAS policy. Accordingly, if these five prototypical versions are unpersuasive 
then we have good reason to be sceptical that there are other more persuasive versions 
on offer that would be wholly immune to the criticisms and rebuttals thusfar 
articulated.  
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A.7. FAILURE TO REBUT THE POSITIVE CASE 
 
I have now articulated the positive case for VAS and argued why, at both an individual 
and societal level, the practice should be permitted. Against the positive case stood 
both the SLA and the SHA. The SLA addressed Part I of the positive case. The SHA 
addressed Part II. Both the strongest secular form of the SLA and the five most 
common versions of the SHA were, in the final analysis, unpersuasive. Accordingly, the 
positive case stands unrebutted. However, this is not to exclude the possibility that a 
stronger version of either the SLA or SHA could not be advanced. 
 
That being said, it does seem reasonable at this juncture to wonder precisely how any 
deontological argument might proceed without, explicitly or implicitly, adopting the 
core elements of the SLA? Similarly, we may also wonder whether other versions of the 
SHA could be articulated without, in some respect, appealing explicitly or implicitly to 
one of the five common versions that have thusfar been discussed and found wanting. 
Accordingly, we may be excused at this stage for believing that the probability of (i) 
constructing a radically different sort of counter argument to the positive case, or (ii) 
modifying these counter arguments, without explicitly or implicitly, endorsing their 
core commitments, is slim.    
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A9. CONCLUSION 
 
This then brings us to the conclusion of the ethical standpoint. I hope to have 
persuaded you of two conclusions, namely, that (i) the positive case is sound, and (ii) 
the standard arguments levelled against it are unpersuasive. However, the fact that the 
counter arguments are unpersuasive, is not to say that the counter arguments did not 
highlight and draw attention to legitimate concerns about individual cases of VAS and 
the implementation of a permissive policy across society.  
 
To the contrary, both the SLA and the SHA highlight, and bring to the fore, the 
potential missteps to which human beings are prone, especially when (i) judging the 
worthwhileness of human lives (ii) adjudicating whether decisions to engage in VAS 
are truly autonomous, and (iii) implementing permissive social policies with the 
minimal chance of mistake or abuse. 
 
How then is the positive case to be integrated and applied in contemporary South 
African society? After all, we are not conducting this discussion in a legal vacuum. We 
are, whether we like it or not, embedded in a robust legal structure which governs and 
shapes our interactions with each other as well as the State. How could a permissive 
VAS policy thus be implemented in practice given the contours of that contemporary 
legal order? What optimal safeguards and regulatory controls would be effective in 
addressing the legitimate concerns raised by the SLA and SHA? Is the positive case for 
VAS even capable of being ‘translated’ into the language of legal and constitutional 
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rights? These questions shall be my principal focus in the following section – the legal 
standpoint. 
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PART B: THE LEGAL STANPOINT 
 
In this section I hope to achieve three things. First, I hope to provide a general and 
non-technical overview of the legal context in which this ethical discussion is taking 
place. Second, I hope to show that it is possible t0 adapt the positive case and ‘translate’ 
it into the language of rights. Finally, it is my desire to articulate (i) the contemporary 
legal position regarding VAS, and (ii) what steps could be taken to develop that legal 
position into a permissive policy that also caters for optimal safeguards and regulatory 
controls.  
 
More particularly, I shall proceed to give a brief outline of the foundational socio-legal 
structure of South African society, namely, the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996163 and why it is to be considered, first and foremost, an objective ethical 
document against which all other conduct is to be measured. In the process, I shall 
contend that the Constitution is best thought of as a social contract that instantiates a 
rights-based ethic, the principal function of which, is to protect vital human interests.  
 
I shall then argue that the positive case for VAS is capable of being admirably 
articulated by reference to three particular rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights, 
namely, the (i) Right to Life (ii) Right to Human Dignity, and (iii) Right to 
Freedom and Security of the Person. These three rights read together are capable of 
doing the work necessary to justify the permissibility of VAS in South African society. 
                                        
163 I shall simply refer to it as ‘the Constitution’ for the remainder of this thesis. 
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I shall then turn to an overview of the current legal attitude to VAS in light of (i) 
historical case law (ii) contemporary case law as well, and (iii) the South African Law 
Commission Report on Euthanasia and Artificial Preservation of Life, 1998. I will then 
argue that the development of the common law, in accordance with the Bill of Rights, 
is the best (and quickest) way to implement a permissive VAS policy that can 
simultaneously provide for optimal safeguards and regulatory controls of such a 
practice. Finally, I shall tentatively suggest how optimal safeguards could be 
implemented which would, inter alia, include judicial scrutiny over each person 
desirous of engaging in VAS by requiring a comprehensive and substantive application 
to court.  
 
B1. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
South Africa is a secular164 constitutional and democratic Republic165 that is founded 
on the rule of law.166 The Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic and law or 
conduct that is inconsistent with it is invalid.167 Not only does the Constitution provide 
for the establishment of the three branches of government – the Executive168, the 
                                        
164 South Africa is firmly committed to Secularism albeit that section 15 of the Constitution provides for 
freedom of religion, belief and opinion. 
165 Section 1 of the Constitution. 
166 The rule of law has both a formal and substantive component. The formal component dictates that the 
State (and private individuals) are entirely subject to the dictates of the law and the Constitution. The 
rule of law also places limits on State power and conduct by (i) permitting its functionaries to act only in 
circumstances prescribed by law, and (ii) prescribing that when they do act, they do so in a way that is, 
at the very least, rational and non-arbitrary. The substantive component dictates that the State is obliged 
to respect the basic rights of the individual. (Currie & De Waal, pp.10-14).  
167 Section 2 of the Constitution. This is the principle of constitutional supremacy. All State and private 
conduct is measured against (and constrained by) the norms, values and standards contained in the 
Constitution.  
168 Chapter 5 of the Constitution. 
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Legislature169, and the Judiciary170 – but it also delineates the powers and functions 
of those self-same governmental branches.171  
 
Chapter two of the Constitution contains the Bill of Rights which is the cornerstone of 
the democracy of the Republic and in which are enshrined the rights of all its peoples.172 
The Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds the Legislature, the Executive and the 
Judiciary.173 Furthermore, the State is obliged to respect, protect, promote and fulfil 
the rights contained therein.174 Similarly, the Bill of Rights is capable, in certain 
circumstances, of binding natural or juristic persons, depending on the nature of the 
particular right involved and the nature of any duty imposed by that right.175  
 
The Bill of Rights thus provides scope for what is called vertical and horizontal 
applicability.176  There is also an important conceptual distinction to be drawn 
between the direct application of the Bill of Rights and an indirect application 
thereof. As Currie & De Waal note: 
 
[T]he 1996 Constitution . . . distinguishes two forms of application of the Bill of Rights. 
Direct application entails imposition of duties by the Bill of Rights on specified actors: 
a breach of such a duty is a violation of a constitutional right. Indirect application 
occurs where there is a provision of ordinary law (legislation, common law or 
                                        
169 Chapter 4 of the Constitution. 
170 Chapter 8 of the Constitution. 
171 This is the principle of separation of powers. The principle is not absolute however, and there is an 
elaborate system of checks and balances on each branch of government by the others. 
172 Section 7 (1) of the Constitution. 
173 Section 8 (1) of the Constitution. 
174 Section 7 (2) of the Constitution. 
175 Section 8 (2) of the Constitution. 
176 Vertical application is the application of the Bill of Rights to matters and disputes between the State 
and the individual. Horizontal application is the application of the Bill of Rights to matters and disputes 
between individuals. 
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customary law) that mediates between the Bill of Rights and the actors who are subject 
to that law. The duty of the courts is to ensure that the ordinary law conforms to the 
values to which the Bill of Rights, by conferring the rights and duties that it does, give 
effect. (2013, p.34) 
 
The aforegoing entails that all laws and conduct by the State, as well as the conduct of 
individuals, is always considered, assessed and critiqued through the conceptual prism 
of the Constitution in general and the Bill of Rights in particular. 
 
The Judiciary is constituted by the various courts of the Republic.177 To the Judiciary 
is bequeathed the monumentally important task of ensuring that the norms, values 
and standards of the Constitution are upheld and that its prescriptions are enforced. 
Orders of court must be obeyed by all persons in the Republic including the State and 
its functionaries.178  
 
Furthermore, the Judiciary is vested with the power179 to (i) enquire into and strike 
down unconstitutional legislation either in part or in toto, as well as (ii) develop the 
common law in light of the norms, values and standards contained in the 
Constitution.180 This implies that the final authority regarding the interpretation, 
application and implementation of the Constitution and its provisions (including the 
Bill of Rights) is the Judiciary. It is thus not hyperbolic to state that the Judiciary is 
both the final bastion of South African democracy and the aegis that safeguards the 
individual from the slings and arrows of abuse. 
                                        
177 Section 166 of the Constitution. 
178 Section 165 (5) of the Constitution. 
179 Section 172 of the Constitution. This is known as the principle of justiciability. 
180 Section 173 read with s 39 (2) of the Constitution.  
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B2. A SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL CONTRACT 
 
What should be immediately obvious from this brief overview of the Constitution and 
the socio-legal order it establishes, is that the Constitution is the embodiment and 
codification of a social contract. The preamble of the Constitution explicitly 
acknowledges this fact by utilising the nomenclature of collective agreement: 
 
We, the people of South Africa [emphasis added], Recognise the injustices of our past; 
Honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land; Respect those who 
have worked to build and develop our country; and Believe that South Africa belongs 
to all who live in it, united in our diversity. We therefore, through our freely elected 
representatives, adopt this Constitution [emphasis added] as the supreme law of the 
Republic. . . 
 
The Constitution is thus not a hypothetical social contract of the sort envisioned by 
John Rawls, in which one imagines what ethico-legal principles and institutional 
structures persons would rationally agree to in an ‘original position’, while deliberating 
from behind an epistemic veil of ignorance (1971).  Instead it represents an actual 
social contract that specifically acknowledges South Africa’s idiosyncratic unjust 
historical legacy and the effect that legacy had on the lives of the overwhelming 
majority of South Africans.  
 
The bindingness of the Constitution on contemporary South African society does not, 
therefore, derive from any abstract hypothetical agreement between idealized rational 
bargainers (i.e. what ethico-legal rules it would be reasonable to agree to) but rather 
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arises, at least in part181, from the actual agreement of the peoples of South Africa in all 
their epistemically encumbered glory, acting by proxy, through their elected legislative 
representatives.182 Accordingly, when the Judiciary sets about the business of 
Constitutional exegesis, it is in effect articulating normative conclusions about what 
the people of South Africa have, in fact, agreed to. The Judiciary, viewed in this way, 
acts as the ‘mature, reflective and percipient moral voice’ of South African society – a 
voice that South Africans have agreed to listen to and be bound by.  
 
In Carmichelle v Minister of Safety and Security183, Ackermann and Goldstone JJ 
pronounced on the fundamental normative character of the Constitution, holding: 
 
Under section 39(2) of the Constitution concepts such as “policy decisions and value 
judgments” reflecting the “wishes . . .  and the perceptions . . . of the people” and 
“society's notions of what justice demands” might well have to be replaced, or 
supplemented and enriched by the appropriate norms of the objective value system 
embodied in the Constitution [emphasis added]. (paragraph 56). 
 
Furthermore, in S v Makwanyane & Others184, Chaskalson P affirmed the role of the 
Judiciary as the binding normative voice of South African society when he held: 
                                        
181 I say, ‘in part’, because, in my view, the normative bindingness of the Constitution arises not just from 
actual agreement to its terms but also from the fact that its terms conduce to the well-being (or 
flourishing) of human persons in the long run.  
182 This of course raises a challenging philosophical question: how are persons born after the adoption of 
the Constitution bound by it? In other words, how is a subsequent generation of persons bound by an 
agreement concluded by an antecedent generation of persons? After all, they never agreed to it! The 
answer I would tentatively provide, is that the Constitution continues to bind successive generations, in 
part, in virtue of the principle of participatory acquiescence. That is to say, subsequent generations 
who live in accordance with its terms, rely on its protections and reap its benefits are tacitly bound by it. 
However, this is not to say that subsequent generations are obliged to be bound ad infinitum. Should 
persons rally their fellow citizens and elect new legislative representatives, they may either amend the 
Constitution or perhaps even abandon it completely. Section 74 of the Constitution provides for such 
radical amendments. 
183 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC).  
184 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).  
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Public opinion may have some relevance to the enquiry, but in itself, it is no substitute 
for the duty vested in the Courts to interpret the Constitution and to uphold its 
provisions without fear or favour . . . This Court cannot allow itself to be diverted from 
its duty to act as an independent arbiter of the Constitution by making choices on the 
basis that they will find favour with the public [emphasis added] (paragraphs 88-89) 
 
O’ Regan J, later in the same decision, held: 
 
In broad terms, the function given to this court by the Constitution is to articulate the 
fundamental sense of justice and rights shared by the whole nation as expressed in the 
text of the Constitution [emphasis added]. The Constitution was the first public 
document of legal force in South African history to emerge from an inclusive process 
in which the overwhelming majority were represented. (paragraph 362) 
 
Therefore, there can be no denying that the legal context in which we are embedded is 
one shaped by a social instrument that purports, first and foremost, (i) to be a 
fundamentally ethical instrument, and (ii) which is taken to articulate objective 
normative values that have been agreed to by South African society. The next question 
that immediately arises is: what has South African society agreed to in this instrument? 
 
B3. A RIGHTS BASED ETHICAL DOCUMENT 
 
The obvious answer is that South African society has agreed to a panoply of rights that 
are borne by persons. However, it is important at the outset to distinguish between two 
different ways of thinking about ‘rights’ and the ‘language of rights’. First, rights could 
be understood as being derived from other ethical or normative principles – the 
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derived view. Second, rights could be understood as being basic, fundamental or 
primitive – the foundational view. 
 
On the derived view talk of rights is rather like ‘linguistic shorthand’ for talking about 
independently arrived at ethical conclusions. It is a view that conceives of ‘rights talk’ 
as simply another way of speaking about our moral duties and obligations that are 
ultimately grounded in other normative principles. On this view, rights themselves do 
not do any primary normative work but rather it is the other principles that do the 
ethical heavy lifting. Rights, so construed, become a convenient way to sum up a 
conclusion to an ethical argument that has relied on other more fundamental 
normative premises, for example, the well-being of persons.  
 
In contrast, on the foundational view, rights are taken to be the basic units, building 
blocks or premises in a normative system. They are the fundamental normative capital 
from which other obligations, duties and constraints on action are constructed. 
However, this does not mean that rights are self-justifying. One particularly persuasive 
way to justify the existence of rights is to point out that rights protect vital or crucial 
human interests from being undermined or threatened. Human persons, descriptively 
speaking, have a panoply of critical interests. Rights serve to protect those critical 
interests. Rights can thus be grounded in non-normative facts about persons while still 
retaining their normative primacy. In this sense, rights are deontological constraints 
that ‘protect the person against being “sacrificed” to the greater good’ (Kagan, 1998, 
p.173). As Charles Jones explains: 
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Human rights are moral claim rights that protect basic or vital interests of individual 
human beings. Their scope is universal in that each person possesses them. They 
provide the grounds for protecting persons from ‘standard threats’ to those interests 
by ensuring protective mechanisms are put in place, and they generate duties best 
attached to institutions so as to ensure that the interests themselves may be clearly 
identified and their protection reliably monitored . . . we should understand human 
rights as the normative link between interests on the one hand and duties on the other 
. . . human rights, therefore, are grounded in human interests; but those rights in turn 
provide the grounds for duties to ensure those interests are secured against standard 
threats. (2013, pp.58-59). 
 
As I already indicated, the Constitution describes the Bill of Rights as the cornerstone 
of the democracy of the Republic. The Constitution thus clearly construes the rights 
that are enshrined in it to be foundational and not derived. The Constitution thus 
takes rights to be the basic building blocks of the South African normative system and 
which are designed to protect vital human interests and place constraints on the 
conduct of the State and other individual persons.185 However, it is important to 
emphasise that in the Constitution no right is considered absolute and, in principle, 
any right can be limited or curtailed provided certain criteria are met.186 
 
This naturally raises a further question: what is the substantive content of the rights 
that have been enshrined in the Constitution and can they possibly provide a basis for 
the permissibility of VAS in South African society? However, before turning to 
                                        
185 ‘Ronald Dworkin proposes . . . that they [rights] may be regarded as trumps in moral disputes’ and ‘a 
similar point is made by Robert Nozick when he describes rights as side-constraints.’ (Almond, 1991 
[1993], p.261). 
186 Section 36 of the Constitution. It is probably safe to say that in light of this fact, the rights based ethic 
established by the Constitution is a form of moderate deontology. That is to say, such rights set barriers 
(perhaps even very high barriers) to the promotion of the good but such barriers are not absolutely 
insurmountable.  
  
131 
addressing that question, something should be mentioned about the formal structure 
of rights in general. 
 
A useful point of departure in understanding the formal structure of rights is to 
consider John Mackie’s187 distinction between two categories of rights viz. liberty 
rights and claim rights:  
 
[R]ights can be, formally, of several different sorts, but the most basic distinction is 
that between a liberty and a claim-right. . . To say that someone has a certain liberty, 
then, may be to say that the system in question, whatever it is, does not forbid him to 
act in the way indicated – or (speaking within the system) it may be to give him 
permission so to act, or explicitly to refrain from forbidding him to do so. To say that 
someone has a certain claim-right may similarly be to say that if he claims (or if 
someone representing him claims on his behalf) whatever it is that he has this right 
to, the system will support his obtaining what he claims – or (speaking within the 
system) to say that he has this right may be to give him this support, typically by 
imposing on one or more or indefinitely many others the duty of fulfilling the claim it 
is made. A liberty and a related claim-right may go together: for example, it will often 
be natural to associate with the liberty to do something the claim-right not to be 
impeded by others in doing it . . . (1977, pp.173-174)  
 
From this description we can see that Mackie has explicitly endorsed the Hohfeldian 
system for the categorization of rights. In such a system, liberty rights have the 
general form: A has a liberty to φ if and only if A has no duty not to φ. Expressed 
conversely, a liberty right entails that other persons have a duty not to interfere 
                                        
187 It is important to mention that Mackie does not believe in objective moral values and thus he does not 
endorse the notion of objectively existing rights. Instead he appears to believe all rights are relative to a 
particular moral or ethical system. I disagree. However, that is a meta-ethical disagreement that would 
take us far beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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with the exercise of the liberty. This has the general form: If A has a liberty to φ then B 
has a duty not to interfere with A’s φ. (Hohfeld, 1919). 
 
Furthermore, in such a system claim rights have the general form: A has a claim 
that B φ if and only if B has a duty to A to φ. Expressed conversely, a claim right entails 
that other persons are not at liberty to refuse the claim. This has the general form: If 
A has a claim against B to φ then B is not at liberty to refuse to φ. (Hohfeld, 1919). 
However, there are two other sorts of rights involved in the Hohfeldian system which 
Mackie does not mention, namely, powers and immunities. These sorts of rights 
relate to the ability of a person to modify either liberty rights or claim rights.  
 
Powers entitle a person to modify either their own or another person’s liberty or 
claim rights. In such a system, powers have the general form:  A has a power if and 
only if A has the ability to alter his own or another person’s liberty or claim rights. 
(Hohfeld, 1919). On the other hand, immunities prevent a person from having their 
liberty or claim rights modified by another. In such a system, immunities have the 
general form: B has an immunity if and only if A lacks the ability to alter B's liberties or 
claims. (Hohfeld, 1919). This Hohfeldian characterisation of the formal structure of 
rights is well suited to analysing the structure of the rights detailed in the Constitution.  
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B4. TRANSLATING THE POSITIVE CASE 
 
From the aforegoing we can now begin to see a way to translate the positive case into 
the language of rights. It will be recalled that the conclusion of Part I of the positive 
case was that it was sometimes permissible for (i) a person to request another’s 
assistance to end her life and (ii) to be so assisted. It will also be recalled that the 
positive case did not entail that there was an obligation on any person to assist another 
to engage in VAS. Thus we can see that Part I of the positive case entails the following 
conclusions about any individual person desirous of engaging in VAS: 
 
(i) A person sometimes has a liberty right to engage in VAS and thus sometimes has 
the corresponding power to modify his own claim right not to be killed by 
another. 
 
(ii) If a person has a liberty right to engage in VAS then others have a duty not to 
interfere with that instance of VAS. 
 
(iii) A person does not ever have a claim right against others to assist him with VAS 
and thus others are always at liberty to refuse to assist a person with VAS.  
 
(iv) A person does not ever have a power to modify another’s liberty to refuse to 
assist with VAS and thus persons always have an immunity against a person who 
requires assistance with VAS.  
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It is important to point out that the positive case entails a derivative view of rights. 
This is because the normative work in the positive case is done by other ethical 
principles, specifically the concepts of human well-being and autonomy. It is from those 
concepts in particular that the liberty right to VAS is derived.  
 
The crucial question now becomes whether there is any scope for articulating such a 
liberty right in the Constitution? It is important to mention that there is no specific 
right to this effect that has been agreed to or enshrined in the Constitution. However, 
in my view, it is possible for the Judiciary to nevertheless articulate such a right. Such 
a right can be distilled by reference to three other rights, namely (i) the Right to Life 
(ii) The Right to Human Dignity, and (iii) The Right to Freedom and Security of 
the Person. These rights taken together can be plausibly construed as protecting the 
vital interests human persons have in their well-being, autonomy and dignity. 
 
B4.1. THE RIGHT TO LIFE 
 
Section 11 of the Constitution reads: ‘Everyone has the right to life.’  
 
The phraseology of this right is, of course, ambiguous in that it is capable of being 
construed in a positive and/or a negative way. That is to say, it can be interpreted as a 
right not to be treated in certain ways (e.g. not to be killed by other) and/or as a right 
to be treated in a certain ways (e.g. to be saved by others). For our purposes, it is the 
negative sense that is important. This is because the negative sense corresponds to a 
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claim right, namely, the claim a person has against others not to be killed and their 
corresponding duty not to kill him. This might be thought, prima facie, to prevent any 
basis for the permissibility of VAS. 
 
However, if the positive case is sound then the value of a person’s life is intimately 
bound up with the various intrinsic goods that a life might possibly contain. It is then 
clear that (in the language of rights) a person has a vital interest in living the sort of 
life that instantiates or expresses those intrinsic goods. In short, a person has a vital 
interest in living a eudaimon life. In fact, one might even say that this is the most vital 
and overarching interest that any single person could have. If this is so, then persons 
have an equally vital interest in avoiding a life that is not worth living i.e. a non-
eudaimon life.  
 
If persons have (i) a vital interest in a life that is worth living and (ii) a vital interest in 
avoiding a life that is not worth living, then it follows (in the language of rights) that 
such persons have a liberty right to end their own existence, if and when, their lives 
ever reach such a horrible state. Furthermore, if a person’s life does reach that state 
and they either (i) cannot end their existence themselves, or (ii) are not willing to do 
so, then they will have a power to modify the claim right that they normally have 
against others not to end their lives. In other words, such persons will be able to waive 
the claim right they would normally have against others. (Benatar, 2010) 
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Is the Right to Life in the Constitution capable of being characterised in this way? I 
believe the answer can be answered affirmatively and there is even textual support from 
the Judiciary itself to support this view.  
  
In Makwanyane, O’ Regan J held the following: 
 
The right to life is, in one sense, antecedent to all other rights in the Constitution. 
Without life in the sense of existence, it would not be possible to exercise rights or to 
be the bearer of them. But the right to life was included in the Constitution not simply 
to enshrine the right to existence. It is not life as mere organic matter that the 
Constitution cherishes, but the right to human life: the right to share in the experience 
of humanity. This concept of human life is at the centre of our constitutional values 
[emphasis added]. . . The Constitution seeks to establish a society where the individual 
value of each member of the community is recognised and treasured. The right to life 
is central to such a society. The right to life, thus understood, incorporates the right 
to dignity. So the rights to human dignity and life are entwined. The right to life is 
more than existence, it is a right to be treated as a human being with dignity [emphasis 
added]: without dignity human life is substantially diminished. Without life, there 
cannot be dignity. (paragraphs 326-327). 
 
What is clear from this passage is that the Right to Life enshrined in the Constitution 
has been understood by the Judiciary as protecting the vital interest that (i) persons 
have in the rich and multifaceted experience of humanity, as opposed to (ii) mere 
organic existence. In this passage, the Judiciary endorses precisely what Grayling has 
articulated about the Right to Life:  
 
‘Life’ in the phrase ‘the right to life’ is not mere existence. It is existence with at least 
a minimum degree of quality and value. It means a life in which the individual is 
protected from arbitrary power and threat, is free to seek opportunities and exercise 
choices, to enjoy the rewards and endeavours in peace, and to seek and foster personal 
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relationships – and which, to the degree reasonably possible for anyone in this world, 
is free from distress and pain. (2001, p.2). 
 
The ‘experience of humanity’ that persons have the most vital interest in are precisely 
that set of intrinsically valuable things that they are capable of experiencing, 
discovering and creating. That is the sort of experience of humanity which would allow 
a person to live with dignity. Implicit in this, is the idea that persons have an equally 
vital interest in not being deprived of the rich and multifaceted experience that 
humanity has to offer. Such an existence would be one that lacked dignity. This passage 
explicitly acknowledges the link between dignity and the experience of humanity. This 
is simply another way of saying that a life that does not, or cannot, share in the 
experience of humanity would be a life that is not worth living.188  Naturally, the person 
who would be most immediately and intimately acquainted with his present and future 
prospects of his experience of humanity, and the dignified nature of his existence, 
would be the person himself.  
 
The Right to Life, construed in this way, entails that if and when a life ceases to be 
worth living and becomes undignified, a person will have (i) a liberty right to end his 
existence, and (ii) the associated power to waive the claim right he would, in the 
normal course, have against being killed by others. This would entail that, whatever 
the State’s duty might be to ‘protect human life from the violations of others’ 
(Makwanyane, paragraph 117), it would not extend to compelling a person to continue 
                                        
188 It is not inconsequential that the preamble to the Constitution itself states that it has been enacted to, 
inter alia, ‘[i]mprove the quality of life [emphasis added] of all citizens and free the potential of each 
person.’ 
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living a life that was not worth living and lacking in dignity. An absolute prohibition 
that prevents a person from exercising this liberty right (or this power) thus infringes 
the vital interest a person has in avoiding a non-eudaimon existence.  
 
B4.2. THE RIGHT TO HUMAN DIGNITY 
 
Section 10 of the Constitution reads: ‘Everyone has inherent dignity and the right 
to have their dignity respected and protected.’ 
 
In Makwanyane, immediately after having spoken about the Right to Life, O’Regan J 
speaks of human dignity in the following terms: 
 
The importance of dignity as a founding value of the new Constitution cannot be 
overemphasised. Recognising a right to dignity is an acknowledgement of the intrinsic 
worth of human beings: human beings are entitled to be treated as worthy of respect and 
concern [emphasis added]. . .  Recognition and protection of human dignity is the 
touchstone of the new political order and is fundamental to the new Constitution’ 
(paragraph 328-329).   
 
Prima facie, the wording of this passage appears to lend support to the idea that the 
Right to Human Dignity entails that human persons are intrinsically valuable in 
themselves. This runs counter to the positive case. If that is so then it would seem to 
involve a claim right against others not to undermine the intrinsic value of 
personhood per se, which claim right is not susceptible to modification and thereby 
not under a person’s power to waive.189  
                                        
189 This would be Velleman’s view (1999). 
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However, when one realises that the dignity of a person’s life is intimately connected 
to the Right to Life which protects the vital interest a person has in avoiding a non-
worthwhile and undignified existence, then it is entirely plausible to construe the 
Right to Human Dignity as similarly protecting the vital interest a person has to 
living a life of a certain quality. From this, it would once again follow that a person 
would have both a liberty right to end his existence if it became undignified and the 
associated power to waive the claim right normally placed on others not to terminate 
his existence. In such cases, the termination of his existence would be the Right to 
Human Dignity vindicated and constitute respect for the person’s autonomy.  Further 
textual support for this construal of the right comes from the case of Barkhuizen v 
Napier190 in which Ngcobo J held that ‘self-autonomy, or the ability to regulate one’s 
own affairs, even to one’s own detriment, is the very essence of freedom and a vital part 
of dignity.’ (paragraph 57)  
 
From this passage, it is clear that the Judiciary already considers autonomy to be a 
crucial feature of human dignity. Accordingly, it is plausible to construe the Right to 
Human Dignity as similarly protecting the vital interest a person has in his autonomy 
and his capacity for self-determination. This must include, at the very least, the 
epistemic freedom to assess the quality of his life as well as the freedom to act in 
accordance with that assessment. When persons are absolutely prohibited from doing 
this, their vital interest in their autonomy and self-determination is undermined. This, 
                                        
190 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). 
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simultaneously, undermines the vital interest persons have in the quality of their life.  
This is what is really protected by the Right to Human Dignity. 
 
B4.3. THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM AND SECURITY OF THE PERSON 
 
Section 12 (2) (b) of the Constitution reads: ‘Everyone has the right to bodily and 
psychological integrity which includes the right to security in and control over 
their body’. 
 
In the language of rights, persons clearly have a vital interest in both (i) maintaining 
their bodily integrity against interference by other persons, as well as (ii) being free to 
construct an existence of their own choosing. These vital interests thus then generate 
both a liberty right and a claim right. These rights secure for persons permissive 
control over their corporeal forms to live the life they wish to live and impose duties 
on others not to violate their bodily integrity. As Currie and De Waal have noted: 
 
In essence the right to freedom and security of the person is the right to be left alone. 
And at least in relation to one’s body the right creates a sphere of individual 
inviolability. Section 12 (2) (b) tell us that this inviolability has two components. 
‘Security in’ and ‘control over’ one’s body are not synonymous. The former denotes 
the protection of bodily integrity against intrusions by the state and others. The latter 
denotes the protection of what could be called bodily autonomy or self-determination 
against interference [emphasis added]. The former is the right to be left alone in the 
sense of being unmolested by others. The latter is a component of the right to be left 
alone in the sense of being allowed to live the life one chooses [emphasis added]. (2013, 
p.287). 
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Understanding the right in this way provides very strong support for a liberty right to 
VAS and the corresponding power to modify the claim right a person normally has 
against other persons not to violate his bodily integrity. This will especially be so when 
one reads this right in conjunction with the Right to Life and Right to Human 
Dignity, both of which plausibly protect the vital interests a person has in avoiding a 
non-worthwhile and an undignified existence, as well as the vital interest a person has 
in his autonomy and self-determination. In the decision of Soobramoney v Minister of 
Health (Kwazulu-Natal)191  Sachs J specifically endorsed the observation that ‘dying is a 
part of life, the completion rather than its opposite’ while also emphasising that ‘[w]e 
can, however, influence the manner in which we come to terms with our mortality.’ 
(paragraph 57). 
 
An absolute prohibition preventing a person from exercising control over his body 
would amount to undermining his vital interest in being able to live his life in a truly 
self-determined manner. Part of living a life in a truly self-determined manner involves, 
as I have already argued, being able to choose when and how to die. This is a significant 
way in which persons can come to terms with their mortality – by taking control of it.  
 
B5. OVERVIEW: COMMON LAW & VOLUNTARY ASSISTED SUICIDE 
 
I believe then that the positive case is capable of being translated quite admirably into 
the language of rights and that by reference to the Right to Life, the Right to Human 
                                        
191 1997 BCLR (12) 1696 (CC). 
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Dignity and the Right to Bodily and Psychological integrity, a sufficiently robust 
liberty right to VAS can be distilled.  However, against this sort of analysis stands an 
historical legacy of common law precedent which entrenches and perpetuates the 
prohibitionist policy that is currently in place. It is worthwhile then to provide a brief 
overview of that common law position. 
 
B5.1. HISTORICAL POSITION 
 
Murder is a common law crime in South African society. This means it is not a crime 
one will find in any statute, proclamation, notice or other piece of legislation. Instead, 
it is a crime that has been defined and delineated by the court system, the record of 
which exists only in a string of legal precedent. 192   
 
The definition of the crime is the following: ‘Murder is the unlawful and intentional 
causing of the death of another human being.’ (Snyman, 2008, p.447). The crime thus 
has four distinct components, namely, ‘(i) causing the death (ii) of another person (iii) 
unlawfully, and (iv) intentionally.’ (Snyman, 2008, p.447). Furthermore, any conduct 
that is intended to hasten the death of another person will constitute murder even if 
the other person was going to die anyway and/or the motive was to alleviate 
suffering.193   
 
                                        
192 S v Ndhlovu 1945 AD 369; S v Valachia 1945 AD 826; S v Sighwala 1967 (4) SA 566 (A); S v Ntuli 1975 (1) 
SA 429 (A).  
193 S v Hartmann 1975 (3) SA 532 (C); S v Marengo 1991 (2) SACR 43 (W); S v Smorenburg 1992 (2) SACR 
289 (C). 
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However, conduct that intentionally causes the death of another human being is not 
considered murder if there is an exculpatory set of facts that can be termed a ‘ground 
of justification’.194 In the context of murder, a ground of justification can be said to 
negate (or nullify) the unlawfulness of the intentional conduct that caused the death 
of the other person. (Snyman, 2008).  
 
Certain recognised grounds of justification exist against a charge of murder, the most 
well-known being that of private defence. If a person acts in private defence then even 
though he intentionally causes the death of another person he will not be guilty of 
murder. (Snyman, 2008). However, not all grounds of justification are available 
when defending a charge of murder. Specifically, the ground of justification known 
as consent195 has historically been unavailable. This means that, according to South 
African common law, it is not possible for a person to consent to conduct that 
intentionally causes his own death. (Snyman, 2008).  
 
Accordingly, any person that were to engage in DVAS, even if motivated by a desire to 
alleviate the suffering of another person, would be guilty of murder.196 Furthermore, 
                                        
194 There are a number of grounds of justification recognised in South African law which can be raised 
as defences, including but not limited to, (i) private defence (ii) necessity (iii) consent. Each has its own 
specific requirements that need to be satisfied in order to be successfully raised. 
195 The crucial elements of consent in South African law are the following: (i) the consent must be given 
voluntarily without coercion (ii) the person giving consent must be mentally capable of giving consent 
(iii) the consenting person must be aware of the true and material facts regarding the act to which he 
consents (iv) the consent is given expressly or tacitly and (v) the consent must be given prior to the 
performance of the unlawful act and (vi) the consent must be given by the person himself or, at the very 
least, by someone lawfully capable of giving it on his behalf. (Snyman, 2008) It is interesting to note that 
these criteria are almost identical to the criteria that constitute the Doctrine of Informed Consent 
(DIC) examined earlier.  
196 S v Robinson 1968 (1) SA 666 (A); S v Nkwanyana 2003 (1) SACR 67 (W). For a very useful overview of 
these authorities as well as the facts of each case. (see Grové, 2007) 
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even though suicide and attempted suicide is not a crime in South Africa, there is a 
possibility that, given the appropriate factual circumstances, a person who engages in 
INVAS will either be guilty of murder, attempted murder or culpable homicide. The 
question of criminal liability in such cases will often turn on whether the person 
providing the means, methods or modes of assistance to the other person can properly 
be called ‘the cause’ of the other person’s death in the legal sense.197  
 
B5.2. THE STRANSHAM-FORD DECISION 
 
Recently, however, there has been an attempt to tackle this common law legacy head 
on in the case of Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services & 
Others.198  The facts of the case were the following:  
 
Mr Stransham-Ford199 was a practicing Advocate who had stage 4 terminal cancer and 
had only a few weeks to live. The Applicant brought an urgent application200 in which 
he sought three principal things: 
 
(i) Permission for a medical practitioner to end his life (DVAS in the form of PAS) or 
enable him to end his life (INVAS in the form of PAS) through the administration 
or provision of some lethal agent. 
                                        
197 S v Grotjohn 1970 (2) SA 355 (A); S v Hibbert 1979 (4) SA 717 (D). 
198 2015 (4) SA (GP) 50. 
199 The Applicant in the case. 
200 This is an application brought on protracted time limits in terms of the procedural rules of the High 
Court. The purpose of such an application is to obtain relief which could not be reasonably obtained if 
the regular procedures and time limits are followed. 
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(ii) A declaratory order that such medical practitioner would not be subject to any 
civil, criminal or disciplinary liability. 
 
(iii) A declaratory order that the common law be developed to the extent required to 
render such conduct lawful and constitutional in the circumstances of his case. 
(paragraphs 1 -4) 
 
The Applicant purported to bring the application freely and voluntarily and without 
undue influence. He sought to ground his application on the basis that as a result of 
his terminal condition, inter alia, (i) the quality of his life had drastically deteriorated 
despite palliative care (ii) he suffered from severe pain and discomfort (iii) his 
condition made him increasingly frail and was only worsening, and (iv) he was afraid 
of dying while suffering. (paragraphs 6-9) The Applicant based his application 
principally on the Right to Human Dignity and the Right to Freedom and Security 
of the Person in the Bill of Rights. (paragraph 11)201 
 
The court, in the final analysis, agreed with the Applicant. The court found, inter alia, 
that: 
 
(i) The Right to Human Dignity was intimately connected to quality of life and the 
choice of how to die was part of what it was to live in a dignified way. (paragraph 
12-14) 
                                        
201 In is interesting to note that the Applicant did not himself rely on the Right to Life, although it was 
referred to by the court when addressing the opposing arguments during the course of the judgment. 
(paragraph 23) 
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(ii) If events were to take their natural course, the sort of death that awaited the 
Applicant would be undignified. (paragraphs 15) 
 
(iii) There was no question of abuse in the present case given the particular medical 
condition of the Applicant, his persistent and informed decision to end his life 
and the fact that he was fully in command of his faculties. (paragraph 20) 
 
(iv) There was no philosophically tenable distinction between killing and letting die 
and thus no tenable distinction to be made between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ 
euthanasia. (paragraph 21.2) 
 
(v) While safeguards on the practice were certainly an important consideration the 
court could determine appropriate safeguards on a case by case basis and on 
consideration of the specific facts before it. (paragraph 17) 
 
(vi) The common law had to be developed in light of the objective normative values 
enshrined in the Constitution. (paragraph 22-23) 
 
In doing so, the court rejected the counter arguments raised by the other parties to the 
litigation, in particular, the arguments that:  
 
(i) The Applicant’s dignity was not infringed by the prohibitionist common law 
position. (paragraph 21) 
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(ii) The Applicant’s contention that his dignity was impaired was simply his own 
‘subjective’ assessment. (paragraph 21) 
 
(iii) A development of the common law that permitted a case-by-case assessment of 
persons who required assistance in dying would lead to abuse. (paragraph 17 and 
19) 
 
(iv) Human life was paramount and sacrosanct and had to be protected no matter 
what. (paragraphs 14 and 23) 
 
The court granted the relief sought by the Applicant and proceeded to develop the 
common law. It did so by holding that the absolute prohibition entailed by the 
common law crimes of murder or culpable homicide, in the context of assisted suicide 
by medical practitioners, violated the Applicant’s constitutional rights and were, to 
that extent only, declared to be (i) overbroad and (ii) in conflict with the Bill of Rights. 
(paragraph 26) In doing so the court engaged in the process of the indirect 
application of the Bill of Rights.202 
 
 
 
 
                                        
202 Unfortunately, unknown to the court and the legal representatives involved, the Applicant had already 
died some two hours prior to the granting of the order. This aspect featured prominently in the appeal 
decision. 
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B5.3. THE APPEAL DECISION 
 
The Stransham-Ford decision was taken on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal and 
is reported as The Minister of Justice and Correctional Services & Others v Estate Late 
Stransham Ford.203 The appeal was successful and the Stransham-Ford decision was 
overturned.   
 
The appeal court overturned204 the decision of the court a quo205 based on three broad 
considerations: 
 
(i) Since the Applicant had died prior to the granting of the order and because the 
relief sought was highly personal to the Applicant, there was no live issue for the 
court a quo to pronounce on at the time of the judgment. The issue before the 
court had become moot and there had been no basis for the court to make any 
order at all. (paragraphs 5, 13, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 26) 
 
(ii) There had not been a full and proper ventilation of the law by the court a quo in 
light of the domestic and international authorities. Specifically, the court a quo 
had not properly engaged with (a) the issue of consent as a ground of justification 
to a charge of murder and/or (b) the issue as to whether assisting someone to 
                                        
203 2016 ZASCA 197 (6 December 2016). 
204 None of the reasons were directly related to the merits of the ethical and constitutional issues that 
were at the core of the matter. 
205 The court beneath it. 
  
149 
commit suicide themselves would always constitute murder. (paragraphs 5, 29, 41, 
55, 57, 69 and 74) 
 
(iii) The court a quo had made the order on an incorrect and restricted factual basis 
without complying with certain procedural rules. Specifically, there was (a) 
insufficient admissible evidence presented for the court a quo to make the decision 
it made, (b) the factual information upon which the court a quo had made its 
decision was incomplete and misleading, and (c) the court a quo made its decision 
without affording all interested parties a proper opportunity to be heard. 
(paragraphs 5, 79, 81, 82 and 89) 
 
Ultimately, the appeal court concluded that: 
 
(i) It was unsatisfactory for any court (including the appeal court,) to make any 
finding on the ethical and constitutional issues involved in this case especially in 
light of the deficient and incomplete evidential record before it. (paragraphs 94 - 
95) 
 
(ii) South Africa faced very different challenges to other jurisdictions that had liberal 
euthanasia policies and which had sophisticated health care systems and extensive 
palliative care networks. In South Africa, the health care system faced significant 
challenges, there were great disparities of wealth and resources in the population 
and any court would need to be satisfied that a proper and functional regulatory 
framework could be put in place. (paragraph 98) 
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(iii) A court addressing these issues had to be aware of different cultural values and 
attitudes in a diverse South Africa and to consider the impact of its decisions for 
the entire population and not just a few. It was in that context that it had to 
consider whether a decision to change the status quo would undercut the 
foundational value of the Right to Life or be supportive of it. (paragraph 100) 
 
(iv) It would be welcome for parliament to address the topic by passing legislation and 
thereby give effect to its proper role as the legislative authority of South African 
society. (paragraph 101) 
 
(v) It was wrong of the court a quo to have developed the common law crimes of 
murder and culpable homicide and that the legal position before the decision of 
the court a quo would remain in force. (paragraph 101) 
 
(vi) When an appropriate case came before the courts, the common law would no 
doubt evolve in the light of both a consideration of the common law precedent as 
well as the developments that had occurred in other jurisdictions. (paragraph 101) 
 
The court in the appeal decision thus effectively did three important things. First, it 
restored the prohibitionist status quo. Second, it suggested that it would be desirable 
for the Legislature to address the issue of VAS by passing legislation. Third, it 
specifically left the jurisprudential door open for the future development of the 
common law in an appropriate case.  
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B6.OVERVIEW: SOUTH AFRICAN LAW COMMISSION DISCUSSION 
PAPER 
 
In both the Stransham-ford decision and the appeal decision, the courts had occasion 
to refer to the South African Law Commission Report on Euthanasia and Artificial 
Preservation of Life, 1998.206  
 
The report was prepared by the South African Law Commission207 for the purposes of 
(i) examining the moral and legal issues that inform a plethora of end-of-life questions 
and (ii) considering proposals for possible law reform. (p.iv) Of these end-of-life 
questions, the report dealt specifically with possible law reform in respect of VAS (both 
DVAS and INVAS). 208 (pp. 24-56) 
 
The commission framed the question in respect of VAS as follows: 
 
Whether it would be lawful for a medical practitioner to give effect to the well 
informed considered request of a terminally ill, but mentally competent, patient to 
make an end to the patient’s unbearable suffering or to enable the patient to make an 
end to his or her unbearable suffering by administering or providing a lethal agent 
(p.v). 
 
The first thing to notice about the framing of the commission’s question is that it limits 
the question to terminally ill persons who are experiencing unbearable suffering. The 
                                        
206 I will simply refer to it as ‘the report’. 
207 The commission is established in terms of section 2 (2) the South African Law Commission Act 19 of 
1973. I shall simply refer to it as ‘the commission’.  
208 The commission referred to DVAS as ‘voluntary active euthanasia’ and to INVAS as ‘assisted suicide’. 
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commission clearly assumed that terminally ill persons who are experiencing 
unbearable suffering would be the only persons who might potentially have a liberty 
right to VAS.209 This differs drastically from the conclusion reached by the positive 
case which would secure a liberty right to VAS for anyone who is not living a 
eudaimon life.210 Secondly, it should also be clear that the commission assumed that 
only a medical practitioner would be entitled to assist a person to engage in VAS. This 
again differs drastically from the positive case which, in principle, would permit either 
PAS or NPAS.211 
 
The commission nevertheless proceeded to consider a number of the versions of the 
SHA as well as the SLA. (pp. 44-54) The commission ultimately recorded that it had 
not taken up any definitive position in respect of VAS either for or against the practice. 
(p.54)  However, the commission stated that if legislation was introduced, it proposed 
the following statutory provisions to regulate the practice: 
 
(1) Should a medical practitioner be requested by a patient to make an end to the 
patient’s suffering, or to enable the patient to make an end to his or her suffering 
by way of administering or providing some or other lethal agent, the medical 
practitioner shall not give effect to the request unless he or she is convinced that: 
 
(i) the patient is suffering from a terminal illness; 
                                        
209 The commission’s assumption is understandable insofar as the lives of terminally ill persons in 
unbearable suffering do constitute proto-typical examples of non-worthwhile lives. 
210 It will be recalled, that one of the core points of the positive case is that a non-eudaimon life could be 
‘multiply realizable’. That is to say, the life of person with a terminal illness and who was suffering 
unbearable pain might just express one sort of non-worthwhile life. There is no reason to think that such 
a life exhausts the category. In fact, according to the positive case, there are good reasons to think that it 
does not. 
211 It will be recalled that the positive case makes a practical argument for the preferability of PAS but 
would permit NPAS in circumstances where no physician was available (or willing) to assist a person in 
a given case. 
  
153 
 
(ii)   the patient is subject to extreme suffering; 
 
(iii) the patient is over the age of 18 years and mentally competent; 
 
(iv) the patient has been adequately informed as to the illness from which he or 
she is suffering, the prognosis of his or her condition and of any treatment or 
care that may be available; 
 
(v) the request of the patient is based on an informed and well considered 
decision; 
 
(vi) the patient has had the opportunity to re-evaluate his or her request, but that 
he or she has persisted; and 
 
(vii) euthanasia is the only way for the patient to be released from his or her 
suffering. 
 
(2) No medical practitioner to whom the request to make an end to the patient’s 
suffering is addressed as contemplated in subsection (1), shall give effect to such 
request, even though he or she may be convinced of the facts stated in that 
subsection, unless he or she has conferred with an independent medical 
practitioner who is knowledgeable with regard to the terminal illness from which 
the patient is suffering and who has personally checked the patient’s medical 
history and examined the patient and who has confirmed the facts as contemplated 
in subsection (1) (a), (b) and (g). 
 
(3) A medical practitioner who gives effect to a request as contemplated in sub-section 
(1), shall record in writing his or her findings regarding the facts as contemplated 
in that subsection and the name and address of the medical practitioner with 
whom he or she has conferred as contemplated in subsection (2) and the last-
mentioned medical practitioner shall record in writing his or her findings 
regarding the facts as contemplated in subsection (2). 
 
(4) The termination of the patient’s life on his or her request in order to release him 
or her from suffering may not be effected by a person other than a medical 
practitioner. 
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(5) A medical practitioner who gives effect to a patient’s request to be released from 
suffering as contemplated in this section shall not suffer any civil, criminal or 
disciplinary accountability with regard to such an act provided that all due 
procedural measures have been complied with. 
 
(6) No medical practitioner is obliged to give effect to a patient’s request to assist with 
the termination of a patient’s life. (pp. 55-56 & pp.99-101). 
 
However, despite the fact that the commission prepared and finalised the report in 
November 1998, and despite the fact that the report had been submitted to the then 
Minister of Health, nothing has been done by the Legislature in the last eighteen 
years.212  
 
B7. PROPOSED SAFEGUARDS AND OVERSIGHT CRITERIA 
 
In light of the (i) Stransham-Ford decision (ii) the appeal decision, and (iii) the report 
there appear to be two broad ways to permit VAS and implement a permissive VAS 
policy. The first would be through legislative reform at the instance of the Legislature. 
The second would be through careful and incremental development of the common 
law through the indirect application of the Bill of Rights at the instance of the 
Judiciary. I shall address each option in turn and argue that the latter is preferable. I 
shall then set out what I believe would constitute a robust procedure that would 
provide optimal safeguards and oversight while still giving effect to the heart of the 
positive case and the liberty right it entails. 
                                        
212 In the Stransham-Ford decision it was argued on behalf of the State that other more pressing issues of 
national importance had demanded the attention of the Executive and the Legislature viz. the HIV and 
AIDS epidemic. (paragraph 21) 
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B7.1. LEGISLATION 
 
The benefits of legislative reform are twofold. First, the Legislature is constituted by 
the elected representatives of the peoples of South Africa. In principle, such 
representatives are in the best position to act on (and implement) the collective 
democratic will of South African society. There is also, in principle, a better chance of 
widespread support for a major paradigm shift in societal policy if it is effected at the 
instance of the elected representatives of that society. Second, legislative reform allows 
for the implementation of uniform, public and standardized criteria that can be 
tailored to a specific issue and immediately implemented and appreciated by society at 
large. In other words, once legislation is passed and implemented it can be quickly 
disseminated and complied with by entire sectors of the population.213 However, 
legislative reform also has a number of drawbacks. Two of which are particularly 
relevant to the issue of VAS.  
 
First, there is the fact that legislative reform can take a long time to be effected. In the 
case of VAS this is particularly noticeable and disconcerting. Despite the 
recommendations contained in the commission’s report, the Legislature has done 
absolutely nothing to bring about reform for the past eighteen years. In all this time 
this has meant that persons living non-eudaimon lives have been condemned to live in 
                                        
213 For an example of a proposed piece of legislation. (See Grové, 2007, pp.169-182) This example, however, 
limits VAS to terminally ill persons, places the final discretion to accede to the person’s request in the 
hands of the physician and does not permit NPAS. 
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an undignified state. A substantial harm has already been done to them as a result of 
legislative laxity.  
 
Furthermore, the laidback and laissez-fare attitude thusfar adopted by the Legislature 
does not instil much confidence that it will have a change of heart any time soon.  
Despite the fact that the court, in the appeal decision, stressed that the Legislature 
should engage in such reform, it is not obliged to do so and could, in principle, keep 
the issue on the legislative ‘back-burner’ indefinitely. The sad reality is that if reform is 
left to the Legislature many persons could find themselves condemned to live non-
eudaimon lives for many years to come.  
 
Second, there is the fact that any legislative reform would most likely be based on the 
commission’s report and the recommendations contained therein. While there is 
certainly much to commend in the report, the recommendations made do differ quite 
markedly from the conclusions and recommendations that would flow from the 
positive case. Any legislative reform based on the recommendations contained in the 
report is thus likely to focus on the limited cases of terminally ill patients who are 
physically suffering, to the exclusion of other persons who, while not terminally ill or 
in physical pain, may be living equally non-worthwhile lives.  
 
Furthermore, given that the commission’s recommendations that (i) non-medical 
practitioners not be permitted to assist a person to engage in VAS, and (ii) medical 
practitioners not be compelled to render assistance to a person wishing to engage in 
VAS, certain persons will still run the risk of not being assisted if they cannot obtain 
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the services of a consenting physician.  Thus while legislative reform may achieve some 
measure of moral progress it would, in my view, do so at the expense of recognising 
the full moral force of the positive case and still leave many persons to live non-
eudaimon lives. 
 
B7.2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW 
 
On the other hand, the development of the common law through the indirect 
application of the Bill of Rights could be a relatively quick way to implement a 
permissive VAS policy that acknowledges and incorporates the core points raised by 
the positive case. In light of the fact that the court, in the appeal decision, has 
specifically left open the possibility for the common law to be developed, all that would 
be required is an appropriate test case.214  
 
Bearing in mind what was stated in the appeal decision, it would be prudent that any 
test case conform, at the minimum, to the following criteria: 
 
(i) The test case should not be brought on an urgent basis.  
 
(ii) The test case should be brought on the regular procedural time periods in order to 
give all interested parties an opportunity to be heard, as well as allow for the 
intervention by potential amicus curiae. 
                                        
214 It is far beyond the scope of this thesis to exhaustively prescribe the desiderata of such a test case. 
Nevertheless, certain general features of such a test case can be mentioned in light of the appeal decision. 
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(iii) The test case should be brought to challenge the constitutionality of the common 
law prohibition on VAS in light of the Right to Life, Right to Human Dignity 
and Right to Freedom and Security of the Person.  
 
(iv) The test case should specifically challenge the common law precedent that 
precludes consent from being considered a legitimate ground of justification to 
a charge of murder. 
 
(v) The test case should specifically seek to develop the common law to allow consent 
to constitute a ground of justification to murder on condition that certain 
safeguards and oversight criteria are met. 
 
(vi) The test case should articulate clearly what the appropriate safeguards and 
oversight criteria should be if the common law were to be developed, taking into 
account their functionality for all persons in South African society. 
 
The appropriate safeguards and oversight criteria I would argue should be 
implemented ought to include both procedural and substantive elements. What I 
shall now articulate is how effective and robust procedural and substantive criteria 
might be developed and implemented which would effectively address the legitimate 
concerns raised by the SLA and the SHA, concerns which were echoed by the court in 
the appeal decision. 
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B7.3. APPLICATION TO HIGH COURT215 
 
From a procedural standpoint the principal and overriding safeguard would be to 
require all persons, regardless of their personal circumstances, and who are desirous of 
engaging in VAS to make a substantive and formal ex parte application216 to the High 
Court in order to seek the court’s imprimatur to engage in VAS. In other words, in 
order for a person to exercise their liberty right to VAS and to properly exercise the 
power to waive their claim right against others not to kill him, the ‘blessing’ of the 
Judiciary would first need to be obtained. Demanding such a procedural step has three 
principal benefits.  
 
First, by requiring persons to apply to court it will naturally and organically filter out 
those persons who are determined to engage in VAS from those who are not. An 
application to court requires significant time, effort and psychological investment on 
the part of any person considering VAS. By its very nature it would force any given 
person to consider what they are truly desirous of and whether they are truly 
committed to ending their life. Not only would the services of an attorney have to be 
obtained but also that of an Advocate who would be obliged to appear in court to 
present the application on behalf of the person.217 The fact that a person would be 
                                        
215 See Appendix II for an outline of a precedent application that one might expect to find in a South 
Africa that has (i) developed the common law, and (ii) has implemented a permissive VAS policy along 
the lines I have suggested. It goes without saying that a real application would have substantially more 
detail.  
216 This is an application in terms of which the applicant is the only party before the court. 
217 Insofar as there is a legitimate concern that many persons in South Africa may not be able to afford 
legal representation for such an application, it is to be noted that there are any number of law clinics and 
pro bono legal institutions that offer professional legal services to financially distressed or impecunious 
persons (e.g. Legal Aid South Africa or even the University of the Witwatersrand Law Clinic). 
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obliged to engage legal representatives would already be quite compelling evidence 
that he has soberly considered his personal circumstances and has taken the question 
of his death seriously. Such a procedural requirement also serves to ensure that there 
can be no case of VAS unless it is instigated by the person himself. Given the gravity of 
what is being sought, this is highly desirable.  
 
Second, by requiring persons to apply to court, the public would have the Judiciary 
acting as the final arbiter of whether a given person is entitled to engage in VAS or not. 
This would take the final determination to euthanize a given person out of the hands 
of physicians, other medical practitioners, family members, friends and any third party 
who might be acting nefariously or from morally dubious motives. Far better that such 
a decision ultimately be made impartially, by a trained jurist, with a fine sensitivity to 
mistake, abuse and deception. Again, this is highly desirable.  
 
Third, by requiring persons to apply to court, the interest that the State (and the rest 
of society) has in promoting and protecting life could still be served. An application to 
court is a public act. It signals to the rest of society that one is part of it and that one is 
connected in innumerable ways to the rest of society and vice versa. It also signals that 
one does not solely conduct oneself according to one’s own idiosyncratic moral 
standards but rather that one’s choices and conduct should be capable of being justified 
to others. An application to court would require persons to justify their choice to die 
by articulating reasons, under oath, that could be reasonably understood and 
appreciated by society at large. Such a procedural step forces a person to take 
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ownership of their decision and live up to the humanistic ideal which I articulated at 
the beginning of our discussion. This is also highly desirable.   
 
From a substantive viewpoint any given application to court should contain the 
following information and allegations in order to assist the court to appropriately judge 
the worthwhileness of the life in question and to come to a just decision: 
 
(i) The person’s full name and personal details, including (a) their age (b) identity 
number (c) marital status (d) occupation (e) place of residence. 
 
(ii) A copy of the person’s identity document or card must be attached to the 
application. 
 
(iii) Facts evidencing that the court has jurisdiction to entertain the application. 
 
(iv) An allegation that the application is being brought on the basis of the Right to 
Life, Right to Human Dignity and the Right to Freedom and Security of the 
Person. 
 
(v) Facts evidencing that the person is bringing the application in as maximally 
autonomous state as possible. 
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(vi) Such evidence must including facts showing that the person is (a) free of external 
personal defeaters to autonomy, and (b) free of internal defeaters to autonomy 
(including defects of control, reasoning, information and stability). 
 
(vii) A supplementary affidavit and report by either a clinical psychologist or a 
psychiatrist must be attached in which the following information must appear: 
 
(a) The psychologist’s or psychiatrists full personal particulars including the 
allegation that they are registered with the HPCSA. 
 
(b) The psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s scope of practice and expertise (if any). 
 
(c) Full disclosure of the psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s relationship to the 
person (if any). 
 
(d) Full disclosure of any and all financial, pecuniary or other legal benefits that 
the psychologist or psychiatrist might obtain as a result of the person’s death. 
 
(e) Facts evidencing that the psychologist or psychiatrist has recently examined 
or interviewed the person and such examination or interview must not have 
occurred more than two months prior to the launching of the application.  
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(f) Full details must be provided regarding the examination or interview 
including where, when and for how long the examination or interview 
occurred. 
 
(g) The psychologist or psychiatrist must have assessed the person’s mental 
health to determine whether the person suffers from any recognised grounds 
of psychopathology and/or personality disorder. 
 
(g) The psychologist or psychiatrist must have assessed the person’s mental 
capacity to appreciate the consequences of his choice, his ability to act in 
accordance with that appreciation as well as his reasons for wishing to die. 
  
(h) The psychologist or psychiatrist must have specifically considered and 
investigated any relevant factors that may militate against the conclusion 
that the person is acting in a maximally autonomous state, in particular, 
by considering any possibility of undue influence or coercion by third parties. 
 
(i) The psychologist or psychiatrist must have conducted interviews with the 
person’s immediate friends, family and treating physicians (as the case may 
require) to obtain as complete a picture as possible of the person’s familial 
and social circumstances. 
 
(j) The psychologist or psychiatrist must give his professional opinion as to 
whether the person is in a maximally autonomous state and whether he has 
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any professional reservations about allowing the person to proceed with the 
application and the reasons therefore.  
 
(k) The copy of the psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s report must be attached to the 
supplementary affidavit. 
 
(viii) A sufficiently detailed explanation of the reasons why the person is desirous of 
ending his life.  
 
(ix) This explanation will inevitably differ from person to person but all explanations 
must have sufficient particularity and detail so as to justify a conclusion that it 
would be reasonable to conclude (a) the person’s life is no longer worthwhile and 
dignified, and/or (b) it is probable that the person’s life will not be worthwhile 
and dignified in future.  
 
(x) Facts evidencing the person’s present and future prospects for living a worthwhile 
and dignified life must be included as well as facts evidencing why his future 
prospects for a worthwhile life are not probable. 
 
(xi) In the event that the person’s decision to end his life is based on medical grounds 
(e.g. terminal illness) then supplementary affidavits must be filed by at least two 
independent physicians each of which must include the following information:- 
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(a) The physician’s full personal particulars including the allegation that he is 
registered with the HPCSA. 
 
(b) The physician’s area of practice and expertise (if any).  
 
(c) The physician must detail his relationship to the person (if any). 
 
(d) Full disclosure of any and all financial, pecuniary or other legal benefits that 
the physician might obtain as a result of the person’s death. 
 
(e) Facts evidencing that the physician has recently examined the person, which 
examination must not have occurred more than two months prior to the 
launching of the application.  
 
(f) Full details of the examination must be provided including particulars as to 
where, when and for how long such examination occurred as well as what 
medical documentation was referred to in order to conduct the examination. 
 
(g) A complete and detailed diagnosis of the person’s present medical condition 
and the grounds for making such a diagnosis. 
 
(h) A complete and detailed prognosis of the person’s medical condition and the 
grounds for making such a prognosis. 
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(i) Details of any and all treatment options (including palliative care if 
applicable) that are available to the person. 
 
(j) Evidence that such treatment options (if any) have been properly explained 
to the person and that the person has been fully informed of the 
consequences of each treatment option. 
 
(xii) A confirmatory affidavit from a physician who is willing to assist the person, 
which affidavit must contain the following:- 
 
(a) The physician’s full personal particulars including the allegation that he 
is registered with the HPCSA. 
 
(b) The physician’s area of practice and expertise (if any).  
 
(c) Full details of the physician’s relationship to the person (if any). 
 
(d) Full disclosure of any and all financial, pecuniary or other legal benefits 
that the physician might obtain as a result of the person’s death. 
 
(e) The physician must not have been one of the other two physicians who 
has previously examined the person. 
 
(f) The physician must explicitly give his consent to assist the person. 
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(xiii) If no physician is capable or willing to assist the person then there must be 
a confirmatory affidavit by a family member or friend who is willing to assist 
the person, which affidavit must contain the following:- 
 
(a) The family member or friend’s full personal particulars. 
 
(b) Full details of the relationship between the family member or friend and 
the person. 
 
(c) Full disclosure of any and all financial, pecuniary or other legal benefits 
that the family member or friend might obtain as a result of the person’s 
death. 
 
(d) The reasons why they are willing to assist the person to end his life. 
 
(e) The family member or friend must give explicit consent to assist the 
person.  
 
(xiv) An explicit allegation that the person has consented to the physician, family 
member or friend (as the case may be) assisting him to end his life. 
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(xv) Facts justifying why the application should be heard in camera (if 
applicable).218 
 
(xvi) Supplementary affidavits by the person’s family or friends expressing their 
views on the person’s decision (if any). 
 
(xvii) A supplementary affidavit by the person’s attorney of record in which the 
following information must appear:- 
 
(a) The attorney of record’s full personal particulars. 
 
(b) Full details of the relationship between the attorney of record and the 
person. 
 
(c) Full disclosure of any and all financial, pecuniary or other legal benefits 
that the attorney of record might obtain as a result of the person’s death. 
 
(xviii) Facts detailing precisely where and when the person wishes to be assisted. 
 
(xix) The relief sought by the person, specifically whether the person wishes to 
engage in DVAS or INVAS. 
 
                                        
218 This means that the application is heard by the court without allowing other members of the public to 
be present at the hearing. This may be important in some highly sensitive matters where persons may 
wish to maintain their privacy in terms of section 14 of the Bill of Rights. 
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Faced with such an application the court would then be in the best position humanly 
possible to assess (i) the worthwhileness of the person’s life (ii) the reasons for his 
decision to end his life (iii) the voluntariness of the request, and (iv) to scrutinize the 
case for any hint of abuse or mistake. By requiring the application to be supported by 
both medical and psychological expert evidence, the court would be greatly assisted in 
this regard and the probability of a mistake or abuse would be greatly reduced.219  
 
This is in addition to the fact that the application would be presented by trained legal 
professionals who, as officers of the court, are encumbered with an overriding 
professional duty of disclosure and honesty in the presentation of cases. The court, in 
deciding, whether a given person should be entitled to end his life would then be vested 
with a discretion whether to grant the application or not.220 However, the court would 
be obliged to adjudicate on the worthwhileness of the person’s life with the rebuttable 
autonomy view firmly in mind.221  
 
B9. CONCLUSION 
 
We have now reached the end of our discussion and it is time to take stock of the 
argumentative landscape that has been traversed. During the course of this analysis, I 
                                        
219 It is important to mention that the High Court has the inherent power to regulate its own procedure. 
Thus a court adjudicating on such an application would be entitled to call for further evidence and 
information on any matter before it and which would be relevant to its decision. This is yet another 
reasons why such a procedural safeguard is eminently desirable.  
220 In light of the civil nature of the proceedings the court would make its decision in accordance with the 
civil standard of proof in South African law viz. on a balance of probabilities.  
221 The court’s decision to allow a person to end his life would be embodied in a court order authorising 
the person to end his life with the assistance of another person. 
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have attempted to do four principal things. First, I presented what I believe to be the 
strongest ethical argument for the permissibility of VAS and for the implementation of 
a permissive policy across society at large. Second, I examined the two major arguments 
against the positive case viz. the SLA and the SHA and found both arguments 
unpersuasive. In doing so, it was nevertheless conceded that valuable insights were 
raised by such arguments, specifically relating to the need for effective oversight and 
regulation. 
 
Third, I described the current ethico-legal attitude to VAS in a South African 
constitutional context and articulated how the positive case could be ‘translated’ into 
that context by an appeal to three rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights viz. the Right 
to Life, the Right to Human Dignity and the Right to Freedom and Security of 
the Person. Finally, I presented the two major methods that are available for reform 
in South Africa each appealing to the Legislature and the Judiciary respectively. I 
argued for the favourability of the latter as well as providing what I believe to be a 
robust set of safeguards viewed from both a procedural and substantive perspective. 
 
It should go without saying that despite the forcefulness with which I have argued for 
my position, the conclusions I have come to cannot be said to be either definite or 
certain. I do, however, believe them to be well-motivated. The quest for certainty in 
moral philosophy (or philosophy in general for that matter) is almost always a fool’s 
errand. The value of this particular ethical journey does not necessarily reside in the 
conclusions that have ultimately been drawn but rather in the questions themselves, 
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posed at the very beginning, and the process by which we attempted to courageously 
and honestly answer them. 
  
We began by considering the nature of death and the value of life. From there we 
attempted to draw some conclusions about how we ought to live. Such questions 
compelled us to confront and judge the character of our own lives as much as we 
confront and judge the lives of others. Such questions also forced us to re-examine 
some of the uncritical assumptions that sat at the heart of our attitudes toward those 
who wish to end their lives, as well as engage in serious and sober reflection about how 
we would want our own lives to end. Over a hundred years ago, Bertrand Russell wrote: 
 
Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions, 
since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake 
of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what 
is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance 
which closes the mind against speculation; but above all because, through the 
greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind is also rendered 
great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its 
highest good. (1912, p.161) 
 
Perhaps by engaging in this ethical discussion about the value of human life we too can 
expand our imagination and begin to speculate about the various ways in which human 
life might lack value and why death might not always be the curse it is often thought 
to be. Such speculations may birth an even greater potential, namely, the possibility of 
enlarging our empathy as well as empowering us to judge, if only with a little more 
wisdom and compassion, the lives of our fellow man. And is this not something worth 
aspiring to? Is this not, in itself, something that makes life worth living? 
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APPENDIX I: ELYSIAN FIELDS: A THANATOLOGICAL TAXONOMY 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Killing oneself 
(Bring about 
one’s death) 
Intentional 
Death 
(Suicide) 
Unassisted 
Suicide (US) 
 
Assisted 
Suicide (AS) 
 
Voluntary 
Assisted 
Suicide (VAS) 
Direct Voluntary 
Assisted Suicide 
(DVAS) 
Indirect Voluntary 
Assisted Suicide 
(INVAS) 
Physician 
Assisted Suicide 
(PAS) 
Non-Physician 
Assisted Suicide 
(NPAS) 
Non-Voluntary 
Assisted Death 
(NVAD) 
Unintentional 
Death 
Accidental 
Death 
 
Negligent 
Death 
 
Involuntary 
Assisted Death 
(IVAD) (Murder) 
US:  Ends life without assistance (via 
commission or omission) 
AS:  Ends her life with assistance (via 
commission or omission). 
VAS:  Currently capable of requesting 
assistance and requests assistance. 
NVAD: Currently incapable of requesting 
assistance. Decision to end life must 
be made by a surrogate. 
IVAD:  Currently capable of requesting 
assistance and either (i) does not 
request assistance, and/or (ii) does 
not wish to end life. 
DVAS:   Assistor, himself, ends the requester’s 
life.  
INVAS:  Assistor provides means to requester 
to end her life.  
PAS:   Assistor is a physician 
NPAS:   Assistor is not a physician. 
EUTHANASIA COVERS BOTH VOLUNTARY ASSISTED 
SUICIDE AND NON VOLUNTARY ASSISTED DEATH 
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APPENDIX II:  PRECEDENT APPLICATION TO HIGH COURT 
 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG 
 
CASE NO: 1234/2017 
 
In the Ex Parte application of: 
(For leave to obtain assistance to die) 
 
ADAM ACHERON        APPLICANT 
 
 
NOTICE OF MOTION 
 
KINDLY TAKE NOTICE that the Applicant intends making application to the above 
Honourable Court on 15 MARCH 2017 at 9h30, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be 
heard, for an order in the following terms:- 
 
1. The Applicant is declared to be:- 
 
1.1. Mentally competent; 
 
1.2. Of sound mind;  
 
1.3. Capable of free and voluntary action; and 
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1.4. Capable of appreciating the choice to end his life and the consequences thereof. 
 
2. It is declared that the Applicant has chosen to end his life without any undue 
influence, coercion or compulsion and has made his decision autonomously. 
 
3. The Applicant is, accordingly, granted leave to end his life with the assistance of Dr 
Charon Styx (‘Dr Styx’) by the administration (or provision of) a lethal agent at a 
date and time of the Applicant’s choosing. 
 
4. The Applicant is at liberty, any time after the granting of this order, to revoke his 
decision to end his life.  
 
5. Dr Styx is ordered to maintain a written record of the assistance provided to the 
Applicant, together with a copy of this order as part of his medical practice. 
 
TAKE NOTICE FURTHER that the founding affidavit of the Applicant as well as 
annexures thereto will be used in support of the application. 
 
KINDLY place the matter on the roll for hearing accordingly. 
 
DATED at JOHANNESBURG on the this 15th Day of MARCH 2017 
 
____________________________________ 
APPLICANT’S ATTORNEYS DETAILS 
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TO: The Registrar of the above Honourable Court 
Gauteng Local Division 
Johannesburg 
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG 
 
CASE NO: 1234/2017 
 
In the Ex Parte Application of: 
(For leave to obtain assistance to die) 
 
ADAM ACHERON        APPLICANT 
 
 
FOUNDING AFFIDAVIT 
 
I, the undersigned 
 
ADAM ACHERON 
 
do hereby make oath and state that:- 
 
1. The content of this affidavit is, unless the context indicates otherwise, within my 
personal knowledge and is both true and correct. 
 
THE APPLICANT 
 
2. I am an adult unmarried male with identity number 8615035041087, currently 
residing at 123 Elysian Fields, Johannesburg. 
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3. I am thirty one years old and unemployed. I am also a quadriplegic. 
 
4. A copy of my identity document is attached hereto marked as annexure “A”. 
 
PURPOSE OF APPLICATION 
 
5. The purpose of this application is to obtain the leave of the above Honourable Court 
to assist me to die with the assistance of a physician by the administration or 
provision of a lethal agent. 
 
6. In bringing this application I rely principally on the following constitutional rights:- 
 
6.1. The right to life (section 11 of the Constitution); 
 
6.2. The right to human dignity (section 10 of the Constitution); 
 
6.3. The right to freedom and security of the person (section 12 of the Constitution). 
 
JURISDICTION 
 
7. The above Honourable court has jurisdiction to entertain this application insofar as 
I am ordinarily resident within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. 
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AUTONOMY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORT 
 
8. I have brought this application freely and voluntarily and without any undue 
influence, coercion or compulsion. 
 
9. The decision to end my life has been one to which I have given serious and sombre 
consideration over a number of years. I acknowledge the gravity of the relief that I 
am seeking and am fully cognisant of what the consequences of such a request entail. 
 
10. Attached hereto is a supplementary affidavit together with the attached report 
prepared by Alexis Psyche (‘Psyche’), a clinical psychologist, marked as annexure 
“B”.  
 
11. As is apparent from the conclusion to annexure “B” as well as the report attached 
thereto, Psyche has concluded that in her professional opinion:- 
 
11.1. I do not suffer from any diagnosable psychopathology or personality disorder. 
 
11.2. I am mentally competent and of sound mind. 
 
11.3. I am fully capable of appreciating the consequence of my choice to die. 
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11.4. I have given serious and proper consideration to the reasons I wish to end my 
life and have made my decision based on a stable and considered assessment of 
my current condition and my future prospects. 
 
11.5. I am not being pressured or unduly influenced by my friends, family members 
and physicians to end my life. 
 
11.6.  She has no professional reservations about why I should not proceed with this 
application. 
 
12. It is important to point out that my personal interview with Psyche was conducted 
on 30 January 2017 which is not more than two months prior to the launching of this 
application.  
 
13. The complete account of her interview with me as well as her discussions with my 
friends, immediate family and treating physicians are set out in her affidavit and 
report. 
 
14. I must also emphasise that Psyche is not related to me in anyway and does not stand 
to benefit in any way, shape or form from my death. This is similarly confirmed in 
her affidavit and report. 
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REASONS WHY I WISH TO END MY LIFE222 
 
15. During or about January 2000 and when I was thirteen years old, I was involved in a 
motor vehicle collision that left me paralyzed from the neck down.  
 
16. I am capable of speaking, eating and moving my head. However, I require a 
mechanical respirator to breathe for me. Every other aspect of my life is attended to 
by my mother who has looked after me since the day that I was paralyzed.  
 
17. My mother looks after me in her home with the help of a nursing assistant. She 
herself is essentially a full time nurse. Not only does my mother cook for me, feed 
me and bathe me but she also dresses me and ensures that I am turned regularly so 
that I do not suffer from any bed sores. My mother and father divorced a few years 
before my car accident and I have no meaningful relationship with him as an adult. 
 
18. Although I was capable of graduating from high school through a specialised 
correspondence program, my dream to study at the tertiary level, graduate with a 
law degree and ultimately become a criminal prosecutor is not even remotely 
possible for me. 
 
19. My day to day existence consists of being stuck motionless in a room watching sports 
I will never play on television and reading magazines and books about people living 
                                        
222 I have adapted the facts presented here from the real case of quadriplegic Dan Crews, whose story was 
published online by the Journal Sentinel (Ghose, 2010, November 28).  
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active and exciting lives I will never lead. I am forced to use an electronic pointer to 
change the television stations. I have no further educational prospects, I am not 
employable and have no friends. Most painfully, I have no romantic prospects and 
the thought of growing older alone without any romantic companionship is both 
terrifying and loathsome.  
 
20. The most demeaning and degrading aspect of my paralyzed condition is the fact that 
absolutely nothing is under my control. I cannot walk outside in the sunshine, or 
feel what it would be like to walk hand in hand with someone I love through a park. 
I cannot play sports with friends or go see a movie when I want to. I cannot travel to 
the countries I see on television documentaries and in the travel magazines I read. I 
can never have sex. I am not able to dress myself or bathe myself.  
 
21. None of the things that make life dignified, rich or fulfilling are open to me. While I 
have a motorized wheelchair that allows me to travel outside on occasion, under the 
supervision of my mother, such outings serve only to remind me of all the things I 
will never be able to do, create or experience. The psychological and emotional 
agony is unbearable to me and so I prefer not to even use my wheelchair.  
 
22. While I could, in principle, end my life by ceasing to eat and drink I am terrified that 
such a death would be painful, degrading and drawn out. Not only am I terrified for 
myself when I contemplate such a death, but I could not wish to put my mother 
through such a horrific ordeal viz. having to watch her only son waste away 
agonizingly before her eyes. 
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23. The fact that I am not even capable of ending my life in a dignified way only 
exacerbates my feeling of helplessness and isolation. While I have been on anti-
depressants for a number of years they have done nothing to alleviate the 
psychological distress I go through on a daily basis. Every day that I wake up is 
another day that forces me to face all my limitations and be reminded of the things 
I will never be. However, given my immobility, there is simply no way for me to end 
my life without the assistance of another person. This inability to take my own life 
serves only to exacerbate my feeling of hopelessness and the utter lack of control 
over my own destiny. 
 
24. The chances of my condition improving in future are non-existent and there is no 
chance of me recovering from my paralysis given the state of contemporary medical 
science.  
 
MEDICAL EXAMINATION AND REPORT 
 
25. Supplementary affidavits by two independent physicians – Dr Rhadamanthus and 
Dr Cronus - are attached hereto marked as annexures “C1” and “C2” respectively. 
 
26. As can be seen from the content of these affidavits, both physicians:- 
 
26.1. Confirm and corroborate my diagnosis. 
 
26.2. Confirm and corroborate the prognosis for my medical condition. 
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26.3. Confirm and corroborate my description of the quality of my life. 
 
26.4. Confirm that I have been informed of all my treatment options (given the 
nature of my medical condition) and what the consequences are for me should 
I wish to pursue those respective treatment options. 
 
27. It is important to emphasise that I was examined by both physicians on 10 and 11 
February 2017 respectively, which was not more than two months prior to the 
launching of this application. The complete account of respective examinations is as 
well as the supporting documentation is set out fully in their respective affidavits. 
 
28. I must also emphasise that neither physician is related to me in anyway nor do either 
of them stand to benefit in any way, shape or form from my death. This is similarly 
confirmed in their respective affidavits. 
 
29. I have considered all the treatment options that have been put to me and I have 
decided to reject all of them. None of these treatment options would allow me to 
live the life I wish I could live. I want nothing more than to escape from the prison 
that my life has become over the past seventeen years. However, I wish to do so in a 
quiet, peaceful and dignified manner with my mother at my side.  
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CONSENTING PHYSICIAN 
 
30. I have managed to obtain the services of a physician who has agreed to assist me in 
ending my life – Dr Charon Styx (‘Styx’). 
 
31. A supplementary affidavit from Styx is attached hereto marked as annexure “D”. 
 
32. As can be seen from Styx’s supplementary affidavit:- 
 
32.1. He has explicitly consented to assist me to end my life. 
 
32.2. Has absolutely no personal relationship with me and is not one of the other two 
physicians who examined me. 
 
32.3. He does not stand to gain any benefit at all from my death. 
 
33. I would also refer to the supplementary affidavits of my mother which is attached 
hereto marked as annexure “E”. 
 
34. While my mother understandably does not wish me to end my life she accepts and 
respects my decision. She does not wish to see me in such emotional and 
psychological anguish. 
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35. I must point out, in the interest of full disclosure, that I have prepared a will, which 
is in the possession of my attorneys of record, in terms of which I name my mother 
as my sole beneficiary of my estate when I die. 
 
36. A copy of my will which contains a full accounting of my estate is attached hereto 
marked as annexure “F”. Finally, a supplementary affidavit by my attorney of record 
is attached hereto marked as annexure “G”. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
37. In conclusion, I humbly request that the above Honourable Court grant the relief as 
set out in the notice of motion to which this affidavit is attached. 
 
 
_____________________________ 
ADAM ACHERON 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE DEPONENT HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE 
KNOWS AND UNDERSTANDS THE CONTENTS OF THIS AFFIDAVIT, WHICH 
WAS SIGNED AND SWORN BEFORE ME AT _________________________ ON THIS 
THE __________ DAY OF _________________________________2017, THE 
REGULATIONS CONTAINED IN GOVERNMENT NOTICE NO 3619 OF 21 JULY 1972 
AND NO 1648 OF 19 AUGUST 1977 HAVING BEEN COMPLIED WITH. 
 
____________________________ 
COMMISSIONER OF OATHS 
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